













II. The Problem Outlined. 3.
III. A Discussion of the Views of Representative
Writers, as far as relevant to the present
Thesis
(a) Early writers and principal represent¬
atives of schools 9.
(b) Academic Psychologists 119.
(c) Writers on Philosophical Aspect .. .. 143.
(d) writers on Ethical Aspect 181.
(e) Writers on Aesthetic Aspect 201.
(f) Writers on Educational Aspect .. .. 206.
(g) Writers on Sociological Aspect .. .. 241.
■ (h) Freudians with special Viewpoints.. .. 259.
(i) Other Special Viewpoints 283.
IV. A Criticism of the Freudian Position that
Repression is a Function of Cultural Process.
(A) Historical:_
(i) Freudian Evolutionary Theories
Outlined 325.
(ii) (a). Development of position
that repressed unconscious had
little influence prior to the
setting up of the Kingship .. .. 367.
(b) Enunciation of theory of how
1




Discussion to show that the Freudian
Superego cannot be regarded as a









The title of this thesis is "The Relation of Repression to
Cultural Development." During his period of special study, the
writer has followed out various lines of thought derived from a
large number of sources, and now that the time has come to embody
his findings in thesis form, he discovers that it is quite
impossible to treat in full the subsections of the territory
which.he has attempted to explore. Before him are notes taken
from the works of perhaps a hundred and fifty authors, dealing
with subjects which, though relevant to the task undertaken,
could not be incorporated into thesis form without extending the
work to an inordinate length.
Notwithstanding, the writer has felt it necessary, in large
part, to follow the draft submitted at the beginning of the
period of study. The subject of repression is a vast one,
covering, if psychoanalysts are right, almost the whole field of
human activities. "Repression is civilisation", according to
Freud, and in addition the claim has been put forward that the
life of the primitive is also largely determined by repression.
Every aspect of contemporary life has been brought within the
orbit of Freudian theorising, and the student who sought to
discuss in detail eveiy view put forward by psychoanalysts would
require to follow them into the domain of all the mental
/.
sciences which they claim to have re-written.
Yet/
'•A. S. Brill, introduction to "Psychoanalysis of the Total
Personality", Franz Alexander, p.vi.
Yet the writer does not feel justified in leaving out of
account the main trends of current thought which are relevant
to the subject under discussion. Any true perspective of the
part played by repression in cultural development can only be
attained by seeing the phenomena of unconscious process in
their historical and sociological setting.
Since, however, the present thesis must be subject to the
limitations imposed upon the writer by considerations of space
and time, it will be necessary to summarise in large part the
lines of thought which have been pursued. Rigid selection
must also be made of the viewpoints of the numerous authors






What is the relation of repression to cultural development?
Freudians are quick to supply the answer: repression is the
supreme cause, the sine qua non, of cultural development: no
repression, no civilisation. PLepression is a function of all
cultural process; abrogate it, and the whole social fabric will
come tumbling down about our ears. The questioner is over¬
whelmed by a vast body of facts which purport to prove
indisputably that repression is civilisation and all that it
stands for.
Others again, including, indeed, Freudians themselves in
different mood, insist that repression is an evil of the first
magnitude, the enemy of rational thought, true morality, and
satisfying aesthetic experience. But challenge these detractors
of the institution of repression, and they will reveal every sign
of radical dissociation. Implicitly or explicitly, they are
harbouring divergent and irreconcilable views. The Freudian
evades the issue by advocating "neither too much nor too little
repression", and the champion of non-repressionist views will
probably declare that what he really means is that, in an
ideally constituted society, repression would .not be necessary.
But the problem of the relation of repression to cultural
development calls for a solution. The question has more than a
theoretical interest. Repressions to-day are being undermined
on a vast scale. Religion is declining, societal changes occur
with alarming rapidity, the moorings of old ways of life are
loosened/
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loosened. We are faced with dangers without parallel in the
history of our race.
Repressions are being undermined, indeed, partly on
account of the dissemination of psychoanalytical teaching.
If, as Freudians claim, the conservation and increase of
cultural values is dependent on repression, it would seem that
the human mind will soon lose all its higher syntheses of the
instinctual tendencies. The social implications are clear.
Civilisation would almost inevitably collapse if its individual
members were no longer subject to ethical and other controls.
If the Freudians are right, we are confronted by a very
grave crisis. In accordance with their theory, culture and
civilisation can only be saved by finding means of re-introducing
those sanctions which in the past led to the formation of
repressed sentiments. Even if they are wrong, the present
situation can in no way be regarded with equanimity. Unwin
has given his considered view as to the effect of releasing
the forces of repression. McDougall has stated his opinion
that the continuance of communal life has at all times
depended on the existence of taboos; whenever taboos have been
withdrawn, social decline has followed. If these writers are
accurate in their statements, the undermining of our system of
repressions, unless something is put in their place, must
inevitably lead to the destruction of our civilisation. We
consider it our task to make a contribution, however slight,
to the elucidation of the issues bound up with the question
of/
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of repression in relation to the life of contemporary society.
As a result of his line of study, the writer has become
increasingly aware that it is the duty of psychologists to prepare
a definite plan of action, by following which society may stave
off the disasters which appear to lie in its path, and, by the
careful application of a considered policy, place the social
organism on secure foundations.
Freud has at least convinced us of the significance of the
first years of life. If society is to save itself, it will be
necessary to apply science to the education of the pre-school
child. The present writer has had before him the works of a
large number of authors who offer guidance to parents in their
task of educating young children. We have been forced to the
opinion that the guidance offered, especially by Freudian writers,
must inevitably have a deleterious influence on the children
themselves, and later on the society of which they are to form
a part. The Freudian advice to parents runs as follows: "Be
careful not to cause too much repression, but remember that it is
equally dangerous to cause too little." Other writers suggest
that parents should not adopt a repressive attitude towards their
children, but, though they are right, they supply little but
negative guidance. Education can never be a matter of leaving
children alone; it must be an active process, and the successful
educator must have a very clear conception both of the nature of the
child and the ends to be realised, and of the means to realise these
ends. The alternative to repression is not "non-repressionr. The
task/
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task of educating the young child is both a science and an art.
A mere catalogue of "don'ts" is, in the main, what is supplied
for the guidance of parents by those writers who consider that
repression is an evil.
The position taken up in regard to child education by almost
all writers both of the Freudian and other schools, appears
unsatisfactory to a degree. We consider that the confusion is
partly due to inadequate conceptions of the nature of repression,
and partly to the fact that the problems in connection with
repression are not sufficiently envisaged in their wider setting.
We construe our present task as an attempt to bring into
perspective the issues bound up with the subject of repression.
Our plan is as follows: we shall first review the opinions of a
number of writers on the subject of the repressed unconscious.
This will take the form of a series of short articles dealing
with each writer in turn. In this section we shall adopt the
policy of criticising the views discussed as we proceed. we
realise that this method is unusual. The reason for following
it is that, in the present stage of the development of the
psychology of the unconscious, it would appear impossible
effectively to co-ordinate the views of writers in this field.
We have felt it desirable to set down the principal trends of
thought in connection with the psychology of repression and
sublimation. We have gathered together representative views on
these subjects, and in developing our thesis in the sequel, we
have/
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have kept before us as far as possible the findings of the
writers whose works we have studied. But it seemed impossible
to attempt the synthesisation of the many disparate views
presented. As we hope to show, few of the authors to whose
works we refer show any degree of consistency within their
writings. The disadvantage of following out this plan has been
that we have been involved in a certain amount of repetition.
Our main critique of the Freudian writers we later base on
a study of Franz Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Person¬
ality." In the case of writers who hold that repression is
undesirable, we have been content to confine our remarks within
the body of the articles in which their views are treated, in
some cases pointing out where they should be supplemented, and in
others suggesting that implicitly they are themselves in part
accepting the Freudian position that repression is a determinant
of cultural process.
We shall then concentrate on repression in its historical
aspect, particularly seeking to answei" the Freudian contention
that repression has been the principal determinant of cultural
development. We shall refer to works both on anthropology and
the history of civilisation. We shall endeavour to demonstrate
that the evidence is in the main against the Freudian view of
repression as having played a large part in cultural development.
We shall then proceed to examine closely the claim of the Freudians
as to the value of the superego as a determinant of cultural
process, using as a basis for discussion, as we have already
stated, Franz Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality".
At/
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At this stage we hope to have shown that, from the standpoint of
culture, repression should be regarded as a dysfunction rather
than a function of higher forms of mental process. 7Je shall then
seek to outline the conditions under which repressions may be
safely dispensed with in the education of young children. Our
position will be that the alternative to repression is control
of impulse after conscious deliberation. In this section,
having in mind the viewpoints of the writers discussed at an
earlier stage, we shall give our views as to how repressions are
built up in the human mind.
It is perhaps desirable to state here, ve.iy briefly, the
position which we have been constrained to take up as a result
of our study. It is this. The phenomena of repression may be
roughly classified into two types, primary repression, being the
removal from consciousness of sentiments of a highly painful
order, and what may be described as secondary repression, leading
to the construction of what Freudians call the superego. It
has appeared to us that this type of repression is more accurately
described as dissociation. It seems doubtful if the first type
of repression ever leads to sublimation. The second type, on the
surface at least, would seem to give rise to sublimations, but a
closer study of the facts suggests that the sublimation in question
would be better described in terms of sentiment formation.
III.
A Discussion of the Views of
Representative Writers as far as
relevant to the present Thesis..
Earlier Writers, and Principal Representatives of Schools.
Pierre Janet.
Discussion of position that repression is due to failure of the
method of applying rational thought. Bo theory of sublimation.
Comparison with Freud.
Morton Prince.
Discussion of dissociated personalities, with reference to the
superego doctrine.'
W. H. R. Rivers.
Discussion of theories that repression is biologically determined,
with the object of clarifying the issues in respect of Freudian
contention that repression, and therefore sublimation, has root in
biological process. Reference to absence of claim by Rivers that
repression leads to sublimation.
ffi. Trotter.
Place of the "Herd Instinct" in repression. How the superego
system is responsible for individuals continuing to be suggestible.
Discussion of possibility that repressed complexes took the place
of custom thought in controlling the individual in society.
Trotter's statement as to the conventionality of the Freudian
viewpoint. His criticism of the statistically normal.
0. J. Jung.
Writer's views given on the Jungian contribution to the discussion
of sublimation. Reference to symbolism. The pragmatic viewpoint
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Alfred Adler.
Adlerians claim that they are in a position so to modify the human
mind that cultural development may be facilitated. Views of
Adler compared with those of Freudians.
Sigmund Freud.
A discussion of the views of Professor Freud in relation to our
subject. in course of the article, the writer's own position as
to the nature of repression is enunciated. Attempt to show that
our discussion, from the genetical standpoint, resolves itself
into an examination of the superego system.
Pierre Janet.
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The writings of Janet are of more than historical interest.
He represents the starting point of Freudian teaching, but during
several decades, in the course of which Freudians have elaborated
the basic theories put forward by him towards the end of last
centuxy, Janet has consistently refused to follow the psycho¬
analytical movement in its later developments.
His main position may be summarised as follows: Mental
behaviour can be divided into two types. First, we have psychic
processes determined by the ordinaxy ends of conscious personality.
In this case, we use intelligence, careful observation of our
environment, and we respond rationally to objective situations as
they come before us. Secondly, there are the phenomena which may
be summed up as "neurotic". Behaviour of this kind is irrational,
automatic, and ill adapted. But the latter type of behaviour is
not limited to those suffering from nervous disorders, for it also
appears when the organism is under the influence of fatigue or in
emotional states.
Where Janet diverges from Freudian writers, or rather where
they diverge from him, is in regard to the relative influence on
conscious life of the two sets of phenomena. Whereas the Freudians
have practically eliminated rational process as a determinant
of behaviour, Janet insists that normality is ideally and in
actuality to be described in terms of purposiveness, the organism
striving to realise objectives which are accepted on account of
intrinsic worth. His "unconscious" includes relatively
unorganised/
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unorganised psychic systems which are nearer to the basic drives
of human nature than the sentiments and ideals formed at the con¬
ceptual level. His views can therefore be correlated with the
position taken up by Shand, McDougall, and others, while he seeks
to explain in terms of repression those irrational trends which
break through into normal consciousness in the form of morbid
process.
In his "Principles of psychotherapy", Janet emphasises the
place of the fixed idea as the determinant of abnormal psychic
reactions. Referring to the development of his views, he states:
"A fixed idea seemed dangerous because it was apart from the
personality, because it belonged to a group of phenomena over
i.
which the conscious will of the subject had no longer any control."
In this simple statement we have, as it were, the first and the
last word as to the place of repressed sentiments in the human
organism.
fhe aim of Janet's treatment was to bring about what he
2
.
describes as "a moral fumigation" by raising the fixed idea to the
conscious plane. "But Freud," he says, "transformed a clinical
observation and a therapeutic treatment with a definite and limited
3.
field of use, into an enormous system of medical philosophy."
He says, pertinently, "...this sexual interpretation of
nervous disorders is becoming the foundation of all pathology...
This conception is soon inordinately extended: all the facts of
normal/
''"The Principles of psychotherapy" p.40. *-Qp.cit., p.41.
3-
Op. cit., p. 41.
normal psychology must be explained in the same way because all
psychology rests on an aggrandised notion of the sexual instinct.
This same interpretation must be applied to legal diagnosis, to
the psychology of religion, to literature, to pedagogy, to
I.
aesthetics, and so on." He compares psychoanalysis with "French
Animal Magnetism" stating that it has "the same characteristics,
the vaulting ambition, the contagious fascination, the struggle
against orthodox science1," but he allows that it may "have given
a useful impulse to the study of psychology."
Janet accounts for repression, or dissociation as he would
say, as due to "the depression of nervous force" this depression
being"fostered by evexy unhappiness, by every form of inaction."
"How many people," he asks, "are ill because their lives are
vulgar, dismal and monotonous, because they have no hope, no
ambition, no aim in life, because no one is interested in them,
3.
because they can see no way ever to become interesting to anyone."
One feels that Janet has indeed given an adequate explanation of
most cases of nervous disorder. Contemporary man seems to
suffer far more from disorganised sentiments than from unorganised
complexes.
Janet finds that, in general, his patients "have very feeble
powers of reflection", their reflection being "always slow,
A.
difficult, and brief". Janet explains this fact as due to fatigue,
and though it is doubtful if his description is altogether
accurate/
Op. cit., p. 44-• Op• cit • , p. 45• Op• cit •, p.120.
*0p.cit., p.130.
accurate, we note his suggestion that "repression' is
characterised "by an absence of the capacity to apply rational
thought to the psychological difficulties which have arisen.
from whence is derived the energy which gives the fixed idea
its power of producing symptoms? Janet's answer is that 'eveiy
tendency, even the slowest, and the smallest, possesses a certain
charge without which it would be impossible to understand either
the suggestions that cause it to function or the excitement
caused by the arrest of this tendency!" He does not doubt the
possibility that a charged idea may have derived its energy from
more original tendencies, "but the new tendency once established,
this charge remains attached to it in a peimanent way." Thus the
human mind has within it impulsive ideas, and there are various
ways ox inhibiting any particular impulse. The one which is
specifically human is the result of what Janet describes as
"reflective deliberation". But should an impulse act (£ut/vitti
the control of higher tendencies, it becomes automatic, the
energy expressing itself independently of the accepted ends which
are the goals of the conscious self. The suggestion, indeed,
leads to the arousal of energised ideas which are not subject to
the control of the organised personality. To Janet it is
obvious that acts based upon psychic automata "have real faults;
not having been reflected upon, they are less assimilated to
the personality, they leave few memories, and do not serve to
build up/
1




Janet is here referring especially to the use of suggestion
as a therapeutic measure. This may be said to be his only
mention, in "The Principles of Psychotherapy", of anything which
might be regarded as "sublimation". But he clearly considers
that even in this case a diseased formation is being utilised in
order to mitigate the evils brought about by the disease's
existence. Where suggestion has been used to good effect, he
says, "suggestion has not accomplished any marvels, and has done
nothing which outstrips the normal human activity. But it has
made it possible to bring about acts which the patient's dis¬
integrating will could no longer perfom and thanks to these
methods, it has prepared the way for the restoration of the whole
2.
mind."
Indeed, his ideas on the formation of "sublimations" seem to
be in line with the doctrine of ordinary sentiment formation.
Sublimation would seem to be due, in-, certain cases, to excessive
energy which is aroused in connection with some ordinary activity.
He says: "In a normal activity, the energy mobilised for activating
the tendency is sufficient, and even over-abundant. After the
consummation of the action, the unused forces drain into other
tendencies, and play an important role in gaiety, the joy that
3.
crowns the act."
For our present purpose, interest is chiefly centred around
Janet's discussion of possible methods in dealing with an impulse
which meets with opposition in some particular setting. The
personality/
'Op.cit., p.144. J-Qp.cit., p.146. 30p.cit., p.171.
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personality is faced with a defeat, and according to Janet there
are three possible ways of dealing with the situation. One is
to make a further attempt to realise the end bound up with the
thwarted impulse. The second is to modify the impulse; and the
third is to give up making any attempt to realise the projected
end. "This last resolution," he says, "is extremely important.
It is resignation, accompanied with a feeling of necessity or
I.
impossibility." This is in many cases the best way of dealing
with a tendency the continued operation of which involves conflict.
It requires, however, a high level of psychic activity, and "when
an individual is somewhat weak constitutionally, or when he is
somewhat depressed by previous exhaustion, he becomes incapable of
2.
this difficult act."
One of the principal characteristics of the neurotic state is
that the individual is unable to appreciate the impossible, and
lacks the ability to be resigned. individuals who, for any reason,
are unable to deal rationally with an impulse involving conflict,
are "disposed to repeat endlessly the same insufficient and
incomplete act, and one may say that many of them spend their
3.
lives in indefinitely pushing against a wall."' But this is not dll.
The energy used up in fruitless effort leads to exhaustion which
makes even less possible controlling activity at the "conceptual
level". The activity becomes more and more degraded, and 'takes
on a lower form in the hierarchy of acts. It loses the character¬
istics/
''Op.cit., p. 191. ''Op.cit., p. 191. 3'0p.cit., p. 192.
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characteristics that belong to the level of reflective activity.
It is no longer co-ordinated with other acts; it no longer
has a part in that story of our life that we are constantly
formulating in our memory; it is no longer correctly assimil¬
ated to our personality. In short, it gradually takes the
strange aspect of an automatic act inspired by some occult
power, of an unreal act performed in a dream, or of a sub¬
conscious act. One observes all the intermediary stages between
the simply excited act that is consciously repeated, in 'getting
stuck', and the really subconscious act that continues indefin-
/.
itely, unknown to consciousness and memory."
To Janet, then, "repression" has as its immediate cause
the non-application of rational methods in dealing with an
impulse, the expression of which involves conflict. The
individual does not, as it were, accept "No" for an answer, and
despite a full assurance of the impossibility of securing a
particular gratification, still persists in an attempt to
realise the forbidden impulse in action. At first the individual
is quite conscious of the stupidity of his attempt, but gradually
the irrational striving becomes more and more automatic. The
energised idea still continues to operate, but now, despite the
utmost effort of will, the energy charge cannot be withdrawn.
It is very probable that Janet's description is capable of
explaining most of the facts of repression, and we shall see




Garnett in his ''instinct and Personality. " what we do not
discover in Janet is the theory of how impulses rendered auto¬
matic as a result of the non-application of reason in dealing
with emotional conflict, give rise to a variety of phenomena
which are to be equated with all that is of value in human life,
civilisation, and all forms of cultural response. if Janet had
formulated such a theory, it would have been necessaiy for him
to see in the "stupidity" referred to a function of cultural
process.
It will be worth while, during our subsequent discussion,
to keep in mind the position taken up by Janet regarding the
nature of repression. what would appear to be the simple facts
of repression easily become obscured when we are seeking to
follow the highly elaborated system of the Freudians. Students
who studied the subject of repression at the end of last century
would never for one moment have thought it likely that repression
lay at the base of all that we are accustomed to regard as higher
human values. Repression meant a diseased condition, and it
would have appeared clear that any society which was daily faced
with the necessity.. of wresting its living under natural con¬
ditions from an unsympathetic environment, could not have
afforded the luxury of neurosis. At best, repression seemed to
be a subtraction of the vital energies from life; at worst, a
process which had a disturbing influence on reactions at the
conscious level/
'■Of. "Instinct and personality",p.183.
^Reference is here made to the primitive who, according to
Freudians, is largely controlled by the unconscious.
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level. And moreover, just because of the sapping of energy
resulting from repression, the mind was necessarily deprived of
the force requisite for conceptual activities.
We realise, of course, that all conflict is not necessarily
at the conceptual level. Theoretically, repressions may be set
up before the mind has attained to that stage of development;
but it is safe to say that the majority of impulses are repressed
during the period when the child has attained a sufficiently high
level of development for dealing rationally with opposed
tendencies. There is one notable exception - that bound up with
the "normal" modes of cleanliness training. But in the main, it
is held that Janet's description of the conditions lying behind
the repression of impulses adequately accounts for the facts.
Further, it may be rightly argued that later Freudian
elaboration of the views held by psychologists in 1900 cannot
be dismissed as irrelevant when seeking an explanation of such
phenomena as class consciousness, refinement, and even the
motives which lead students into the philosophic field. Notwith¬
standing, the present writer would still insist that the utmost
significance must be placed on the viewpoints of the earlier
students of unconscious process, viz., that repression is due to
irrational modes of dealing with primitive impulses; and there¬
fore, if Freud is right in his assertions as to the part played
by repression in cultural development, existence must be regarded
as even queerer than is ordinarily supposed.
Freud re-writes the Book of Genesis in this vein: In the
beginning/
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beginning, God created man with a set of instinctual impulses,
but he also endowed him with the capacity for rational self-
control. Man was destined for a high degree of cultural
development, religious, artistic, intellectual, and moral. But
as a means of changing natural man into a being a little lower
than the angels, the Creator hit on this rather surprising
expedient. He ordained that progress should occur as a result
of man's losing self-control. Various instincts should be turned
into compulsive mechanisms, i.e., into unconscious processes, and
thereupon there should blossom forth in man's nature an interest
in religion, art, and philosophy.
It is suggested that when the Freudian view is stated in the
above terms, we cannot escape the impression that it has within it
an element of improbability. Janet tells us that repression is a
very unsatisfactory way of dealing with our instinctual impulses:
the Freudians appear to regard repression as an ingenious means by
which the soil of man's nature has been prepared for the growth of
"higher" impulses. Who is right, Janet or the Freudians? It is
the purpose of this thesis to supply the answer by showing
(a) that culture arose before repressions as we know them were set
up in the human mind, and (b) that much of what Freudians consider
is due to unconscious processes is capable of explanation along
the lines of ordinary sentiment formation.
.19.
Morton Prince.
For our present purpose, a brief reference need only be made
to the contribution made by Dr. prince to our understanding of the
nature of repression. It is felt that, while the student of the
unconscious must bear in mind the almost bizarre facts revealed
in Prince's famous case history of the Beauchamp family', there
seems little prospect, meantime, of relating the phenomena to
which he drew our attention to the present-day theory of
repression with its essential emphasis on the superego system.
The possibility of the existence of co-conscious person¬
alities, even in the normal mind, should not be left out of
account. It is indeed possible that the phenomena of the
latency period may be in part due to a break in the development
of the personality .owing to the essentially new conditions which
arise during the early years of school life. The earlier, purely
play responses, are no longer evoked to anything like the same
extent, especially when the child's time is occupied even during
the evenings by "home work". At the stage referred to, the
child's orientation is chiefly in relation to teachers and
companions outwith the home. Does the child's earlier person¬
ality tend to live on, revealing.'itself in unconscious phantasy
2.
and in the dream life? Hadfield refers to discarded personalities.
And again, if superego ideals do not fuse together into a
single system, it is quite possible that different personalities
3.
may be formed in the same individual. This might result from
incompatibility/
''Morton Prince, "The Dissociation of a personality".
3 J. A. Hadfield, "Psychology and Morals", p. 60.
3 S. Freud, "The Ego and the Id" p. 39.
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incompatibility between the viewpoints of parents, or in cases where
a child, during its early formative period, is placed for a time
under the care of other guardians.
As a definition of subconscious personality, Dr. Prince gives
the following: It is a condition where "complexes or subconscious
processes are constellated into a personal system manifesting a
secondary system of self-consciousness endowed with volition and
intelligence."
In the opinion of the present writer, the Freudian superego
would appear to have the characteristics of a subconscious person¬
ality. According to Freud the superego is highly organised, and is
certainly endowed with volition and at least a kind of intelligence.
Freud never commits himself to this view, but AlexanderJ as we shall
see, draws what appears to be the only logical conclusion in this
matter. It would appear desirable that the superego should be
recognised in the light of a subconscious personality. If the
normal person is at all times under the influence of a secondary
personality, it is just as well that he should know this, in order
that he may become aware that part of his personality is pathological.
Dr. prince holds the view that connation expresses itself in
three ways: in overt conduct and thoughts, in internal visceral
discharges, and in the inhibition of other impulses. It is this
last activity of connation which leads to repression, and in this
way there is set up the repressed unconscious. Prince's description
appears to fit in with the facts of dissociation rather than those
of repression proper. We note that Campbell Garnetl takes up a
similar/
'See section on Alexander, p. 398.
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similar view'. Prince's finding is doubtless based on a care¬
ful study of the facts. It is our view that the phenomena of
the Freudian superego system are in the normal person to be
explained far more in terms of dissociation than in terms of
repression.
Prince's theory, however, does not appear to account for
complexes of the type described by Rivers, nor in our view does
it account for Freud's primary repressions. It appears that
when a certain intensity of psychic pain is experienced by a human
being, the cause of the disturbance is withdrawn from conscious¬
ness. There seems reason to believe, however, that mostof what
Freud describes as repression is not brought about by the
mechanism to which we.have referred. To a large extent the
individual can still be said to have as his motive the avoidance
of psychic pain, but his response is by no means an ''unconscious
process". Difficulties are overcome by the use of dissociation
rather than repression. It would indeed appear that in many
cases the kind of repression brought abbut by the superego averts
the necessity for repression proper.
''A.C.Campbell Carnett, "instinct and Personality ' p.157 et seq.
w. H. R. Rivers.
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Dr. Rivers, like Janet, may be regarded as a classical
writer on the subject of the unconscious mind. For our
present purpose, however, reference to his work may be brief.
We shall pass over his biological theories of the origin
of repression. As far as can be seen, the position taken up
by him that repression has as its determinant the substitution
I.
of epicritie for protopathic sensibility is unsubstantiated.
The caterpillar-butterfly analogy also does not appear to have
any relevance to the facts.
Rivers, in any case, builds no theory of sublimation on
the basis of his biological theories.
Also, we are not-satisfied with his regarding repression as
biologically determined in that it is a means of removing
unbearable thoughts from the mind. Ho animal, as far as is
known, resorts to mechanism of this kind in repressing disagree¬
able experiences. Biologically, the possession of such a
mechanism would be fatal.
Rivers, however, has a theory of sublimation. Conflict,
he thinks, draws energy from the physical on to the psychic plane.
Even if this be the case, most conflicts are conscious, and if
they are responsible for increasing the energy available for
psychic uses, it may still be held that this energy is expended
in the formation of ordinary sentiments. Again, if a conflict
is/
'
"Instinct and the Unconscious" p.5.
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semi-conscious ox subconscious, it is in no way necessaxy bo
use the woxd "sublimation" bo descxibe the mebhod by which
addibional enexgy is xeleased fox bhe consbruebion of psychic
foxmabions. We suggesb bhab bhe enexgy may sbill be xegaxded as
leading bo bhe formation of oxdinaxy senbimenbs. In general,
Rivers' "sublimation", accoxding bo oux own theory, coxxesponds
bo whab appears bo be superego debexmined redirecbion of energy.
We shall elaborabe bhis conception in bhe sequel.
Bub Rivexs never appears bo consider bhab repression by bhe
dxasbie mebhod described by him leads bo sublimabion. As. he
says in connecbion wibh his famous case of clausbrophobia:
"Nature took no account of bhe effects of bhe suppression which
were bo torment bhe child and man for thirty years...Suppression
is a process of reaction bo bhe pleasures and pains which are
immediately present, and bakes no account of the more extended
experience wibh which it is bhe function of intelligence bo deal."
His viewpoint here is similar bo bhab of Janet. It would appear
bo have been obvious bo Rivers that repression of this type did
nob lead bo socially valuable redirecbion of instinctual energy.
Rivers believes bhab repression of bhe drastic type is due
bo the activities of the instinct of self-preservation. In our
view, he is probably right, if we re-interpret bhe self-preserv¬
ation concept in terms of the flight instinct, in its immobilis¬
ation aspect. If such reinberprebabion be permissible, it
appears/
'•"Instinct and bhe Unconscious" p.21.
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appears even more unlikely that sublimation is a consequence
of drastic repression.
Rivers' theory at this point appears to be in accordance
with the facts. We should, however, like to suggest an
amendment. Rivers, in enunciating the theory, is chiefly
thinking of painful situations objectively conditioned. In our
view, there are many highly painful experiences in children which
are intrapsychically conditioned (Freud's"secondary anxiety").
We refer chiefly to the "night terror". An experience of this
kind is far more "horrible" than anything experienced by day.
It is probable that Rivers' "repressed unconscious" is largely a
reservoir for experiences of this type.
To Rivers, then,, repression is not a function of cultural
process, but he certainly suggests that it may be a decided dys¬
function of such process. His claustrophobic patient could
hardly be described as being capable of entering fully into his
cultural heritage.
If, then, we would evaluate repression in relation to
cultural development, we would be led to the conclusion that the
conditions which give rise to repression of the type under dis¬
cussion are a dysfunction of cultural process. It would then
be relevant to enquire into the nature of these conditions, in
order to see if they are subject to control.
We would only here point out that Rivers'"repression" is
usually/
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usually the result, direct or indirect, of fear of someone or
something in the environment. Such fear, in our view, is
peculiar to civilisation, being the result of the means used
for enforcing discipline when civilisation as we know it was
set up in lynastic Egypt'.
Finally, the fear may also be determined in the developing
mind of a civilised individual by unpleasantly toned nocturnal
experiences. Into these there would appear to enter painful
feeling tone largely derived from "inferiority feelings". it
is probable that in lynastic Egypt, painful negative self-
feeling was soon developed as a concomitant of the fear of the
rulers.
But first and foremost, Rivers tells us, we must look to
the instinct of self-preservation if we would understand
repression. Supplemented by the conceptions of Trotter and
Janet, the theory under discussion probably supplies all that
is required to explain the phenomena of repression.
Repression is a process subject to control. If it is
considered desirable to dispense with repression, all we need
to do is to prevent the child feeling that his environment is
dangerous, avoid stimulating powerful negative self feeling, and
allow the child to solve his problems by the rational method.
We have made no reference to the doctrines of the child
analysts.- It is our view that, in an atmosphere of emotional
calm, any phylogenically determined conflict will, in course
of/
'
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of time} be resolved without the individual resorting to
repression. If the child is not subject to painful conflicts,
he will have no urge to take refuge in phantasy through the
construction of a superego.
.27.
W. Trotter.
Dr. Trotter wrote his book on "The instincts of the Herd
in Peace and War" shortly after the Great War. The theories
he enunciated_have been criticised from various angles. It
may well be that he is not sufficiently analytical in his
method, but in spite of any criticism to which he may be sub¬
jected, the work stands out as a forceful statement of the
relation in which the individual finds himself in respect of
public opinion.
It is not at all unlikely that Trotter is dealing with
secondary phenomena, and that human nature is not necessarily
in the grip of the "herd" to the extent he suggests. Be this
as it may, the student of repression must take into consider¬
ation the power of society over its individual members. It
may be said that Trotter's statements are to-day even truer
than at the time when they were written. life is becoming more
and more regimented. Departures from the norm are met with
powerful sanctions. It would almost appear that our mass attempt
to throw off the yoke of inner compulsion has merely had the
effect of increasing our sensitivity to the opinions of others
The student of biological process might even seek to establish a
relation between the two sets of phenomena. The Alternative to
"superego conditioned" individuality might well seem to be a
re-establishment of the old-time control of custom thought; in
dispensing with inner controls, we find ourselves being drawn
within/
''Of. J.Drever, "The Psychology of Education" p.113.
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within that vortex which must inevitably lead to a reversion
to the ways of the custom-haunted savage'.
Referring to the savage, Trotter tells us that "his whole
life, to its minutest detail, is ordained for him by the voice of
the herd, and he must not, under the most dreadful sanctions, step
outside its elaborate order. It does not matter to him that an
infringement of the code under his veiy eyes is not followed by
judgment, for with tribal suggestion so compactly organised, such
cases are in fact no difficulty, and do not trouble his belief,
just as in more civilised countries apparent instances of malignity
in the reigning deity are not found to be inconsistent with his
benevolence....Such must everywhere have been primitive human con¬
ditions, and upon them reason intrudes as an alien and hostile
power, disturbing the perfection of life, and causing an unending
2 .
series of conflicts."
The view above elaborated may not be without value when we
attempt to trace the development of human beings from the food-
gathering stage to that of civilisation. Whatever be the dis¬
advantages of the primitive type of mentality, it is at least
stable. There is no need for repression; no one persists in
the attempt to realise "private" impulses. Janet's ideal method
of dealing with conflict seems invariably realised. The
individual gives up desires which are not in accordance with the
mores of his tribe, as a matter of course. The renunciation is
final/
'"Of. C.E.M.Joad, "The Future of Morals" Chapter V.
"•"The Instincts of the Herd in peace and War" pp.34-35.
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final. It could be suggested that the savage is scarcely using
a high level of mentation in making such renunciations, but this
is doubtful. The primitive shows great intelligence in the
practical tasks of his life. It is not at all unlikely that he
clearly realises the folly of "kicking against the pricks" when
individual impulse comes into conflict with established order.
But should the primitive accept the doctrine of the "rights of
man" and seek to work out a societal system whereby each individ¬
ual may follow out his own inclinations, he is embarking on a
task the realisation of which strikes contemporary individuals
as a Utopian dream.
nevertheless, a study of the early days of Egyptian and
Minoan civilisation arouses in the mind a suspicion at once
staggering and fantastic. Gould it indeed have been that these
early folk succeeded, as they emerged from the pure food-gathering
stage and its accompanying mentality, in developing a social
order, a working arrangement by which the powers of the mind
were released, which was consistent with individuals living
together in primitive harmony? If such be the case, ive must
stand in awe before an outburst of racial genius beside which the
attainments of the later Greeks must be regarded as the work of
mere amateurs in societal organisation^'
Trotter appears to look forward to a time when the herd
instinct might be used as a sanction for rational thought. 'If
rationality"/
xSee section on Egypt and Crete, thesis page 367 et seq.
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rationality"j he says, "were once to become really respectable,
if we feared the entertaining of an unverifiable opinion with the
warmth with which we fear using the wrong implement at the dinner
table, if the thought of holding a prejudice disgusted us as does
a foul disease, then the dangers of man's suggestibility would be
i.
turned into advantages." But he also says: "Again, scepticism
may detect the nature of the herd suggestion and deprive it of its
a.
compelling force." It is suggested that as soon as "rationality"
got under way, it would not be long before the guns of herd
suggestion were effectively spiked, and there is a possibility
that the newly discovered "individuality" would hold dangers as
great, or greater than, those bound up with the acceptance of
3.
herd opinion.
Yet Trotter is right in detecting a high degree of
insecurity in our present mental organisation. Our confidence
in mere mechanism, whether it be the product of repression or of
excessive suggestibility, causes the individual to be prone to
the acceptance of illusion which may well bring our civilisation
to irretrievable disaster. If Stanley Casson be right, in his
A.
"Progress and Catastrophe", intelligent Romans who lived during the
last stages of the decline of the Roman Empire, were completely
unconscious of the doom which was fast overtaking "Bheir
civilisation/
'"Op.cit., p.45. a,0p.cit., p.52.
3-lTote: Nevertheless, the writer is confident that rational
thought may be trusted if the application is sufficiently
thorough.
''•Stanley Casson, "Progress and Catastrophe" Chapter 13.
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civilisation. There is a possibility that contemporary man
is equally blind to the dangers which await him.
Referring to the work of Freud, Trotter made an observation
which in recent decades has gained increasing significance. "To
those who approach Freud's work solely by the path of medicine,
the idea that it can give anyone the feeling of a certain con¬
ventionality of standard and outlook, and of a certain over-
estimation of the objectivity of man's moral values, will seem
perhaps mainly absurd. That this is an impression which I have
not been able altogether to escape, I record with a good deal of
hesitation and diffidence, and without any wish to lay stress
I,
upon it." Those who have read Professor Freud's idyllic
reference to the virtues of the superego as set down in "The
a.
Ego and the Id", can have little doubt that Trotter was
essentially right in the suspicion which he held.
We also discover in Trotter a critic of the Freudian con¬
ception of the "normal" to which the patient is to be restored.
He says bluntly: "The statistically normal mind can be regarded
only as a mind which has responded in the usual way to the
moulding and deforming influence of its environment - that is,
3.
to human standards of discipline, taste, and morality." And,
N
he might have added, a proneness to suggestibility which appears
to be inherent in the normal mind. To Trotter, normality is a
resultant of processes which at once mould and deform the psychic
apparatus/
Op. cit., p. 78. J'"The Ego and the Id" pp.47 and 49.
3- Op. cit. , p. 79.
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apparatus of the young child. He is deeply conscious that there
is no safety in the acceptance of mere normality as our guide.
Somehow, we must find a method of adopting a thoroughgoing
critical attitude to the psychological bases of our present-day
mentalities. Otherwise, we shall not be in a position to rise
to that "conscious direction of man's destiny" which "is plainly
indicated by nature as the only mechanism by which the social
life of so complex an animal can be guaranteed against disaster
I.
and brought to yield its full possibilities."
Speaking of Freudian resistances, Trotter makes the
following superlatively valuable statement: "It is interesting
to notice that in discussing the mechanism of psychoanalysis in
liberating the abnormal patient from his symptoms, Freud
repeatedly lays stress on the fact that the efficient factor in
the process is not the actual introduction of the suppressed
experience into the conscious field, but the overcoming of the
resistance to such an endeavour. I have attempted to show that
these resistances or counter impulses are of environmental origin,
and owe their strength to the specific sensitiveness of the
2.
gregarious mind."
We may speculate with a fair degree of certainty on what
N
would have been Trotter's views on sublimation had he discussed
the subject. We should have had from him no complacent utter¬
ances on the secondary advantages of disease. To him,
suggestibility/
''Op.cit., p.162. Op.cit., p.90-91.
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suggestibility, and whatever forces were proved to lie at its
root, would have been an evil which was in no way mitigated by
claims for recognition as being indirectly responsible for the
"highest" in human life. Any such claimant for respectability
would have been viewed by him as a wolf in sheep's clothing, to
be at once disrobed of its pretensions and recognised for what
it was, an enemy within the gate of the City of Mansoul.
Trotter, we believe, has indicated for us the prime cause
of those conflicts which lead to repression. The parent has to
hand a potent weapon which, if not applied with the greatest
discrimination and in the light of a full objective knowledge of
the personality of the child, will inevitably involve the minds
of the young in painful conflicts this leading to (a) primary
repressions, (b) to that extraordinarily elaborate and fantastic
psychic superstructure which Freud describes as the superego.
On the other hand, if the parent does not apply the weapon of
prestige suggestion to the child, he will not resort to
repression and phantasy weaving, and the "parent" will not be
set up within the child. The child will retain his critical
faculties, and as an adult, will be only slightly amenable to
public opinion, his propensities for scepticism leading him to
detect the irrational nature of morality, national ideals, and
ill-based ideologies of all kinds.
Even intelligently directed public opinion might prove
ineffective in controlling him. What is for the good of the
community, or of posterity, is not necessarily in line with the
private/
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private interests of the individual. The task of the educator
who departs from traditional methods is anything but simple, and
also the path of a society which trains up its children
intelligently will be strewn with difficulties. Repression is
an evil, but lack of repression may well be a greater evil unless
humanity realises the full implications of departures from the




We shall now turn to a consideration of the views of Dr.
C. J. Jung, in relation to the subject of repression and sub¬
limation. The sub-title of his "Psychology of the Unconscious"
is, "A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the
Libido." ■ We may take it, then, that Dr. Jung's special concern
is the theory of sublimation. We do not, however, propose here
to follow in detail the various standpoints which he puts forward.
The impression given is that Jungian psychology is "in the air".
Freud accuses him of being in full flight from the basic findings
of psychoanalysis'. There may be more or less truth in Freud's
charge, and of course there is always a possibility that Freudian
psychologjr is indeed inadequate for the task of interpreting the
facts revealed through psychoanalysis. Most writers at least
admit that Jung has done a considerable service in stressing
certain aspects of Freudian theory, and here and there providing
a corrective, especially in respect of what they regard as the
Freudian preoccupation with sex.
In the view of the present writer, Jung has thrown out many
valuable suggestions which may form a basis for further research,
nevertheless, one feels that the Freudian interpretation of the
repressed unconscious is in essentials accurate. Our principal
disagreement with the Freudian position is that it seems to over¬
emphasise the part played by the facts which it has discovered,
in relation to the activities of the entire psyche as we find it
at/
''S.Freud, "An Autobiographical Study" p.96.
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at work in contemporary individuals, and as far as can be
gathered from a study of peoples living in other ages, the
Freudian unconscious never has played the part which is claimed
for it.
Jung does, indeed, provide us with a valuable contribution
in tracing out the place of symbolism in the process of "sublim¬
ation", although it would probably be better to state that the
value of his work chiefly lies in demonstrating how symbolisation
provides a link between the instinctual tendencies and the types
of interests which mankind follows'. What he has really emphasised
is the part played by symbolism in sentiment-formation. His con¬
ception of the libido as a kind of elan vital has enabled him to
form a more or less systematic theory of the development of senti¬
ments, and possibly on account of the very lack of differentiation
in the conception of the libido, he has rendered more easy the path
of those who would relate ultimate values to the instinctual basis
of human life.
nevertheless, it appears to the writer that he has merely
thrown a veil over the biological tendencies clearly indicated to
exist in man by McDougall, Drever, and others, and that therefore
his system suffers from a lack of definiteness. There is even
reason to suppose that the Jungian psychology is little more than
a "polite" version of Freudianism, suffering from most of its
defects and having few virtues to compensate for its departure
from psychoanalysis proper.
Speaking/
We shall again refer to this point in our section on Otto
■^ankis "Trauma of Birth" p. 339 et seq.
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Speaking of sublimation, Jung tells us that if instinctual
energy is diverted from "the sexual territory into associated
I.
functions.. .without injury to the adaptation of the individual"
we have sublimation. But he gives little attention to what
constitutes "injury to the adaptation of the individual". Here,
indeed, lies the entire crux of the problems raised by recent
study of the unconscious. Jung inveighs against repression as
A .
harmful. He is apparently quite unconscious that as far as his
own system goes, the factors leading to repression have not been
submitted to that keen scrutiny without which they will continue
to exert their baneful influence. When the facts are rightly
envisaged, it is our contention that repression, and therefore
sublimation, is at all times harmful from the standpoint of the
development of the total personality.
Like the Freudians, Jung sees in repression a distinct
function in relation to cultural development. He says, for
instance; "The resistance against sexuality aims, therefore, at
preventing the sexual act; it also seeks to crowd the libido
3.
away from the sexual function." He does not, indeed, consider
that the young child has a specifically incestuous attachment to
the parents. Such an attachment, however, takes place later,
\
and when the attachment is forbidden, the energy is diverted along
the lines of pregenital interests, which are themselves largely
directed/
"Psychology of the Unconscious" p.50- 'Op.cit., p.332.
" Op.cit. , p. 171.
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directed towards the parents. It is, of course, very doubtful
if the distinction is worth making. Jung would appear to wish
to minimise the part played in early life by the Oedipus com¬
plex. The young child is not faced with the bitter problems
bound up with an incestuous attachment. But if the Jungian
theory teaches the non-sexuality of the child in its earlier
stages, the phenomena which it describes as emanating from the
unconscious as a result of incest prohibition are essentially
the same as those which enter into the Freudian system.
At the end of Jung's "Psychology and Religion" the following
statement occurs: "The thing that cures a neurosis must be as
convincing as the neurosis; and since the latter is only too
real, the helpful experience must be of equal reality. It must
I.
be a very real illusion, if you want to put it pessimistically."
Since to Jung the sole foundation of truth is pragmatic, being
a.
that which "helps 3?"ou to live", one feels that he might have
difficulty in convincing his patients as to the difference between
"mere" illusion and "real" illusion. Jung appears never to have
discovered that the only cure for a neurosis is truth of a very
obvious order, the truth that has finality. At the present day,
Freudians have become entangled within their superego system.
They are at any rate struggling with something which is very
»
real. Jung has not followed the Freudian logic into its
present Slough of Despond. He would seem to prefer the
pleasures/
'
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pleasures of the imagination to engaging in the arduous task
of discovering a way to the Celestial City. The present writer
believes that the truth is to be found somewhere within the
slotigh to which we have referred.
We also find Jung saying: "If the repressed tendencies, the
shadow as I call them, were decidedly evil, there would be no
I.
problem whatever." If this were the case, repression, according
to Jung, would be wholly desirable. "There would be no problem
whatever." Jung would appear to be completely oblivious to the
fact that if the repressed tendencies were "decidedly evil" there
would be all the more reason why they should be controlled by
conscious purpose rather than by an act of repression. Experience
shows that a repressed impulse tends to do far more harm than it
2.
would do if subject t.o conscious control, and moreover Jung
appears to have no realisation that repression is something which
occurs in the sensitive mind of a young child. It is senseless
and unethical to speak of a child as having evil tendencies, and
it is equally wrong and psychologically futile to adopt an atti¬
tude of blame towards a child for being the possessor of a
tendency. It would seem useless, therefore, to expect from
Jung any enlightenment on the problem which we have before us.
The task of a psychologist is not to distinguish between the
relative significance of sets of illusions. What are the facts
in regard to the process of repression? Jung appears to be
almo st /
'• "Psychology and Religion" p.94.
3- Of. m. Blake's, poem on "Christian Forbearance".
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almost unaware that repression exists. There may be
differences of opinion as to the universality of repression and
also regarding the adequacy of the Freudian description of the
repressed unconscious. But repression is a very real process,
occurring in the human mind at definite times and under definite
conditions. We feel that any real development in the psychol¬
ogical field will come as a result of a determined effort to
study, not the symbol, but that which is symbolised.
Alfred Adler. .41.
The late Professor Adler had the distinction of developing
a system of psychology without reference to the concept of
repression, or to the idea of sublimation. We cannot, however,
merely dismiss his work as irrelevant in the elucidation of the
problems which have occupied the attention of the writer. Adler,
in the main, is dealing with facts which he himself observed
when forming contacts with individuals who represent the viewpoint
of our Western civilisation. The fact that societies have every¬
where sprung up with the aim of practising "Individual Psychology"
sufficiently demonstrates that what he describes is true to the
experience of a vast number of people.
It is often complained that Adler is superficial, and that
his followers betray an. essentially uncritical attitude to the
psychological system which they have embraced. in our view,
this criticism is just. The mind does not reveal its secrets
save as the result of prolonged and scientific introspection.
The average Adlerian, we suggest, has no more claim to be
regarded as scientific than those naive members of the public
who imagine that they are qualified to undertake what they
describe as spiritualistic "research".
"V
It would, indeed, appear that Adler himself was in the grip
of his own mechanisms, rather than being guided by intelligence,
in developing his psychological scheme; how else could he allow
Phillipe Mairet, in his introduction to 'The Science of living",
to make the following statement: "If the occidental world is
not/
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not too far gone to make use of his (Adler's) service, he may
/.
well come to be known as the Confucius of the West."
in the same introduction, we read; "What Adler proposes
is not the universal study of psychopathology but the practical
reform of society and culture in accordance with the positive
and scientific psychology to which he has contributed the first
principles....A positive psychology", Mairet continues, "useful
for human life, cannot be derived from psychic phenomena alone,
still less from pathological manifestations. It requires also
a regulative principle, and Adler has not shrunk from this
necessity by recognising, as if it were of absolute metaphysical
validity, the logic of our communal life in the world....The
ideal, or rather normal, attitude to society, is an unstrained
and unconsidered assumption of human equality, unchanged by any
2.
inequalities of position."
The Adlerians, therefore, claim that they have to hand a
psychology which adequately explains the workings of the human
mind, and that by its application they are in a position to
institute those reforms in our psychical make-up which are
essential if we vrould attain to rationality of thought and
outlook. Although, indeed, the followers of this^school make
slight use of the conception of repression, it is obvious that
they claim to have discovered a panacea which will release
mankind from the evils arising through the distorting influence
of complexes on the conscious life. Moreover, the Adlerian
system/
''"The Science of Living" p.30. 2'0p.cit., p.l4--l6.
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system has also implicitly a doctrine of sublimation. The
tendency towards superiority brought into activity by what we
might describe as the negative irritant of inferiority feelings
the source of which is no longer conscious in adult life, provides
the energy for cultural development in its narrower and wider
senses.
The Adlerian system which, in our view, has an essential
similarity to Freudian psychoanalysis, despite the fact that
both parties would emphatically disclaim relationship, has
within it many incompatible viewpoints. Like the Freudians,
the Adlerians attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, being
unaware of the real premises on which the.y base their conclusions.
We thus find them stressing the necessity for the development of
''communal feeling". It is in this respect that man tends to be
deficient. We even find them insisting on the essential "goodness"
of human nature. "We ought not to regard," says Mairet, "the
communal feeling as something to be created with difficulty. It
is as natural and inherent as egoism itself, and indeed as a
principle of life it has priority. We have not to create, but
only to liberate it where it is repressed. It is the saving
I.
principle of life as we experience it."
We find ourselves on even more Utopian heights when we
discover that in Viennese education where, according to Mairet,
the Adlerian doctrine of salvation is being applied, "abolition





found to liberate the energy of both pupils and teachers.1'
And also, we read: 'Our conception of normal behaviour should be
to allow the world or society or the person with whom we are con¬
fronted, to be somehow in the right equally with ourselves. We
should not depreciate either ourselves or our environment, but
assuming that each is one half in the right, affirm the reality
of ourselves and others equally." We are almost conscious of
the brush of paracletan wings when we discover that the "practice
of Individual Psychology demands that its students should submit
themselves to mutual scrutiny, each one to be estimated by the
3.
other as a whole personality."
By the magic of Adlerian psychology-cum-philosophy,
repressions are to be "swept from the face of the earth. "All
feelings of innate suspicion, of hostility, of an undefined
caution, and desire for some concealment, when such feelings
affect the individual in social relations generally, evince the
same tendency to withdraw from reality which inhibits self-
I-*.
affirmation."
The followers of the Adlerian school, by a proper use of
psychological method, are enabled to submit their whole natures
to the scrutiny of an enlightened public opinion. dBut when we
read on, in the passage above quoted, our suspicions as to the
efficacy of the system are aroused. "The ideal, ' we read, 'or
rather/
'Op.cit., p. 29. 3 0p.cit., p. 22. 3-Op.cit., p. 29.
*-Op.cit. , p. 16.
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rather normal, attitude to society is an unstrained and unconsidered
assumption of human equality, unchanged by any inequalities of
position." We can only remark, from what we know of human
nature, that, although individuals belonging to the favoured
classes may imagine that their attitude towards those in the
lower strata of society is objective, it is certain that the lower
classes could never be described as having "an unstrained and
unconsidered assumption of human equality, unchanged by any
I.
inequalities of position." Mairet's "normal" is impossible in
society as at present constituted.
Adler's psychological system is, in fact, just as much a
psychology of the unconscious as Freudian doctrine. It is
indeed the psychology - of a "complex" and, stripped of its
trappings, it reveals a single principle. At times, Adler
speaks of his "complex" as a disease formation. But in his
role of doctor, he at best provides a palliative, a means of
alleviating to. some extent the evils which spring from the
disease, both in the individual and in society. like the
Freudians, he justifies the existence of his complex on
biological grounds, while at the same time giving full recog¬
nition to any advantages which might accrue from the irration¬
ally determined strivings of the impulse towards what is some¬
times described as "ego-maximation". He is indeed committed to




formula, and in the last resort he is unable to envisage a
psychological organisation in which there is an absence of
repressed inferiority feelings, with the resultant irrational
striving towards self-affirmation as a means of balancing the
"negative irritant".
Man, as Adler sees him, is mechanism, and all that is
left for consciousness to do is so to manipulate things that
the mechanism functions in a way consistent with the smooth
workings of the social organisation. As in the case of
Ereudianism, the underlying philosophy is that of the individual¬
ists of last century, who believed that the maximum social good
would accrue from allowing each individualr-sn-ope- to pursue his
own private ends. The popularity of the system can easily be
understood.
Adler's viewpoint is essentially static and conservative,
but he claims that it is dynamic and progressive. It is
mechanistic, but he insists that it is hormic, that it incor¬
porates within itself the principle of biological purposiveness.
in his "Education of Children" he states: "The fundamental
fact in human development is the dynamic and purposive striving
of the psyche. The child, from its earliest infancy, is engaged
in a constant struggle to develop, and this struggle is in
accordance with an unconsciously formed but ever-present goal - a
vision of greatness, perfection, and superiority. This struggle,
this goal-forming activity, reflects, of course, the peculiarly
human/
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human faculty of thinking and of imagining, and it dominates
all our specific acts throughout life. It dominates even our
thoughts, for we do not think objectively but in accordance
with the goal and style of life we have formed....In considering
the construction of a personality, the chief defect to be noted »
is that its unity, its particular style and goal, is not built
upon objective reality, but upon the subjective view the individual
takes of the facts of life. A conception, a view of a fact, is
never the fact itself, and it is for this reason that human beings,
all of whom live in the same world of facts, mould themselves
differently. Each one organises himself according to his own
personal view of things, and some views are more sound and some
views are less sound.- We must always reckon with these
individual mistakes and failures in the development of a human
being. Especially must we reckon with the misinterpretations
made in early childhood, for these dominate the subsequent
i.
course of our existence."
And we read in "The Science of living": "When the proto¬
type - that early personality which embodies the goal - is formed,
the line of direction is established and the individual becomes
definitely oriented. It is this fact which enable^ us to predict
what will happen later in life. The individual's apperceptions
are from then on bound to fall into a groove established by the
line of direction. The child will not perceive given situations
as they actually exist, but according to a personal scheme of
apperception/
"The Education of Children" p.6.
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apperception - that is to say, he will perceive situations under
J.
the prejudice of his own interests."
Adler has here given us a picture of human personality as he
sees it. His views correlate with the Freudians who find that
the principal motives which determine our life ends are unconscious.
He tells us that we are essentially unobjective; we do not deal
with facts as they are, but live in our own little individual
world. Offset our main system of motivation by the development
of a little social feeling, and we still are and must remain
individualistic to the core. We form our life plan, as we build
up the superego, in the years of early infancy, at a time presum¬
ably, when we are no more competent to form an adequate conception
of what life should be than we are to draw up the plans of our
future residence.
Even the young child to whom we refer is hardly rational in
the formation of his immediate goals. He is obsessed not with
the idea of positive achievement, but with the desire to assuage
a feeling of inferiority. "We can imagine," says Adler, "how the
process takes place. A child, being weak, feels inferior and
finds itself in a situation which it cannot bear. Hence it
strives to develop along a line of direction fixed by the goal
*• ^
which it chooses for itself."
And, moreover, it is uncertain, according to Adler's pre¬
suppositions, how far even the young child can be regarded as
using conscious judgment in elaborating his goal. "In medicine,"
he/
Op. cit., p. 35« 2':,lhe Science of living" p. 33.
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he says, "we see all organs striving to develop towards definite
goals. They have definite forms which they achieve upon
maturity. Moreover, in cases where there are organic defects,
we always find nature making special efforts to overcome the
deficiency, or else to compensate for it by developing another
organ to take over the function of the defective one...low the
movement of the psyche is analogous to the movement of organic
I.
life."
We may take it, then, that the child, in developing his
compensating goal, is under the influence of motives similar
to those by which nature makes blind attempts to compensate for
organ inferiority. There is a suggestion that even at the stage
when the life goals are formed, the child is essentially an
automaton in the grip of circumstances over which he has no
control. If we are to consider that the Adlerian striving for
superiority, as incorporated in what he asserts is the normal
personality, is a desirable institution in psychic life, we are
forced to the conclusion that the biological striving, as
revealed in the infant, is equipped with remarkable insight and
prevision, both as to the type of society and the kind of
individual which is to result from the life-goals formed under
its domination.
We have already quoted Adler as saying: "This struggle,
this goal-forming activity, reflects of course the peculiarly
human faculty of thinking and of imagining," We suggest that
the/
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the child's construction of a goal in infancy, under the stress
of a mere biological urge, and subject to the essential limit¬
ations of its restricted viewpoint, is far removed from anything
we should regard as "peculiarly human". Whatever the child does
construct will be merely infantile, supplying immediate antidotes
for irrationally conditioned inferiority feelings. Why, may we
ask, does not Adler see the entire influence of the hidden goals
which he claims to have discovered in human beings, as a purely
morbid phenomenon? Moreover, why does he fail to realise that
there must be factors which prevent the mature individual from
revising the aims incorporated in his life system?
Instead of stating the obvious, that his "inferiority"
mechanism is irrational to the core, he calmly accepts the
complex which he has discovered as a part of "normal" human
nature, only dilating 011 the evils of its excessive development,
and seeking by therapeutic means to modify the infantile goals
when these happen to be non-adaptive. Lest he should lead his
followers to perceive the obvious, he side-tracks the issue by
taking refuge in principles of biological necessity. His
solution for man's ills is to develop social feeling alongside
of the necessary and inevitable superiority striving, being
seemingly oblivious to the fact that, according to his premises,
he is encouraging the development of dissociation phenomena, an
activity scarcely creditable in a psj^chopathologist who has
assumed the role of the Western Confucius.
in/
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In our view, however, the Adlerian unconscious goal, though
probably existent to some extent in all, does not in the normal
have the degree of influence which he suggests. To use a
popular phrase, our "ego-maximation" tendencies are usually
"taken with a pinch of salt", and alongside of our irrational
superiority strivings, we build up sentiments which are truly
adaptive. Our main life purposes are formed at the conceptual
level, chiefly during adolescence, and although it is true that
the superiority tendency which Adler describes influences us to
a greater or less extent in formulating our life goal, we are
usually conscious that it represents an interference factor, to
be partially accepted maybe, but at all times limited in its
influence on the formulation of our life plan.
Adler tells us that the striving for superiority has a
biological root. Indeed, "human nature is tied up with the
development of the striving for superiority." Moreover, he says,
"there are certain functional abilities which can be developed
further, and it is in this possibility of further development that
we see the biological root of the striving for superiority, and the
whole source of the psychological unfolding. And, as far as we
can see, this dynamic urge to assert oneself under all circum-
\
stances is common both to children and adults. There is no way
of exterminating it. Human nature does not tolerate permanent
submission. Humanity has even overthrown its gods. The feeling
of degradation and depreciation, the mood of uncertainty and of
inferiority/
I.
''"The Education of Children" p.36
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inferiority, always gives rise to a desire for reaching a higher
'
I .
level in order to obtain compensation and completeness." We
take this quotation from a chapter headed, "The Striving for
Superiority and its Educational Significance."
We would pass two remarks. first, throughout man's long
period of development prior to civilisation, we have little
evidence that the striving for superiority played a considerable
part in primitive life. For milleniums, we are told, our
ancestors would continue the even tenor of their way without
making even the slightest improvement in their implements; the
present-day Australian aborigine does not fit in with Adder's
description. Whenever his complexes show signs of disturbing
the surface layers of his mind, he quickly performs the necessary
x
rites for restoring internal equilibrium.
Secondly, according to Adler it would be, we imagine, a
mistake of the first magnitude to remove from the child's life
the causes of inferiority feeling, since by so doing we should
destroy that with which is tied up the development of the human
being. in the main, however, this contingency is improbable,
since nature sees to it that children are given a reasonable dose
of negative self-feeling, for, as Adler says, "all children have
\
an inherent feeling of inferiority which stimulates the imagination
and incites attempts to dissipate the psychological sense of
inferiority/
"The Education of Children" p.37.
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inferiority by bettering the situation."
It is the duty of educators not to exaggerate the sense of
inferiority. The child must not be rendered super-sensitive,
otherwise he will become nervous or eccentric, and may become
irresponsible and criminal. Nevertheless, the dutiful educator,
if he accepts Adler's teaching, will be ready to assist nature
by deepening the sense of inferiority in the child if, perchance,
"our mete nurse" has neglected, for any reason, to equip the
child with the average amount of inferiority feeling.
We stated above that there is an essential similarity
between the Adlerian and the Freudian viewpoints. When we come
to discuss Freudian teaching in our criticism of the views of
Franz Alexander, in "The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality",
we shall discover an almost tiresome repetition of Adlerian
psychologising. We shall find that Alexander, as a typical
Freudian, brings us to the point of seeing that the superego
"complex" is irrational. Its virtues, however, will be duly
stressed; it will be accounted the mainspring of all cultural
development, and when we are about to enquire as to the ethical
significance of what, to an unbiassed mind, is a product of
crazydom, when we are on the point of bringing ourselves to face
the essential fact which has been revealed, viz., that our present
methods of child training are directly or indirectly responsible
for the conditions which cause the young child to construct an
irrational/
''"The Education of Children" p. 10.
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irrational psychic formation the effects of which will be felt
throughout the whole course of subsequent life, then we are
informed that the course of development is "biologically
determined". Nature is responsible, and our duty as educators
is to stand by watching the beneficent unfolding of biological
purpose, taking steps only to prevent "excessive repression".
As we shall suggest later in our discussion, such an
attitude is entirely mischievous. Whatever is responsible
for either superego formation or for its correlate, the
Adlerian "superiority striving" - we suggest that they are
identical - must be eliminated. The conditions which lead to
the superiority striving are, of course, far more complex than
Adlerians suppose, but nevertheless, if educators made it their
constant task to prevent the formation of inferiority feelings
in children, or if they happen to come into existence on account
of circumstances outwith the control of the educators, to take
immediate steps to neutralise these inferiority .'feelings, it is
certain that the developed human being would cease to be
troubled with superiority striving or the machinations of the
superego.
What is to become of culture, it may be asked, by those who
accept the teaching of Adler, if it is cut off at the roots -
that is, if children are no longer made to feel inferior and
therefore no longer make the attempt to compensate themselves
by/
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by developing their personalities? At the risk of over¬
simplification, we would state that most of the things worth
while, including Adler's community feeling and Freudian reality
or objectivity, are in no way dependent on "complexes".
Finally, Adler tells us that parents and teachers "should
learn to interpret personality on the basis of objective facts,
seen as the expression of the purposive but more or less
I.
unconscious strivings of the individual." That is, the
educator should discover the hidden goal of the child person¬
ality and build his educational system around it. As we
suggest in our discussion of Wilfrid Lay's contribution to the
psychology of education, this attitude is also mischievous in
the extreme. Our business, particularly as teachers, is not
to draw out the motives which are bound up with the superego or
ego-maximation; on the contrary, we shall best subserve the
interests both of the child and of society if we are able to
ignore the irrational inthe child. Despite the imposing
Freudian theory of the latency period, a teacher suitably
equipped may tap the original power sources of hitman nature.
The grand educational appeal must be at all times to fundamental
disinterestedness, and not to aim-inhibited impulses, or, for
that matter, to irrationally determined superiority strivings.
A thoroughgoing application of Adlerian and Freudian theory in
our schools would lead to an enormous increase in the present-
day trend towards the production of neurotic and psychotic
phenomena/
''"The Education of Children" p. 16.
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phenomena. Education must not be adapted to "civilisation'';
education must reform civilisation.
Individual Psychology, we suggest, has to date shown little
appreciation of the nature of the individual in his early stages.
Without the understanding of the child that resides in the breast
of the adult, it is impossible to treat adequately the various
psychological ills from which he may suffer. And also, without
an accurate understanding of the nature of children during the
formative period, little can be done to assist them to overcome
the inner difficulties with which they are faced.
We must reject the claim made for Adler as being the
"Confucius of the West".
Sigmund Freud.
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We shall now attempt to give an account of the views of
Professor Freud on repression and sublimation.
Freud's psychological writings extend over a period of
forty years, and during this time his views have developed.
He has, indeed, seen little reason to change his original
position, and it may be said that his later statements merely
systematise his earlier findings. It has been held that
Freudianism stands or falls according to the truth of the
doctrine of the Oedipus complex I' This statement we feel is
not necessarily true. Freud himself does not rule out the
possibility that our bi-sexuality may be the principal determin¬
ant of unconscious process'. It would be far truer to state
that psychoanalysis stands or falls on the proof or disproof of
the doctrine of the superego. It cannot indeed be justly
asserted that Freud is dogmatic in respect of the factors which
lead to the formation of the superego. He admits that the
process of identification is little understood.3' What Freud
does assert, however, is that there is within the normal human
mind an irrational factor which has a direct influence on
conscious process, and which, in addition, accounts^for
repression, symptom,and sublimation.
If we were to enquire of Freud as to the relation of
repression/
''Ernest Jones, "Psychoanalysis" (Benn's Series) p. 31.
'•"The Ego and the Id" p.43. JOp.cit., p.36.
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repression to cultural development, his reply would resolve
itself into a discussion of the superego as the determinant
of cultural process. His position is, in general, that the
superego mechanism has been responsible for the development
of civilisation, and has largely determined the structure of
society, the more or less willing acceptance of the privations
inherent in that structure, and in the case of a minority of
individuals it has supplied the energy for higher forms of
development.
In his "Future of an Illusion", Freud argues that there is
at least a possibility that humanity could develop without
repression. But so consistent has Freud been in most of his
writings in maintaining that all higher development is
repression-determined, that Roheim has cause to say: "In spite
of occasional remarks by professor Freud and others to the
contrary, I cannot easily understand how a sublimation, that is,
an impulse-deviation, can occur without repression. First,
there must be anxiety, then repression, and lastly the break
through and motor discharge of the repressed in a form
acceptable to the superego. Thus impulse energies are not
damped down but canalized. In order that this can happen,
I.
some power other than the id must have been operative."
As we shall see in our discussion of other Freudian
writers, it is generally accepted as being the teaching of
the "
''
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the founder of psychoanalysis that repression is a necessary and
inevitable process. This would indeed appear to be the usual
viewpoint of Freud himself, and moreover, when considering his
later writings, we can only conclude that he regards the superego
also as necessary and inevitable. There is at present a tendency
among orthodox Freudian writers to discover the superego in pro¬
cess of formation at the age of six months. According to Melanie
Klein, 'early analysis shows that the Oedipus complex sets in as
early as the second half of the first year of life, and that at
the same time the child begins to modify it and to build up its
I.
superego." And since Freud himself accounts for so much on the
lines of phylogenic inheritance, it is probably true that he
accepts the findings of those of his followers who have made a
special study of the formative period of child development. As
we shall see later, Alexander, who is considered to follow closely
the teachings of Professor Freud, bases his whole discussion of
the ''Total Personality" on the concept of the superego.
Freud admirably summarises his later position in his intro¬
duction to Theodor Reik's "Ritual: psychoanalytical Studies".
This was published in 1931. His "Hew Introductory Lectures ',
delivered in the following year, are mainly an expansion of the
views summarised in the article to which we refer. Speaking in
historical vein, Freud tells us that in the earlier days of his
work there seemed no likelihood of being able to place the new
findings in respect of neurotic and psychotic individuals in
relation/
''Melanie Klein, "The Psychoanalysis of Children" p.28.
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relation to normal persons. Psychoanalysis was to all intents
and purposes a branch of medicine. later, however, he says, the
study of the dream convinced psychoanalysts that there is an
essential similarity between the mentation of the normal and the
abnormal. "And in solving the enigma of dreams, it found in
unconscious mentality the common ground in which the highest as
well as the lowest mental impulses are rooted, and from which
arise the most normal mental activities as well as the strange
products of a diseased mind. The picture of the mental mechanisms
of the individual now became clearer and more complete: it was seen
that obscure impulses arising in his organic life were striving to
fulfil their own aims, and that controlling them there was a series
of more highly organised mental formations acquired and handed on
by man under the pressure of his cultural development which had
taken possession of parts of these impulses, developed them, or
employed them in the service of higher aims - had bound them
fast, at all events, and utilised their energy for its own
purposes. This higher organisation which we know as the ego,
had rejected another portion of the same elementary impulses as
useless, because these impulses could not accommodate themselves
to the organic unity of the individual, or because they conflicted
I.
with its cultural aims."
Freud thus gives us a picture of what he considers to be the
normal mind. Arising from the purely organic plane, the mind has
two/
''S. Freud in "Ritual: Psychoanalytical Studies", by Theodor Reik,
p.5-6.
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two Impulses, the life instinct and the death instinct." At the
human level, these impulses are worked up into a complex organis¬
ation through the medium of cultural tradition. The task of
taming and utilising raw natural impulse in the interests of
cultural purposes is by no means simple. Man has been faced with
the stark necessity of securing a firm grip of his basic impulses,
these representing purely and simply his animal inheritance. He
has succeeded, however, in taking possession of parts of the
impulses lodged in his primitive psychic organisation. But
Freud seems to consider that !ltaken possession of'' does not quite
describe the process by which man has secured control of his
primitive impulses, and adds: "had bound them fast at all events,
and utilised their energy for its own purposes."
Behind Freud's statement there lies his whole doctrinal system
of the superego, to which we more specifically refer at a later
stage. The whole process of instinct control, according to Freud,
is complicated and, indeed, ingenious. Under the stress of vital
necessity, the individual rejects a portion of his elementary
impulses partly because certain impulses are mutually incompatible,
and partly because they are in conflict with cultural aims. In
the last resort, Freud's viewpoint is strictly biological, and he
believes that most of our psychic organisation at the adult level
is constructed under the direction of that stern taskmaster,
Necessity.' The question, for Freud, is not the place of
repression in the development of higher forms of cultural process:
repression/
/'Beyond the Pleasure Principle" p.47-8.
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repression, "to Mm, is a sine qua non of any development whatso¬
ever at the human level. Take away repression, if this were
indeed possible, and man at once sinks to a purely animal level,
but with this disadvantage, that his instincts are no longer
sufficiently specific for effective orientation in any imaginable
environment. Freud.does not present us with the alternatives of
repression or a lower form of cultural development: to him, the
alternative to repression is extinction.
Perhaps Freud is wrong; at least one hopes that he may be
proved to be wrong. But however this may be, one cannot but
admire the courage which has enabled him to face a Nature at once
grim and terrifying. His logic may conceivably have led him to a
position which is illusory, but lesser mortals would have hesitated
to follow reason to its ultimate conclusions.
But we would suggest that Freud has here made an implicit
confession. He has not completed his course of self-analysis,
for if he had, his instinctual forces would no longer be "bound";
that is, according to his teaching, he would be insane. This is
a point to be remembered. The Freudian position ultimately
rests not on knowledge but on hypothesis, hypothesis which is
incapable b'f proof. That is, analysis brings the individual to
a point at which there is a sign: ''Thus far shalt thou go, and no
f.
farther." Rank would also seem to have come upon the same sign,
though his picture of the Never-Never-Land is essentially different
from/
''Otto Rank, "The Trauma of Birth".
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from Freud's, and consequently his explanation of the raison d'etre
for the warning sign is not the same.
We are reminded of Blake whose spiritual wanderings brought
him to the lowest known stratum of the psychological world. He
was impelled to go farther, but discovered that this could not be
done unless he broke his way through a layer of extremely disgusting
materials. Disturbing these, he found that tree roots were
embedded within them, whose lower portions stretched out into the
awful void beneath. Still pursuing his purpose, he lowered himself
through the aperture which he had made, and found himself suspended
over an abyss, his hands holding desperately to the projecting roots,
in his vision, Blake released his grip and allowed himself to fall
into the depths, only to.discover that he was in a beautiful
i.
garden, a Paradise wherein the Golden Age found living embodiment.
It is indeed pertinent to ask whether Blake's dream was a mere
expression of insane imagining. Was he the subject of illusions?
Who is right, Freud or Blake? Would we become insane if we took
the further step of analysing out all repressions, or is this step
required before we can become truly sane?
The present writer does not pretend that he has solved this
problem, but precisely because the problem is not solved he is
compelled to admit that any conclusions to which this thesis may
bring us are, in the last resort, contingent. Ho Roheim has, to
bate, solved the Riddle of the Sphinx. We await a greater than
Freud to unlock the secret places of the unconscious mind.
To/
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To return to our immediate theme. In the article to which
we have made reference, Freud continues: "The ego was not powerful
enough to exterminate those forces it could not control. Instead,
it turned away from them leaving them on the most primitive psychol¬
ogical level, and protected itself against their demands by means of
energetic defensive or reactive mechanisms, or sought to compromise
with them by means of substitute gratifications. Unsubdued and
indestructible, yet inhibited in every direction, these repressed
impulses together with their primitive mental content, form the
underworld, the kernel of the true unconscious, ever on the alert
to urge their claims and to find any means for gratification.
Hence the insecurity of our proud psychical superstructure, the
nightly emergence of proscribed and repressed things in dreams, and
our proneness to fall ill with neuroses and psychoses as soon asthe
distribution of power between the ego and the repressed is altered
to the disadvantage of the former.
"It requires but little consideration to realise that such a
view of the life of the human mind cannot possibly be limited to the
sphere of dreams and nervous diseases. If it be a justifiable
view, it must apply also to normal mental phenomena and even the
highest achievements of the human mind must have some relation to
the factors recognised in pathology - to repression, to the strivings
for masteiy of the unconscious, and to the possibilities of gratific-
I.
ation which are open to the primitive impulses."
We have here a simple and concise statement of the Freudian




inevitable, and moreover the principal determinant of cultural
process. Freud goes on to say that it is "a scientific duty
to extend the psychoanalytical methods of investigation from
their original field to more distant and diverse spheres of
I.
mental interest." He says it is evident that in neurosis there
are expressions which correspond "with the most highly valued pro¬
ducts of our civilisation'1. The hysteric is a poet, the
obsessional patient, through ceremonials and prohibitions, creates
a religion, albeit a private one, and the paranoiacs "show an
unwelcome external similarity and inner relationship to the
2.
systems of our philosophers." Freud draws the conclusion that the
only difference between poetry, religion, and philosophy, as
ordinarily understood, and the expressions of the afflicted
individuals to whom he has referred, lies in the fact that in the
so-called normal, their higher activities happen to be 'acceptable
3
to a large number of persons." Both are making an attempt,
unconsciously and fortuitously, to solve their conflicts and to
appease their urgent desires.
Here we find all that is essential in the Freudian theory of
sublimation. Cultural interests are not the result of an attempt
by the individual consciously to orient himself to a world of
values; they are determined by inner drives over which the
individual has no direct control. To use a geological metaphor,
we/
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we have the picture of vast subterranean lava streams which are
at all times attempting to force their way through the crust of
the earth. The how and why of their breaking through is
apparently adventitious. At once place there is a quiet outflow
of molten rock which is harmless; at another place, the internal
stresses, the ultimate cause of the lava flow, reveal themselves
in hot springs, geysers, etc., whose heated waters may be used
for a variety of purposes by the natives; the geyser phenomena
may be aesthetically pleasing, and the minerals contained in the
evaporating water may lead to beautiful encrustations of surroundin;
rocks. At another place, springs may occur of medicinal value.
On the other hand, the-inner forces might lead to destructive
explosions, devastating earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions which
spread ruin over the surrounding area.
Modern science can with a fair degree of accuracy predict
when and where the more disruptive forces will break out, but it
is powerless to control these forces. To all intents and
purposes, this situation also applies to the human mind in Freud's
view. It is true that by means of psychoanalysis a few
individuals may have their psychological processes modified in
some degree, but in the main the unconscious is almost entirely
outwith "human control, both for good and for ill. There is a
prima facie case for those who see in the unconscious according to
Freud's description an evolutionary mechanism of the highest
significance. Man at the present stage at least has virtually
no/
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no control over his destiny. Under compulsions, he propagates
his kind; he strives for the maintenance of his social organis¬
ation, and as a sort of bi-product of evolutionary process, he
produces works of art, intellectual systems, and interesting
though apparently illusory rules for the guidance of his ethical
life.
Preud seemingly agrees with Re.ik in his finding that the
subject matter of literature in general, and particularly in
dramatic poetry, is almost entirely limited to working out in
artistic form a solution for the Oedipus complex. "Through the
elaboration of this complex into the most manifold variants,
distortions and disguises, the poet seeks to elucidate his most
I.
personal attitude to this affective theme."
Preud then gives a brief outline of his theory of the form¬
ation of the Oedipus complex. "It owes its significance," he
says, "not to any unintelligible concatenation of events. The
importance of the parental relationship springs naturally from the
biological fact of the long helplessness and slow maturing of the
young human being, and the complicated development of his capacity
for love; and furthermore guarantees that the lines on which the
Oedipus complex is overcome shall run parallel with those on which




We would specially note that the solution of the Oedipus
complex, according to Preud, is by means of "binding1' the original
instinctual/
'■Qp.cit., p.8-9. 5-0p. cit., p.8-9.
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instinctual impulses. McDougall would have us believe that
Freud considers that in normal individuals the Oedipus complex
I.
disappears. We do not think that this is a true rendering of
Freud's position. While Freud does not hold that in normal
persons the Oedipus complex sets up stresses which affect
conscious life, it is his view that the complex in question
only ceases to be an interference factor in conscious life in
so far as the operation of the impulses contained within it is
effectively side-tracked into the domain of the superego. The
impulses must be "bound" in order that the solution of the
Oedipus complex should run parallel with the method by which
the "archaic and animal inheritance of mankind is most success¬
fully brought under subjection." we are not quite clear,
however, that Freud succeeds in differentiating between the two
types of process, that which is biologically determined and that
which is dependent on cultural tradition. But from the above
quotation, it seems certain that Freud views the construction
of the superego as part of the process of growth in normal
human beings.
The Oedipus complex is not dissolved in any real sense, but
transformed, and if it be true, as Freudians often tell us, that
any normal individual may, under certain circumstances, be
involved in neurosis, it follows that the Oedipus complex is
capable of being revived in the normal individual.
We/
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We therefore repeat our assertion that to the Freudians
repression, sublimation and symptom are all superego determined,
and therefore a discussion of the relation of repression to cultural
development on Freudian premises resolves itself into an examination
of the superego and its dependent systems in relation to cultural
development. It will be on these lines that we shall later
attempt to deal with the main Freudian attitude .to the subject of
sublimation.
We would here briefly refer to the question as to whether
repression is necessary as a means to sublimation. Here and there
Freudians tell us that sublimation is the alternative to repression,
but usually we find that writers who make this statement later
qualify their position by informing us that sublimation is only
hindered by too much repression. If a child analyst should indeed
demonstrate that a redirection of instinctual energy occurred without
repression, our reply would be that the new interests were formed
along the lines ofordinary sentiment formation. It is to be noted
that these analysts treat of a period in the life of the child prior
to the setting up of the superego. But according to Freud, the
repressions of later life are part and parcel of the superego
system and therefore, as we have seen, the impulses contained within
them can no longer be subject to direct control. They are already
repressed, and must remain so, and any overt expression will be by
way of circuitous modes of superego functioning.
Of course it might be argued that in the pre-superego stage
the/
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the alternative to repression might have been sublimation. in
this case, however, it would appear obvious that the re-directed
energy from the very start found expression through ordinary senti¬
ments and was therefore under direct conscious control. We think
that a great deal of energy, especially in the normal person, is in
no way subject to the control of the repressed unconscious, but there
seems to be no justification for using the term "sublimation5' for
this type of expression of instinctual energy. According to the
main Freudian pre-suppositions, most if not all of our energy is
caught up within the system of the repressed unconscious, and in
adult life only expresses itself in so far as the censor or superego
allows it to do so, the invariable condition being that expression
should be disguised.
We are of opinion, then, that there can be no basis for the
view that the alternative to repression is sublimation. Sublim¬
ation is dependent on repression, as Roheim insists.
The alternative to repression is not sublimation, but non-
repression, in which case, hypothetically at least, instinctual
energies would be utilised in ordinary sentiment formations. It
was the writer's original intention to discuss in detail the
Freudian theory of sublimation in respect of various forms of cultural
process, but as we followed up our line of study it became
increasingly clear that such a treatment would be irrelevant to our
main purpose. As we stated in the introduction to this essay, the
purpose in developing our theme is practical. The question at
issue/
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issue is, how should we regard repression in relation to cultural
process in contemporary life? Almost every Freudian makes out a
case to show that repression lies behind a variety of forms of
higher development. We consider that our present task is to
demonstrate that any advantages from repression are merely
incidental. There may be a grain or two of wheat in the bushel
of superego-determined chaff, but the question which occupies our
attention is why the human mind, in so far as it is superego
determined, should produce such a disproportionate amount of
useless material, if we are to accept the Freudian finding that
occasional "sublimations" do occur.
We suggest that the answer to our query is only discoverable
by a close study of the. conditions under which the superego is
formed. It is our view, from the standpoint of human values, that
the existence of the superego in the human mind is intolerable.
Our judgment of Charles I. as a bad king is in no way affected by
the dilations of his apologists as to his family virtues. A
clergyman's rhetorical abilities do not influence us in our view
as to his unfitness for the office which he holds if his moral life
has shown flagrant defects. The fine-spun arguments of the
Schoolmen do not impress us when we realise that their intellectual
life took no cognisance of really significant facts.
And so with the superego. If it is morally and intellectually
disreputable, we need not concern ourselves with incidental
advantages which accrue from its operation. Our question is, can
we/
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we regard repression as a function of cultural process? If by
function we mean an indispensable factor, an essential determin¬
ant, we must form the conclusion - that is, if our position can
be substantiated - that repression is not a function of cultural
process, and we must maintain in the face of the defenders of
the sublimation theory ofhuman development that repression is
indeed a dysfunction of cultural process, a harmful intrusion
in the minds of human beings, which vitiates many lines of
intellectual thinking and prevents adequate ethical response.
Prom the aesthetic standpoint, we hope to show that any individual
in whom a superego exists is essentially limited in his powers both
of the creation and the appreciation of beautiful objects.
We shall now seek-by means of a quick review of Freud's works
to bring into our intellectual purview statements which appear
significant from the standpoint of our present undertaking. let
us first turn to Professor Freud's "introductory lectures on
Psychoanalysis''', using the reprinted edition of 1923. Freud,
throughout his entire works, strives to relate his theories to
the evolutionaxy viewpoint. In his introduction to the work
under consideration, he states that the opposition to his theories
is due to intellectual, moral, and aesthetic prejudices. These,
he says, "are powerful things, residues of valuable, even
i.
necessary, stages in human evolution."
Presumably these prejudices are connected with the forces





attitudes are themselves determined by repression. "Nay, more,"
he says, "—these sexual impulses have contributed invaluably
to the highest cultural, artistic, and social achievements of the
I.
human mind." Then follows a peculiar statement: Why, he asks,
does psychoanalysis evoke such a storm of resistance from the
ordinary members of civilised communities? It would seem that
he has already supplied the answer. It so happens that we are
prejudiced against certain types of knowledge; but Freud does not
give this expected reply. . He tells us that we, as ordinary
members of a civilised community, know quite well that the
enlightenment which the Freudian offers is dangerous to our
community life. In our heart of hearts we are already aware of
all that he has to tell us, but we prefer not to raise our implicit
knowledge to the conscious level.
The point we wish to emphasise is that the charge directed
against us by Freud is not that we repress but that we dissociate
a large number of facts. The ordinary individual knows precisely
what he is doing in suppressing certain types of knowledge. And
moreover, he insists on doing it. Freud provides an excellent
reason, of which it would again seem that the individual has been
implicitly aware throughout. We quote from the relevant passage:
"We believe that civilisation has been built up under the
pressure of the struggle for existence by sacrifices in gratific¬
ation of the primitive impulses, and that it is to a great extent
for/
'"Op.cit. , p. 17.
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for ever being recreated as each individual successively joining
the community repeats the sacrifice of his instinctive pleasures
for the common good. The sexual are among the most important of
the instinctive forces thus utilised: they are in this way sub¬
limated, that is to say, their energy is turned aside from its
sexual goal and diverted towards other ends no longer sexual, and
socially more valuable. But the structure thus built up is
insecure, for the sexual impulses are with difficulty controlled;
in each individual who takes up his part in the work of civilis¬
ation, there is a danger that a rebellion of the sexual impulses may
occur, against this diversion of their energy. Society can conceive
of no more powerful menace to its culture than would arise from the
liberation of the sexual impulses, and the return of them to their
original goal. Therefore society dislikes this sensitive place in
its development being touched upon; that the power of the sexual
instincts should be recognised and the significance of the
individual's sexual life revealed is far from its interests; with
a view to discipline, it has rather taken the course of diverting
attention away from this whole field. For this reason, the
revelations of psychoanalysis are not tolerated by it, and it
would prefer to brand them as aesthetically offensivemorally
I.
reprehensible, or dangerous. "
Crichton Miller tells a story, in "The lew psychology and the





theory of evolution. "Descended from monkeysl" she exclaimed.
"My dear, I trust that is not true; but if it is, let us pray
it may not become widely known." The plain man, according to
Freud, differs from the lady referred to in that he has an
implicit knowledge of the main tenets of psychoanalysis before
psychoanalysis seeks to enlighten him. The plain man, however,
resembles the lady in not wishing the facts revealed by psycho¬
analysis to become extensively known, not only in society at large,
but within the precincts of his own personality.
We cannot allow that the attitude of the plain man may
rightly be regarded humorously. On Freud's own showing, he is
fundamentally right in insisting that dissociations should be main¬
tained both in himself and others. Freud appears to blame society
for resorting to rationalisation in warding off his psychoanalytical
rapier. It appears to us that the plain man is justified in using
any weapon which lies to hand. He cannot return the attack by
means of genuine intellectual weapons, for should he do so it will
be at the expense of a complete surrender of his entire position
before the battle begins. As we have stated, the plain man prefers
not to know the facts of psychoanalysis, and for excellent reasons,
if Freud's diagnosis is true. Freud tells us that he himself has
yielded to no tendency in propounding this objectionable theory.
Our intention has been solely to give recognition to the facts as
we found them in the course of painstaking researches, and we
now claim the right to reject unconditionally any such introduction
of practical/
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practical considerations into the field of scientific investig-
I.
ation..."
It is one of the positions which we wish to establish in this
thesis that any considerable increase in the influence of the
superego or the repressed unconscious is at the cost of blunting
the ethical sense. Even at the risk of being considered hyper-
.
critical, we cannot withhold this remark. For a quarter of a
century before the publication of the "Introductory lectures",
Freud had been immersed in the study of the superego determined
unconscious. If our theory is right, "libido" had been drawn
into this system from normally developed sentiments, ethical,
intellectual, and aesthetic. The vision of life as a whole was
accordingly distorted. . As the foregoing statement made by Freud
stands, we are obliged to take up the viewpoint that it expresses
an attitude at once unreasonable and ethically reprehensible.
There are many medical matters which are not discussed in
.
public, and rightly so, and perhaps Freud would have been
justified in disseminating the knowledge of psychoanalysis among
his medical confreres under the conditions of professional secrecy.
Supposing it were found that death could be brought about by the
application of some common household substance to a part of the
body; or, should it be discovered that the application of slight
pressure to a blood vessel would have fatal effects without any
suspicion falling on the individual who happened to have homicidal
.




far and wide such discoveries? The reply is obvious. If Freud,
believing that the system of knowledge which he has propounded is
dangerous to society, insisted on broadcasting his results, it is
difficult to exonerate him from the charge of ethical irrespons¬
ibility. Psychoanalysts have, indeed, vied with each other in
publishing popular accounts of their theories, and the exponents
of the "new freedom" base their activities on psychoanalytical
theory.
What is the relation of repression to cultural development?
Freud supplied the answer, and then took the best possible means
of destroying both culture and civilisation. But fortunately,
we suggest, there are more things in heaven and earth than are
included in Professor Freud's philosophy, and we should perhaps
give him the benefit of the doubt in attributing to him an
implicit knowledge as to what normal human nature really is like,
when not drawn within the vortex of superego mechanisms. Perhaps
after all he did not feel that his revelations were quite as
dangerous to humanity as his logic led him to conclude. It is
our belief that ordinary individuals succeed passably well in
evading their superegos in so far as these are constructed within
their personalities, and proceed in the building of their
characters to all intents and purposes as though the superego were
non-existent. Of course, we cannot at once rule out the possi¬
bility that superego morality, even if implicit, has some restrain¬




facts gains the impression that superego morality is chiefly
honoured in its neglect.
Aldous Huxley has a volume of essays entitled "Do What You.
Will." It would appear that the average individual acts on the
principle here implied, and that the superego is utilised in
order to make possible "free living". As Trotter has pointed
out, we are so constituted that we are very much under the control
of public opinion. We cannot bear to feel ourselves ostracised
by those who are in a position to exert prestige suggestion upon
us, If, however, we look to "conscience" as our supreme authority,
we are then able to escape from the control of parental and similar
influences. We have indeed a suspicion that the young child
who takes to that phantasy weaving which is the precursor of the
superego system has a shrewd idea as to the essential utilitarian
value of internalised authority from the standpoint of securing
freedom to "do what he wills".
Alexander makes much of the self-punishing mechanism in the
neurotic personality. It is probably true that young children
make considerable use of their imaginations in discovering means
for evading parental control. The child who has been "naughty"
may allay the anxiety which will rise in his mind when he realises
the inevitable attitude of the elders to his misdemeanour, by
imagining that he is the grown-up. All he then needs to do is to
Play at punishing himself, perhaps by causing a slight "accident",
and all is well.
When/
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When the child grows up normally, the impression is given
that the adult individual treats his superego formations very
1
much as he did when he was a child. It is probably true that
civilised human beings do not wish their superego formations to
be disturbed, as Freud suggests, but the reasons would appear to
be quite different from those supplied by Freud. The person who
possesses a superego is probably far more concerned for his
psychological comfort than for civilisation, when he informs the
psychoanalyst that he prefers darkness to light. On the whole,
we are still inclined to be sympathetic to those who request tin
Freudians not to disturb their psychic peace. It is perhaps
not very creditable in the adult to use childish tricks to
escape the forces of public opinion, but as society is at present
organised, it would not be easy to seek out those who are in a
position to give reliable and salutary guidance on problems of
behaviour. As Margaret Mead points out, there are so many con¬
tending authorities. The person without an inner authority
would find himself involved in constant conflict, and particularly
in adolescence it is vitally necessary that the young person
should break free from the sense of being under the control of
his parents or guardians. Whatever be the truth of^Freud's
theory of infantile sexuality, it would appear to be a matter of
common observation that incestuous tendencies develop in the
later home environment if the adolescent has been unable to find
the necessary courage to seek out new attachments outside the
home. In our opinion, Freud is essentially conservative in
his/
I.
Margaret Mead,"Coming of Age in Samoa" p.199-200.
• 80.
his attitude; he at least is more moral than he appears. is
it not a little ironical that young people nowadays are
inclined to regard hirn as the high priest of the new order of
freedom, thus having additional confidence in making even fuller
use of their superegos to evade parental control7.
Like Janet, Freud states that repression does not take place
if an impulse suffers rejection as the result of deliberation.
Where this occurs, the repudiated impulse becomes powerless.' But
unlike Janet, as we have seen, he considers that in the formative,
years, repression is inevitable, in part because of biologically
determined forces, and partly on account of the necessity for the
child's adapting itself to a civilised environment.
We have seen that Freud holds that civilisation is dependent
for its existence on the continuation of the system of repressions
being built up in the human mind, or at least he states that the
civilised individual believes that interference with repression
would be fatal to society's continuing in its present form. In a
later chapter, Freud definitely tells us that he is in agreement
with those members of society who consider his process of
enlightenment dangerous. Ee says: "For it is indeed one of the
most important social tasks of education to restrain, confine, and
subject to an individual control (itself identical with the
demands of society) the sexual instinct when it breaks forth in
the form of the reproductive function. 'In its own interests,
accordingly,/
"Introductoxy Lectures ' p.245.
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accordinglyj society would postpone the child's full development
until it has attained a certain stage of intellectual maturity,
I
since educability practically ceases with the full onset of the
sexual instinct. Without this, the instinct would break all
bounds and the laboriously erected structure of civilisation would
/•
be swept away."
Freud then gives his opinion as to society's motives for
repression. He does not tell us to which society he refers, nor
does he inform us how the individuals who make up a society discover
what are the views of the "group mind", since as far as we are
'
aware there never has been a literature which has deliberately
instructed parents to crush out the sexuality within their children.
Presumably he makes special reference to contemporary society, but
if we were to enquire of any individual parent as to his motives
for suppressing sexuality, he would certainly not give as a reason
that provided by professor Freud. The parent in question would
frankly inform the questioner that no ulterior motive was involved:
it was a clear matter of right and wrong. The question as to who
or what it is that has a motive for inducing repression in children
is still unanswered. If pressed, it would seem that the Freudian
would have to fall back on a 'biological principle"; this at
least is his usual method when faced with similar situations.
Freud tells us: "At bottom, society's motive is economic;




work on their part, it must see to it that the number of these
members is restricted and their energies directed away from sexual
activity on to their work - the eternal primordial struggle for
i.
existence therefore persisting to the present day."
But Freud does not appear to be aware that there is every
reason to suppose that, during the far greater part of human
history, society did not concern itself about infantile sexuality.
Although no certain conclusions can be reached, the probability
is that civilisation existed through several millenniums without
sex prejudices being engrained into the minds of children. Early
Egyptian moral codes know nothing of "sin" and seem to take it for
granted that sex expression is natural and normal, and quite
compatible with societal organisation. The pharaohs were
notoriously immoral, and the gods, it would seem, provided abundant
amorous opportunities for those who were admitted into the realms
of the blessed. We draw attention to these facts, as Freudians
would have us accept a theory of civilisation as based on sexual
repression. Here Freud speaks of society's motive as being
economic, and it is as well fo realise that statements of this
kind are essentially without meaning. The implication of the
Freudian doctrinal system is that society will collapse if
complexes are not set up in the minds of our children. Since
psychoanalysis aims at destroying complexes, the Freudian is the
self-confessed enemy of society. As we shall see in our discussion
of/
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2'See section on Egypt, thesis p. 378-9.
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of Roheim, Freudians take comfort in the thought that their
activities will be ineffectual. Humanity loves its bonds too
dearly for there to be any likelihood that the Freudian programme
of emancipation will be successful. But however satisfied
Freudians themselves may be with their peculiar logic, or lack of
logic, the practical educator in the form of the modern parent
discovers himself in an equivocal position, and that indirectly
due to Freudianteaching. On the one hand, psychoanalytical
writers lecture parents on account of being responsible for the
formation of complexes in the child; on the other, they calmly
info rip them that civilisation is endangered, and what is more,
that the individual child will probably "go wrong", if complexes
are not formed.
Speaking of prophylaxis, Freud says: "It may accomplish too
much; in that it favours an exaggerated degree of sexual
repression which is harmful in its effects (that is, if the
parent seeks to prevent the child having sexual experiences) and
it sends the child into life without the power to resist the
I-
urgent demands of his sexuality that must be expected at puberty."
The second danger is due to strict supervision in the sense of
talcing precautions against the child becoming involved in
situations which lead to conflict and ultimately to repression.
Freud then continues: "It therefore remains most doubtful how
far prophylaxis in childhood can go with advantage, (that is,
parents are to do nothing in the matter) and whether a changed
attitude/
''"Introductory Lectures ' p.305-6.
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attitude to actuality would not constitute a better point of
departure for attempts to forestall the neurosis. "
What Freud means by "a changed attitude to actuality" it is
difficult to understand. We must ask again, who is to change?
The answer would be, "society". But according to Freudian
findings society cannot change its attitude unless it modifies its
method of child education, and Freud forbids us to do this. As
far as we can see, the circle is completed. Society and parents
are equally helpless. For good or ill, we can do nothing to
control our evolutionary development. Freud is not the apostle
of a new order, he is a reactionary, an ultra-conservative.
In making the above statements he is apparently blind to the
ethical situation which he himself has partly created. The
parent has had his eyes opened to the irrationality of creating
conditions in the nursery which lead to conflict; not only the
irrationality, indeed, but the stark injustice of blaming the
child for possessing impulses for which he is in no way responsible.
Despite Freud's advice, parents who are influenced by his
teaching are altering their policy, in that they are afraid to
adopt any consistent policy at all, and the child suffers.
Children cannot be safely left to grow up by themselves; even
the most primitive society has its definite traditions incorporating
consistent methods of child rearing. "Custom thought" brings
many evils in its train, but society continues to exist, and the
individuals/
''Op. cit. , p.306.
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individuals who compose it find a reasonable amount of happiness
and satisfaction as members of the social group. lever before
has humanity been led to adopt the policy towards its children of
mere drift. Contemporary man must discover a new policy in regard
to methods of child rearing, deliberate and purposive, if there is
to be any security in the future, both for the individual and for
the race. It may be fairly asserted.that psychoanalysis to date
has done nothing to assist in the propounding of such a policy.
In Freud's reference to prophylaxis above quoted, we have
implicitly the doctrine that what is required is "not too much and
not too little" repression. If too much, we have neurosis, if too
little the individual will be incapable of self-control as he pro¬
gresses towards later stages of develojDment. We have no hesitation
in stating that the Freudian "training formula" is mischievous to a
degree. the alternative to traditional modes of child rearing is
not merely modification in the direction of a lessening of severity,
or a reduction of the forces of moral suasion, but the careful
application of methods which will ensure that from the very beginning
the child is able to bring his impulses under control by rational
means. the Freudian method prevents the child having built up
within himself those effective controls based on powerful
repressions; nor can he view his problems sufficiently unemotion¬
ally to be in a position to subjugate his a-social impulses by
]





Freud views the early form of infantile sexuality as being
composed of a number of what he calls "component tendencies1'.
These tendencies later come together to form sexuality as we know
it in adult life. These component tendencies he regards as the
growing points of cultural life. They are ultimately destined to
repression. When repressed, the theory would seem to be that
thqyact as psychic dynamos, producing energy which the individual
may use for cultural purposes.
In his "Introduction to Psychoanalysis", Fliigel gives a list
of the cultural derivatives of anal-eroticism, this being one of
the Freudian component tendencies. In this list are to be found
almost all the instincts upon which society depends for the main¬
tenance of its communal life. Repressed anal eroticism may lead
to concentration, generosity, interest in children, writing,
painting, and chemistry. It may also lead to tidiness, clear
thinking, punctuality, purity, and strong will, and, rather
surprisingly, to a "sense of reality".
The question arises as to what will happen to our communal
life if the component tendencies have not been subject to
repression. The lay reader becoming acquainted with the state¬
ments of such writers as Flugel, can only gain the impression that
the hidden sources of power resulting from the repression of the
component tendencies have an indispensable part to play in pro¬
ducing the energy necessary for socially useful pursuits, and
the question will arise in his mind as to whether it is desirable
to/
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to interfere with traditional methods of child rearing. if
the child were not equipped with the psychic dynamos to which
we have referred, would he not be unfitted to play his part in
the life of the community?
Freudians have also developed the theory that among the
reaction formations arising from repressed anal-eroticism, is a
tendency to displace sex interest from below upwards. Once
again, the impression left on the mind of the lay reader is that
the state of affairs would be indeed deplorable if the human
being should no longer have a tendency to displace his interest
from objects which have no intrinsic worth to higher things.
We are led to understand that the inmates of insane asylums often
revert to disgusting interests, and teachers are well aware of the
underlying anal-erotic trends in the characters of their pupils.
Two problems arise. Is it desirable to subject to psycho¬
analysis the mind of the developed human being? Is it not
likely that, if such analysis were thoroughgoing, the individual
would become unashamed of his infantile liking for disgusting
things? Surely the human being would then become a mere animal.
Also, is it safe to refrain from disgust conditioning and the
application of the sanctions of shame and fear in training young
children? would not the child remain uncivilised? It might
be held that, if the anal-erotic and other component tendencies
were subjected to rational control, they would still supply
their quota of psychic energy for the construction of socially
directed/
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directed interests. This is, however, improbable. First, the
reaction formations would not be brought into existence under
these conditions. Secondly, the component tendencies, with
the exception of the sadistic tendency, are relatively weak if
the interests to which they lead have not been opposed by the
child's environment. parents who are acquainted with Freudian
literature will inevitably draw the deduction that wisdom lies
in continuing to use traditional methods in educating their
young children.
The question therefore arises as to whether cultural process
is dependent for its supply of energy on the repression of the
component tendencies. The Freudian thesis that human beings are
supplied with a great deal of energy as a result of the repression
of component tendencies seems to be well substantiated, although
the present writer is of opinion that the component tendencies
are as a general rule dissociated rather than repressed, or., more
accurately, they operate subconsciously rather than unconsciously.
Be this as it may, the component tendencies of an individual who
has been subjected to traditional methods of child rearing appear
to act in accordance with the statements made by the Freudians.
To put the matter simply, in the case of the anal-erotic
impulse, is the alternative to repression the acceptance of dirt
as an object of supreme and absorbing value? Our reply is that
children brought up without what is known as -''cleanliness training"
appear to have little interest in what are considered to be
disgusting/
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disgusting objects. Furthermore, a child so brought up develops
all the necessary energy for cultural pursuits; that is, the com¬
ponent tendencies would-not seem to act by any means exclusively
as the growing points of cultural interests, as Freudians claim.
Each and every instinctual tendency as described by Shand,
McDougall, Drever, and others, would seem to supply its quota
of energy as the child proceeds in his task of constructing
sentiments which will be of value when he takes his place as a
member of the adult community.
We have noted how Freud has led us to believe that repression
has a vital part to play in the maintenance of the conditions of
civilised life. We are therefore surprised to discover, towards
the end of the "Introductory Lectures", this statement: "We can
demonstrate with ease that what the world calls its code of morals
demands more sacrifices than it is worth, and that its behaviour
I.
is neither dictated by honesty nor instituted with wisdom."
Since repression is largely the result of the moral demands made
by educators upon children, we would seem to be supplied with a
carte blanche to do away with repressions. Freud has told us the
likely effect on the individual of applying rational methods in
child rearing, and he has stated in no uncertain terms the probable
effect on society of the abrogation of the repressed unconscious.
And now we discover that he is giving society a sound rating on
account of its hypocrisy and moral worthlessness. since,




courting utter extinction, it would, appear that Professor Freud's
attitude is a little unfair.
In '"The Ego and the Id" Freud develops his theory of the
superego. We shall treat of this subject later when we under¬
take our main critique of the Freudian system. Freud has
demonstrated that the human personality may be divided into
three parts: the ego, the superego, and the id. He has dis¬
covered that part of the ego itself is unconscious, and this he
calls the superego. It is, however, essentially a piece of
mere mechanism, whose activities the conscious personality can
in no way control. It is a complex among complexes, repressed
for reasons which, according to Freud's description, are far from
obvious. The impartial reader has formed the conclusion that
the pathological may even invade parts of the personality in
ways previously unsuspected. One is greatly surprised, there¬
fore, to read the following: "But now that we have embarked upon
the analysis of the ego, we can give an answer to all those
whose moral sense has been shocked and who have complained that
there must surely be a higher nature in man: 'Very true', we can
say, 'and here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal, or
superego, the representative of our relations to our parents.
When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we
admired them and feared them; and later we took them into
i-
ourselves.'" And later he says: "It is easy to show that the
ego-ideal/
'"The Ego and the Id" p.47.
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ego-ideal answers in eveiy way to what is expected of the
higher nature of man. In so far as it is a substitute for
the longing of a father, it contains the germ from which all
religions have evolved. The self-judgment which declares that
the ego falls short of its ideal produces the sense of worth-
lessness with which the religious believer attests his longing.
As a child grows up, the office of father is carried on by
masters and by others in authority; the power of their
injunctions and prohibitions remains vested in the ego-ideal
and continues, in the form of conscience, to exercise the
censorship of morals. The tension between the demands of
conscience and the actual attainments of the ego is experienced
as a sense of guilt. . Social feeling rests on the foundation
of identification with others, on the basis of an ego-ideal in
I.
common with them."
In the same strain, we read in the "New Introductory
Lectures": "It is probable that the so-called materialistic
conceptions of history err in that they underestimate this
factor. They brush it aside with the remark that the
'ideologies' of mankind are nothing more than resultants of
their economic situation at any given moment, or superstructure
built upon it. That is the truth, but very probably it is
not the whole truth. Mankind never lives completely in the
present; the ideologies of the superego perpetuate the past,




slowly to the influence of the present and to new developments,
and, so long as it works through the superego, plays an import¬
ant part in man's life, quite independently of economic
I.
conditions."
We shall here make no further comment, except to state
that according to Freud, the superego is the heir to the
Oedipus complex, is the end result of a long series of acts of
repression, and is responsible for the continued existence of
repression in the adult human mind. It is a result of all the
insincerities and hypocrisies of that social morality which
Freud, as we have seen, bitterly condemns. The heir would
seem to have developed many fine mental qualities despite the
degrading conditions from which he has sprung. The Freudian
doctrine of absolute:determinism appears to have one exception.
We would now make brief reference to the Freudian doctrine
of repression, quoting from "Sigmund Freud: Psychoanalytical
Epitomes, Ho. 1", edited by John Rickman. Here, we read:
"The ego hates, abhors, and pursues with intent to destroy, all
objects which are for it a source of painful feeling, without
taking into account whether they mean to it frustration of
sexual satisfaction or of gratification of the needa of self-
a.
preservation." In other words, the human personality responds
blindly to situations involving psychic pain, seeking at any
cost to rid itself of that which causes the irritation. This
fact/
'"Hew introductory Lectures" p.91.
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fact probably accounts for the final stages of any repressive
process. It is probable that repression proper never occurs
without consciousness having been faced with a situation of
extreme pain.
We read later: "we see then that it is a condition of
repression that the element of avoiding pain shall have acquired
i.
more strength than the pleasure of gratification. !T Once again,
Freud is stating that the motive for repression is the avoidance
of pain.
Freud has a theory that there are two types of repression,
one primary and the other secondary. We shall quote the
relevant passage, but we would first draw attention to what
would appear to be a decided omission from Freud's theory. In
our view,.the end result of normal disgust conditioning is the
basic complex of the human mind. We shall return to this point
later.
We find Freud saying: "Now we have reason for assuming a
primal repression which consists in the denial of entry into
consciousness to the mental (ideational) presentation of the
instinct....The second phase of repression, repression proper,
concerns mental derivatives of the repressed instinct present¬
ation, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have
come into associative connection with it." And on the following





purpose if these forces did not co-operate, if there were not
something previously repressed, ready to assimilate that which
i.
is rejected from consciousness."
But we now face a difficulty. Freud uses the conception
of another type of repression, that under the domination of
the superego. Presumably, we are committed to thinking of a
tertiary type of repression. Indeed, the entire later trend
of Freud's thinking would lead us to believe that in the adult
at least the effective repressing agent is the superego. In
the "pew lectures" he says: "Now that we have posited a
special function within the ego to represent the demand for
restriction and rejection, that is, the superego, we can say
that repression is the work of the superego - either that it
does its work on its own account, or blse that the ego does it
2.
in obedience to its orders."
He also says; "The superego has the ego at its mercy, and
applies the most severe moral standards to it; indeed, it
represents the whole demands of morality, andwe see all at once
that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension
3.
between the ego and the superego."
Implicitly, we suggest, this would appear to be the
position; The superego represents our "morality", that which
is responsible for our having prejudiced feelings in relation to
the/
'"Psychoanalytical Epitomes" p.102.
2-"Hew lectures" p. 93. 3' "Hew Lectures" p.83.
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the id. The id is essentially a part of our make-up on account
of which we experience acute feelings of inferiority. As
adults, we automatically deny that it is part of ourselves,
this through the mechanism of the superego. Though many com¬
plexes would appear to have been set up before the superego
came into existence, (primary repressions), these, once the
superego is formed, appear in a matrix which is itself repressed.
The superego therefore does not directly render inaccessible the
primal complexes. when it was set up, the personality no
longer knew of their existence. But so long as the superego
continues to function, the whole matrix in which the primal
complexes are embedded remains in a state of repression.
For our present purposes, we shall dispense with the
Freudian conception of that secondaiy repression which is con¬
ditioned by primary repression, and shall use "secondary
repression" to denote the repressive activities of the superego.
In elucidating our subject as to the relation of repression to
cultural development, the question arises whether primary
repression is a determinant of cultural process. That is, we
would enquire whether a single complex set up in early life has
or has not a function.
It is of significance to note in this connection that
neither Janet nor Rivers, whose attention was primarily fixed
on what we might describe as the simple complex, suggests that
complexes have a function. Purely and simply, they represent
a pathological condition. We would also bear in mind that,
in/
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in oiir view, the constant primal repression among civilised
people brought up under traditional methods of child rearing
is due to disgust conditioning. The question arises: Is
there any likelihood that a simple complex would act as a
determinant of cultural process? Our reply is, on the whole,
in the negative. For this reason: most people who are subject
to the influence of repressed complexes consider the underlying
mechanism as an intolerable nuisance. We feel that they are
abnormal, and have a restricting influence from the standpoint
of effective adaptation. We feel almost a passion to be free
from the entanglements due to our having forgotten incidents
or phases of our past life. It is suggested that, if complexes
could be simply resolved, few individuals would spare themselves
the necessary effort to bring into consciousness their relapsed
memories. The organism in its entirety has, it would seem, a
distinct tendency towards abreaction. A little concentration,
and the submitting of oneself to a certain amount of psychic
pain, would enable us to resolve the greater number of our com¬
plexes, if the situation were not complicated by factors bound
up with the superego. It seems likely, therefore, that simple
complexes would have little relation to cultural development,
since they would be speedily resolved as the individual passed
into years of maturity.
One possible exception is that of the disgust complex, but
even here the writer can recall that as a child he realised the
artificiality of disgust attachments and it appears even likely
that/
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that if the issues remained simple, the developing individual
would find means of freeing himself from an essentially
irrational attitude of mind.
But, as we suggest, we are not here concerned with the
simple complex. According to Freudian theory, both repression
and sublimation are controlled in the adult by the superego,
and if this last named psychic institution were abrogated, both
repression and sublimation would cease to exist. Our contention
is that the superego exercises a harmful influence on cultural
development, and it is the main purpose of this essay to show
that repression, as determined by the superego, is essentially
a dysfunction of cultural process. Far from representing the
things which we most v-alue, it is, when rightly regarded, the
enemy of man's cultural life. Repression is dependent for
its continuance on the superego: and the superego cannot
possibly be allowed to remain as part of the mind if the
individual is to attain to his full stature as a human being.
It represents a dwarfing influence, and when considerably
developed, shuts out the possibility of worthy behaviour, satis¬
fying aesthetic experience, and most of all bars the way to
intellectual advance. The superego tends to bring about the
atrophy of all higher cultural processes, not their facilitation.
If the human being were without repressions, would he adapt
himself to his cultural environment? Although at times Freud
would/
would seem to think that the impulse towards science is not
determined by complexes, his general theory would seem to be
that repression is the sole explanation of cultural develop¬
ment. We find him saying; in "Beyond the Pleasure Principle":
"The development of man up to now does not seem to need any
explanation differing from that of animal development, and the
restless striving towards further perfection which may be
observed in a minority of human beings is easily explicable as
a result of that repression of instinct upon which what is most
I.
valuable in human culture is built." Such is Freud's estimate
of human nature.
Even the capacity for tenderness is not innate in human
nature: we are dependent for this quality on the repression of
the sex instinct. The child has first an attachment to his
parent which he renounces under cultural pressure. Freud says
"The repression which then sets in compels him to renounce the
greater number of these infantile sexual aims, and leaves
behind a profound modification in his relation to his parents,
but by instincts which must be described as being inhibited in
their aim, the emotions which he feels henceforward towards the
2.
objects of his love are characterised as tender."
Nevertheless, Freud seems to teach at other times that
repression is not necessary as a means to sublimation. In
fact, repression and sublimation are alternatives. As an
instance/
Psychoanalytical Epitomes" p.188. *'Op.cit., p.220.
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instance of this, we find him saying: "The components of the
sexual instinct are especially distinguished by such a capacity
for the sublimation and exchange of their sexual goal for one
more remote and socially valuable. We probably owe the highest
achievements of our culture to energy which has been liberated
in this way. A repression taking place at an early period
precludes the sublimation of the repressed impulse; after the
i.
removal of the repression the way to sublimation is again free."
The situation is a little baffling. As far as we know,
Freud has not made an attempt to reconcile these opposed views.
What seems to lie behind his statements is this: If during the
pre-superego stage of development, an impulse is subjected to what
he seems to describe as primary repression, the energy of that
impulse may no longer be used by the personality. Later
repressions under the dominance of the superego appear to be of
a rather different nature. As we have pointed out, they are
massive. On the other hand, the repression is not necessarily
severe. Indeed, the impression is given that we are not
justified in using the texm repression at all. Repression, as
Rivers pointed out, is unwitting. A sentiment in the mind con¬
ditions a highly painful affect when it is aroused. After a
while, the sentiment apparently loses the power of conditioning
experience directly; it becomes repressed. How this happens
would appear to be still a complete mystery. There is reason





fear instinct. Pear at least would always seem to be an
accompaniment of an impulse about to undergo repression, and
when a complex is about to emerge from the "unconscious the
subject is apt to experience fear paralysis during the con¬
dition of sleep. It would seem according to Preud that
repression of this type does not lead to sublimation; in
fact, sublimation only occurs when the repression is raised.
Precisely what, then, does Preud mean by his constant reiter¬
ation that repression is a means to sublimation, indeed an
indispensable means? The only explanation is that Preud is
speaking of two different things. We suggest that"dissociation"
not "rep ression," should be used for all the phenomena of instinct
control bound up with.the workings of the superego. Sublim¬
ation is probably at all times a redirecting of an instinctual
energy to be described in accordance with the theory of senti¬
ment formation. The superego, unless it attains pathological
proportions, lays a relatively light hand on the impulses which
it is supposed to repress. The normal individual is more or
less implicitly conscious of his superego phantasy system. It
is a part of himself which is reasonably under control. Pro¬
vided the instinctual tendencies have not been tied up in
early childhood as a result of a trauma or series of traumas,
the individual has available for the purposes of life practically
all the energy provided by these tendencies. Preud seems to
consider/
.101.
consider that every child experiences a certain amount of
primary repression, but the point arises as to whether the
superego would be formed at all if there were no complexes
formed in the pre-superego period.
It is our belief that the superego is a more or less
consciously elaborated escape mechanism, which the child con¬
structs in order to assuage a sense of inadequacy of which he
is fully conscious. This feeling is by no means sufficient,
under normal circumstances, to occasion repression proper - if
it were, no further problems would be experienced, and the
superego would not be formed. But it is sufficient to- cause
the child to discover means of making his mind "comfortable" and
it seems to be quite in accordance with what we know of the
mentality of young children, and indeed of adults, that refuge
will be taken in phantasy weaving. The child "pretends" that
he is his father or mother, the doctor, an older brother, etc.
He is not a naughty boy, but a good person; he is not weak,
but strong. The child resorts to taking psychic drugs, and if
inferiority feelings are continually evoked by his environment,
the practice becomes habitual.
But it is not to be supposed that the individual is without
a reasonably shrewd idea both as to the worth of his pretensions
to being a superior being, and of his moral poses. He knows,
however implicitly, that he is only play-acting. The "censor"
allows the utilisation of his energies through "sublimation"
because/
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because "the censor is the conscious personality. That is,
there occurs sentiment formation, not sublimation in the strict
sense of that term. The redirecting of energy towards a
desirable end is subconscious, not -unconscious.
What harm, then, is there in the superego? Probably not
as much as would at first sight appear. But we do suggest that
it rather detracts from human dignity if the adult personality
must carry around at all times a set of childish fictions. As
Preud rightly points out, the superego leads to illusions, and
although these may have little influence on practical life,
they would seem capable of doing considerable harm when the
possessor of such illusions turns his attention to those
sciences which are based on a knowledge of human personality.
We shall later go more carefully into this last mentioned point."
We shall conclude this section with a brief reference to
one of Freud's later works, "The Future of an Illusion". in
this book, Freud turns his attention to the future prospects of
society, basing his discussion on the facts brought to light by
the psychoanalytical school. He says that he disdains "to
2.
separate culture and civilisation", and whatever may be the
precise significance of this statement, Freud continues through¬
out his work to regard culture and civilisation as more or less
synonymous.
He repeats his doctrine that civilisation has been built
up/
''See Appendix. 500.
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up as a result of sacrifices made by the individual. On account
of these sacrifices, "every individual is virtually an enemy of
culture.... Thus culture must be defended against the individual,
and its organisation, its institutions, and its laws are all
directed to this end; they aim not only at establishing a
certain distribution of property, but also at maintaining it;
in fact, they must protect against the hostile impulses of man¬
kind everything that contributes to the conquest of nature and
(•
the production of wealth."
Why is not the average individual satisfied with culture,
Freud enquires. Why does not he consider that the cultural
life which he has created is well worth the sacrifice of lower
forms of pleasure? Freud states his reply as follows: "So one
gets the impression that culture is something which was imposed
on a resisting majority by a minority that understood how to
2.
possess itself of the means of power and coercion."
But if society in the past has rested on a foundation
unacceptable to the majority of its members, why should not
contemporary humanity proceed to invent societal forms which
will please eveiyone? "That would be," says Freud, "the Golden
Age, but it is questionable if such a state of affairs- will ever
be realised. It seems more probable that eveiy culture must be
built up on coercion and instinctual renunciation; it does not
even appear certain that without coercion the majority of human
individuals/
"The Future of an Illusion", p.9-10. *'0p.cit., p.10.
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individuals would be readjr to submit to the labour necessary for
i.
acquiring new means of supporting life," That is, the average
human being would sink to the level of the primitive, if left to
himself.
As we have previously observed, Freud has a low opinion of
human nature. Here we find him saying: "One has, I think, to
reckon with the fact that there are present in all men destructive,
and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural tendencies, and that
with a great number of people these are strong enough to determine
their behaviour in human society," Mankind would still seem to
need the slave-driver's whip if it is to submit to those conditions
which are necessary for life in a civilised community. For, as
Freud says, "the masses are lazy and unintelligent, they have no
love for instinctual renunciation, they are not to be convinced of
its inevitability by argument, and the individuals support each
other in giving full play to their unruliness....Men are not
naturally fond of work, and arguments are of no avail against
3.
their passions."
Freud foresees the obvious objection to his description of
human nature, that man's undesirable qualities are "only the result
of defective cultural organisation, through which men have become
embittered, revengefi-il, and unapproachable. Hew generations
brought up kindly and taught to have a respect for reason...will





their very own possession, and they will be ready 011 its
account to make the sacrifice in labour and in instinctual
i.
renunciation that is necessary for its preservation.
Freud does not rule out this possibility, but he considers
it irrelevant. His estimate of human nature holds, since
there is no possibility that new methods of child rearing will
be tried out. If the superegos of the educators are not
modified, children will be submitted to the traditional methods
of child rearing, and since the superego can only be extensively
modified by altering these methods, the social system as we know
it is ordained to continue.
But preud is by no means hopeful that, even if means could
be devised for changing our present methods of educating young
children, society could dispense with coercion. Man is limited,
he feels, in his capacity for education. The trouble is that
each new-born child, almost independently of education, must
submit to the1 control of processes which are phylogenically
determined. Frustration thus occurs quite independently of
cultural training, and the child must inevitably develpp a
hostility to culture. Freud is referring to his theory of the
development of mankind as elaborated in "Totem and Taboo". We
there read: "One day the expelled brothers (of the primal horde)
joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to




would have remained impossible for them singly.... The violent
primal father had surely been the envied and feared model for
each of the brothers. Now they accomplished their identific¬
ation with him by devouring him, and each acquired a part of
i.
his strength." This deed being committed, suppressed tender
impulses asserted themselves, and the brothers felt intense
emotions of remorse and guilt. These led them to invent two
taboos, one against incest and the other against parricide.
The child of to-day retrospectively lives through the
primal scene, and at the point in the drama where the emotions
of remorse and guilt assert themselves, he imposes upon himself
the ancient taboos of the primeval band of brothers. But the
taboos are only accepted by the personality under the stress of
strong emotion, and the older antagonisms still remain active.
Since Freud is committed to this rather extraordinary view of
human nature, it is only logical for him to suppose that the
child is not completely amenable to educational influences.
However, on the basis of his theory, it must be considered a
merciful dispensation of Providence that the terrible
instinctual impulses, as revealed in the incestuous, parricidal,
cannibalistic, children of the primal horde, should be brought
pnder control by any method.
Preud would appear to accept gratefully as de_ facto this
phylogenically determined method of bringing the instincts under
control/
'"Totem and Taboo" p. 235-6. ?'0p.cit., p.238-9.
.107.
control. His wonder appears to be aroused at nature's
ingenuity in "binding" the primary instincts. He even con¬
siders his newly discovered superego as a lineal descendant
of nature's earlier invention for the control of the instincts.
"It is in accordance with the course of our development", he
says, "that external compulsion is gradually internalised in
that a special mental function, man's superego, takes it under
its jurisdiction. Every child presents to us the model of
this transformation; it is only by that means that it becomes
a moral and social being. This strengthening of the superego
is a highly valuable psychological possession for culture.
Those people in whom it has taken place, from being the foes of
culture, become its supporters. The greater their number in a
cultural community, the more secure it is, and the more easily
i.
can it dispense with external coercion."
It would appear, however, that in the suppressed classes
we do not find any considerable internal!sation of cultural
prohibitions5. Is, then, the superego, according to Freud, the
exclusive possession of the members of the higher classes? This,
incidentally, is not the opinion of the present writer.
Freud then goes on to discuss the value of ideals in
holding together the social group. He considers that the
3.
satisfaction which an ideal gives is of a narcissistic nature.
If this be the case, they would appear to be determined by the
superego mechanism. The ideal, Freud says, "can be shared not
only/
'
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only "by the favoured classes which enjoy the benefits of this
culture, but also by the suppressed, since the right to despise
those that are outside it compensates them for wrongs they
I.
suffer in their own group." But in addition, the lower classes,
by identifying themselves with the higher classes, are led to
imagine that they themselves possess the superior qualities if
not the privileges of those who are more favoured. "In spite
of their animosity, they can find their ideals in their masters.
Unless such relations, fundamentally of a satisfying kind, were
in existence, it would be impossible to understand how so many
cultures have contrived to exist for so long in spite of the
2.
justified hostility of great masses of men."
The most useful ideal, however, in our racial development,
according to Freud, has been the religious one. He frankly
states Ms belief that religion is illusory." But he considers
that it has had a contingent value in reconciling humanity to
it.
life in society. He believes, however, that in the near
future mankind will have to develop rational sanctions for
behaviour if social life is to continue. science has under¬
mined the foundations of religion,and we must look elsewhere for
5"
norms by which to guide our conduct. Rather strangely, Freud
does not here connect up his doctrine of the superego with the
factors which are responsible for religious faith. We have
previously noted that Freud considers the superego to be the
source of religion.
Dr. /
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Dr. Emest Jones, in his "Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis" ,
also gives the viewpoint of the psychoanalytical school in regard
to the relation of the repressed unconscious to the development
of religious ideas, when he says: "By a divine Father or Mother,
ie., god or goddess, we mean, from a purely psychological point
of view, an infantile conception of a Father or Mother, a figure
invested with all the attributes of power and perfection, and
I.
regarded with respect or awe." Since the child identifies with
the parents to form the superego, religion must therefore be a
derivation of the superego.
We have noted that Freud has stated the view that social
advance must be on the lines of the further development of the
superego!' It would seem quite clear that nothing would be more
destructive of the superego formation than the breaking down of
religious beliefs. According to Freud, the "authorities" within
the superego are imagos of our parents. Throughout life those
in whom the superego is well developed act precisely as though
the parents had a continued right to control their conduct. But
there is reason to believe that all such individuals have
identified their parents with the divine figures of whom they
heard in childhood when under religious instruction. It is safe
to say that the superego of these people would become dissolved,
or would at least assume more normal proportions, if religious
faith were lost. And again, if children are no longer given
conceptions of divine figures who have essentially the qualities
and/
'"Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis" p.427.
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and characteristics of their parents, any superego formation
which may be developed will have much less influence. Fewer
prohibitions will be internalised.
Freud, in the volume under consideration, is adding his
weight to those who., on scientific grounds, teach that religion
is illusory. He is therefore assisting indirectly in the
demolition of superego formations in his contemporaries, and
thus, according to his own arguments he is rendering impossible
any further cultural advance; indeed it would seem clear that
on Freudian presuppositions, cultural retrogression will
inevitably follow the weakening of religious belief.
Freud informs us that religion, far from being indispens¬
able in cultural development - which, as we have seen, to him
means the extension of superego control - is to be regarded as
the universal obsessional neurosis, and adds; "One might
prophesy that the abandoning of religion must take place with
the fateful inexorability of a process of growth, and that we
/■
are just now in the middle of this phase of development."
He does not appear to realise that his analogy is extremely
inapt. Anyone who has followed his previous discussion must
have arrived at the conclusion that, according to Freudian
teaching, the fateful inexorability is not one of growth but
of moving in a closed circle.
In developing the analogy, Freud says: "We know that the
human child cannot well complete its development towards
culture without/
1
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without passing through a more or less distinct phase of
neurosis. This is because the child is unable to suppress by-
rational mental effort so many of those instinctual impulsions
which cannot later be turned to account, but has had to check
them by acts of repression, behind which there stands, as a
rule, an anxiety motive. Most of these child neuroses are
overcome spontaneously as one grows up, and especially is this
I,
the fate of the obsessional neuroses of childhood." But is it
not the case that, according to the whole tenets of Freudian
theory, unwanted character trends are overcome by the process
of internalisation? They are "bound" within the superego
formation, and in the case of successful development their
energies are transformed by the method of sublimation.
In Freudian!sm, all psychic roads lead to the superego.
Without the inhibition of natural instinctual outlets, no
energy would be available for cultural process. And Freud
adds: "The remainder (of the childhood neuroses) can be cleared
2
.
up still later by psjrchoanalytical treatment." But Freud has
asked, "where the throng of superior, dependable, and dis¬
interested leaders who are to act as educators of the future
3.
generations are to come from?" Nature does not seem to have
as part of her plan the provision of ready-made psychoanalysts.
She apparently knows nothing of the Freudian analogy. It
would almost seem that "the fateful inexorability of a process
of growth" will only take place if nature has the good sense to
imitate/
1
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imitate the psychoanalytical method as developed by Professor
Freud. We can only state that as far as we are aware, there
is no evidence "that we are just now in the middle of this
phase of development". Nature so far has not responded to
Freudian sympathetic magic.
We are reminded of the story of the Frenchman who was
being attacked by a farm dog. The farmer, from a distance,
called out: "You have nothing to fear. Barking dogs don't
bite." The gesticulating Frenchman replied; "I know ze
proverb. . You know ze proverb. But does ze dog know ze proverb?"
We also have a suspicion that Nature is ignorant of the said
fateful inexorability.
In the final chapters of "The Future of an Illusion", Freud
appears to have been subjected to a widespread amnesia. He seems
to have forgotten all about psychoanalysis, the- superego,
biological principles, and the primal horde-father. We suggest
that the changed attitude is not to be deplored. The reader is
almost filled with amazement as he peruses the following lines:
"Certainly men are like this (his imaginary opponent has suggested
that human beings are not amenable to reason). But have you
asked yourself whether they need be so, whether their jinner
I
nature necessitates it?"
He then likens our present methods of child rearing to
deforming children's heads by bandaging them, and therefore the




cranial indices. He contrasts the "radiant intelligence of a
(
healthy child and the feeble mentality of the average adult."
He tells us that he does not believe that children would naturally
trouble themselves about religion. (We presume that the horde-
father is a little more pushing than the Almighty). Our minds
are enfeebled because we "accept without criticism all the
A.
absurdities that religious doctrines repeat." Our only means of
controlling the instincts is by intelligence, but the inhibition
of sexual interests prevents the development of intelligence,
especially in women, and he concludes his paragraph by saying:
"So long as a man's early years are influenced by the religious
thought inhibition, and by the loyal one derived from it, as well
as by the sexual one, we cannot really say what he is actually
like."
Freud admits the possibility that he, too, is "chasing after
an illusion", and says: "Perhaps it will turn out that human
nature remains the same even if education is not abused by being
3.
subjected to religion."
Preud thinks, then, that it is worth while to experiment with
non-religious education, and if this should prove unsatisfactory
he is ready to give up the attempt to reform human nature, and to
return to his previous description of man as being "a creature of
A.
weak intelligence who is governed by his instinctual wishes. " We
can only remark that on Freudian presuppositions, society will be
no/
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no longer in existence if the said experiment should have
proved unsuccessful.
Freud commits himself to the view that mankind should no
longer seek consolation in religious illusion. He foresees
that if this happens, man will be in a difficult situation.
"He will have to confess his utter helplessness and his insig¬
nificant part in the working of the universe; he will have to
confess that he is no longer the centre of creation - no longer
the object of the tender care of a benevolent providence
Man cannot remain a child for ever; he must venture at last
into the hostile world. This may be called his 'education to
I.
reality'". And then he adds: "Heed I tell you that it is the
sole aim of my book to draw attention to the necessity for this
2.
advance?"
And later: "Thus, bjr withdrawing his expectations from the
other world, and concentrating all his liberated energies on this
earthly life, he will probably attain to a state of things in
which life will be tolerable for all, and no one will be oppressed
3.
by culture any more." This view is hardly consonant with the
psychoanalytical doctrine of human development having proceeded on
the lines of retardation.
We shall now refer to what we believe to be the most extra¬
ordinary statement in the whole of Freudian literature. "We
may insist as much as we like," Freud says, "that the human
intellect is weak in comparison with human instincts, and be
right/
'
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right in doing so. But nevertheless, there is something
peculiar about this weakness. The voice of the intellect
is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a
hearing. Ultimately, after endlessly repeated rebuffs, it
succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be
optimistic about the future of mankind, but in itself it
I,
signifies not a little." And Freud goes on to state his
belief that •ultimately the rational part of man's soul will
strive for "the brotherhood of man and the reduction of
suffering."
Freud appears to us in the role of the man of faith,
believing where he cannot prove. More than that: he is a
sublime example of one who, in spite of all the evidence, as
he sees it, being diametrically opposed to a certain belief,
holds it to his bosom as containing within it the quintessence
of saving knowledge.
Freud gives evezy indication that he is suffering from
dissociation. And, we may say, in this lies his sanity. As
we are constituted, or rather, in so far as the superego holds
sway over our minds, reason is powerless in providing a basis
for a significant life philosophy. in large part we must trust
to intuition. it would appear certain, on the evidence of the
above quotations, that despite appearances, Professor Freud has




The superego has had limited sway in determining his fundamental
beliefs and attitudes. But if Freud has for a moment allowed
his essential humanity to express itself, he quickly resumes the
role of the dispassionate investigator. We are led to under¬
stand that he bases his optimism on science which "has shown us
I.
by numerous and significant successes that it is no illusion."
And in concluding his work, he reiterates: "No, science is no
illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that we could
3.
get anywhere else what it cannot give us."
According to Freud, then, what is-the relation of repression
to cultural development? The whole body of doctrine which he
has developed leads but to one conclusion: that repression is a
necessaiy and inevitable process which first and foremost prevents
man reverting to the level of the animal, a condition which would
involve racial extinction. The instincts must be bound, other¬
wise the devil, whose name is legion, will work destruction on the
face of the earth. But Nature is not unkind. She has provided
her consolations and compensations. Man has his ideals, his art,
his intellectual activities, these coming into existence as a bi-
product of the process of instinctual repression. Indeed, if
repressions were abrogated, mankind would be left witlf no urge
towards higher syntheses. He would become as the natural man of
Hobbes' definition, "poor, nasty, brutish". But Freud cannot
quite accept the position as stated. The scientific spirit at
least cannot be the mere product of blind, irrational, incon¬
sequential strivings. It at least must have its basis in man's
original/ (
Op.cit., p.95. '"Op.cit., p.98.
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original nature, otherwise psychoanalysis itself would have to
be regarded as just another delusion of man's over-heated
imagination. We discover that reason and crude instinctual
impulses lie at the basis of human nature. We must surmise
that reason soon realises that it is no match for its formidable
companions in a straight fight. If it is to prevail, it must do
so by guile, and even cunning. Fortunately, it would seem, the
other basic impulses become engaged in internecine strife, and
when the contending forces are nicely balanced, reason steps in
and secures victory for one side or the other despite its puny
strength. Or, to use Freud's metaphor, the instinctual impulses
become "bound". Then, and only then, has reason a chance.
In "The Future of an Illusion" Freud suggests that we
should put our faith in reason, and points out means whereby he
thinks the whole mind might be brought under the control of the
rational faculty. He suspects that the motive for the internecine
strife is somehow bound up with religion, and suggests that the
instinctual forces should, as it were, call a truce in order that
they may come to realise that that for which they are fighting is
a mere illusion. The despised and largely ignored little brother,
reason, is to have the task of providing his confreres with the
necessary information, whereupon the contending parties will
become members of a democratic community, with reason enthroned.
We can only state our opinion that, in accordance with
*
Freudian presuppositions, the outcome of the little drama we
have/
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have attempted to depict would be quite different. And yet
we believe wholeheartedly that Freud is right, and also we
venture to suggest, Freud the man, rather than the scientific
worker, knows that he is right; for human nature is not a mere
bundle of biologically determined instinctual impulses plus a
little reason. Given a fair chance, the soul of the primitive,
the soul of the child within, may yet arise in its simplicity
and lovableness. Whether the pure in heart will see God we do
not profess to know, but we are at least confident that the
single-minded will inherit the earth. "Whatever be the explan¬
ation, the soul of man thirsts after righteousness, hungers
after truth, and is unhappy unless he is able to find expfession
for his yearning for those things which are beautiful. It at
times we are drawn within the influence of that realm of crazydom
the superego, we are at least conscious of our departure from
'normality1'. Surely that is a proof of our essential sanity.
Academic psychologists.
William McDougall.
The purpose of the article is to establish the part played by
taboos in repression. Consideration of McDougall's warning
in respect of raising taboos. Suggestion that implicitly
McDougall accepts the superego mechanism as desirable.
Doctrines of self-sentiment and sentiment of self-regard
compared.
Francis Ashling.
Aveling quoted as illustration of a psychologist who finds
little evidence for the factual existence of Freudian
phenomena in normal people. Suggestion that repression




Professor McDougall expresses his views on matters relevant
to our subject in an article in "Sex in Civilisation", entitled
"Should All Taboos be Abolished?" McDougall appears to think
that repression is the indirect result of the application of
what he describes as "taboos". His arguments are principally-
based on observations of individuals who are already developed,
and there is just the possibility that he is dealing with
secondary phenomena in much of what he says. But McDougall
also did anthropological field work in the Torres Straits and
Borneo, and had at that time the opportunity of studying human
behaviour which is relatively free from the influence of
repressions. We can also take it for granted that he has
profited by the observation of the growth and development of
his own children. He has himself done work in psychopathology,
especially during the war, and therefore, in spite of the fact
that he is regarded by the psj^choanalysts as an "academic"
psychologist, we have every reason to treat with respect the
statements which he makes.
The trouble is, however, that the psychoanalysts have
obtained a hearing from the lay public, and it is greatly to be
regretted that parents especially are given a version of
psychology uncorrected by those psychologists whose vision does
not limit them within the narrow confines of superego determined
doctrine/
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doctrine. Thus, when we state that McDougall appears to
regard repression as the result of taboos, there is good reason
to believe that his opinions are the result of a careful study
of all the relevant facts. And moreover, when he warns us of
the dangers of attempting to abolish taboos, we may take it for
granted that his admonitions are based upon a careful consider¬
ation of the relevant data.
McDougall sees as the principal determinant of conduct, the
fear of breaking taboos. In a sense he states the obvious, but
it is a matter for wonder that those immersed in the study of the
unconscious mind experience difficulty in realising the part played
by the fear of breaking taboos, both in childhood and adult life.
A resistance seems to be set up in our minds against accepting
what should be so obvious. The present writer remembers
definitely attempting to dissociate his conviction of the power
of the "herd instinct" in human life. It would even appear
that in so far as we have within us neurotic trends, it is not
sex from which we are running away, but the disapproval of someone
in our present or past environment. The main purpose of
repression would appear to be the freeing of oneself from the
obligation of facing squarely the critical eyes of one's
cont emporarie s.
The neurotic is a Jonah attempting to escape from the
necessity of recognising the force of public opinion. Rank
sees in the Medusa head a symbol of the dangerous mother. He
is in part right, but the mother was dangerous just because she
exerted/
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exerted over us the force of prestige suggestion. The question
before the child is not mainly how to free himself of his pro¬
hibited impulses. The child, on the whole, retains a kindly
feeling towards the poor relations of his psychological family.
What tortures his soul is the awful sense of being subjected to
an attitude of disapproval. He wants to kill the mother or the
father, not because of the sadistic element in his make-up, not
because of his Oedipus complex - both of which may be regarded
more or less playfully by the child: not so much because they
have the power of inflicting punishment - as Freud points out,
the masochistic trend may do much to mitigate the severity of
the infliction of physical pain, erotogenous zones usually being
involved - but because the parent has the power of arousing in
the child intense negative self-feeling, a sense of worthlessness,
of being an outcast, a pariah. Oiften the child wishes to run
away from home, but he soon realises that this way out of his
difficulty is impracticable. He may seek another "authority'
to offset the parental one,among other adults, but he discovers
that grown-up society in general thinks in very much the same
terms as his parents.
It would indeed appear that there is only one possible way
of escape from the influence of the frowning eyes of the parent,
and that is among the child's contemporaries. If he can but
feel that he belongs to a "society" of individuals who have
different ideas from his parents, who indeed agree with him that
their/
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their aesthetic conceptions have no foundation in reality - we
refer to the parental negative evaluation of the coprophillic - if
he may he assured that others also regard the adults as betraying
an incapacity to differentiate between truth and error - then the
individual may succeed in assuaging the intense negative feelings
aroused by the parental "Nay".
And if we would seek for a true explanation of the formation
of the superego, it is not in Freudian mechanics, in an interplay
between aggressive feelings bound up with the Oedipus situation,
the striving of the Eros principle towards expansion, and the
clash of all positive impulses with the death instinct. Not in these
mechanisms is to be found the vera causa of that flight into unreality
which comes under the descriptive term of "'superego formation". The
sole efficient cause lies" in the child's dire need to escape from
the disapproving parent.
As we have watched the growth of our little boy, we have
noted at times his eyes turned towards his parents in almost
pathetic expectancy that there will be directed upon him those
looks of disapproval which he would appear instinctively to feel
are the force which he has most reason to fear. On one occasion,
when Philip had created a disturbance during the night, his cot was
removed by his father to an adjoining room. The boyuonly remained
two minutes in isolation, but the sight which met his father's eyes
when he returned to the room will never be forgotten. The child's
face revealed the epitome of sheer despondency. He would give in.
He would not again disturb his parents. He wanted to be wheeled
back/
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back into his room and have his mother "tuck him in". The
strained and anguished look on the child's tear-stained face,
the entire suggestion that he had recognised an overpowering
force, something which had the power to break him, to crush the
spirit, to demand implicit obedience to the word of the parental
law-giver, brought home to the writer a realisation of the sheer
quality of the irresistible which is bound up with the taboo,
the "Thou shalt not", as emanating from the adults who belong to
I.
a child's environment.
As we have said, it is strange how those engaged in self-
analysis fight shy of the most obvious fact that the meaning of
repression is only to be found in the recognition of the part
played by "the herd instinct" in human life, its all-compelling
power, its finality, its inescapability. In an earlier section
of this thesis we described the views expressed in Trotter's
"Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War", and we remarked that
however open to criticism his theoretical conceptions may be,
he was describing the most significant facts in relation to
the/
'"Note: Suttie would account for the phenomena as an exemplific¬
ation of the effects of separation anxiety. In our
view, such anxiety plays an essentially secondary part in
creating highly painful situations of the type we have described.
Philip is quite willing that his parents should go out and leave
him at home, provided a present is to be brought back. He even
urges us to go out as a means of securing an additional toy.
(See Ian Suttie, "The .Origins of Love and Hate".)
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the subject of repression.
We are willing to dabble in sexuality, we are ready to take
trips down the corridors of time in the company of Freud, of Rank,
or of Roheim. We cheerfully accept our sadism, once we have
overcome the initial shock. Even our aggressiveness is, after
all, a part of the self whose existence we had already suspected.
But what we will not accept is the truth about ourselves, in that
we are principally motivated in the setting up and retention of
repressed complexes by the simple desire to adjust ourselves to
those who have the power to evoke negative self feeling, as
McDougall has insisted for several decades.
The repressed unconscious, according to McDougall, can only
be explained as an indirect expression of taboo activity. Change
the nature of the taboos, and something will happen both in
respect of the unconscious of the contemporary individual - the
psychoanalytical curative process in reality rests on methods
which secure this end - and of society at large. 'or good or
ill, taboos represent the supreme controlling power of our societal
life. Take away that control, and the powers of darkness may be
I.
unloosed, or conversely, maybe the powers of light.
We/
''Note: Historically considered, it is probable that the fear
sanction had px-iority as a determinant of repression. The
early Egyptians seemed to be largely free from the influence of
taboos. in the case of contemporary individuals, it is also
likely that repression is founded on fear of the punishing parent
in the first place. Once ''inferiority feelings" have been
aroused, however, an abnormal sensitivity to public opinion is
developed within us. Henceforth, those painful feelings which
are the precursors of repression seem to be largely determined by
the arousal of the self instinct in its negative aspect.
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We would now consider more expressly the views of Professor
McDougall as revealed in the article to which we have made
reference. Here we find the following: "The simple secret of
the power of taboo is that man is by nature incurably social.
He cannot bear to be alone, and worse, far worse than physical
isolation, is moral isolation. We are so constituted that we
desire not only to be with our fellows, but also to be at one
with them, and each of us knows that, if he should break a taboo,
they will look askance at him, regard him as an outsider. And
we cannot bear to be so regarded. It is only the social outcast,
the man that is already a hopeless outsider, who is unaffected by
\.
taboo. For him, the worst has happened; he has nothing to fear."
And, we may add, it is almost certain that the person seemingly
unaffected by taboos has formed within himself the conception
that he is the object of some special approval, possibly of a
divine figure.
McDougall continues: "in spite of the assurance of secrecy,
of exemption from all ostracism, we shrink from the tabooed action.
The action is not forbidden by law; it carries no penalty, as far
as we can see; it will harm no one. And yet we shrink from it,
it is repugnant to us. How explain the fact? For fact it is.
■v.
There are some tabooed actions, the mere imagination of which we
7
.
shrink from in horror, even though they may fascinate us."
McDougall's explanation is on the whole similar to Freud's
in that, he states that our respect for taboos which are not
connected/
'
"Sex in Civilisation" p.85. s'Op.cit., p.85.
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connected with our immediate environment is due to the influence
of early training, being "formed under the influence of...our
i.
social circle, and more especially the circle of our childhood."
We are here tempted to state a belief which may be regarded
as unorthodox. In our view, there is an extraordinary similarity
between many of the conceptions of Freud and McDougall. It is
true that McDougall explains psychological phenomena in terms of
the sentiments, while Freud's views are anchored to the notion of
repressed complexes working more or less autonomously. But when
McDougall describes the higher sentiments, especially the moral
ones and those of self-regard, he appears implicitly to accept
most of the findings of Freud in respect of the part played in
life by the superego.
Briefly, our position may be stated thus: McDougall, in his
conception of the normal, has a place for an intrusive element of
an irrational nature. He regards human nature, however, as it
were from the outside. He notes the workings of instinctual
tendencies in ordinary conscious life, and has formed a theory
which in the main appears to be true to the facts. When dis¬
cussing the abnormal aspects of human character, McDougall tends
to explain the abnormal in terms of the normal. In certain
cases, his explanation of the "unconscious" does not appear
altogether satisfactory. We suggest the reason. McDougall is




level also account for phenomena resulting from repression,
but it is doubtful if he is fully cognisant of the degree of
elaboration which typifies unconsciously determined mental
expressions, and also he would not appear to be fully aware of
the universality of the ''repressed unconscious".
Freud, on the other hand, attempts to explain the normal
in terms of the abnormal. He is superego obsessed, and his
psychological conceptions are almost entirely based on the
admittedly strange workings of unconscious repression determined
process. His exclusive dealing with the phenomena of the
unconscious leads to two opposite results. He insists that
conscious life is not what it seems to be. The instinctual
tendencies described by McDougall are mere figments of the
imagination; and when in his explorations of the unconscious,
he comes across the very peak formation of human inanity, he
proudly describes it as the determinant of all the best in
human life, that which .represents the summit of human, achievement,
the ego-ideal, incorporated in the superego.
By a strange irony of fate, this Sinaic eminence is the
meeting ground of the two most outstanding figures in the psycho¬
logical world, whose views' would appear to be diametrically
opposed, whose methods of psychological approach are as disparate
as could possibly be imagined. Freud, however, wrapped in his
aura of superego-determined emanations, fails to note the presence
of the other, while McDougall, much to his chagrin, discovers that,
in spite of all his efforts to attract the attention of his
di st ingui shed/
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distinguished contemporary, his presence is ignored.
We read in McDougall's "Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology"
in reference to the fourth level of human development: "The top¬
most level...is achieved by the formation of the moral sentiments
and an ideal of self shaped by the moral tradition. Freud's
"ego" is, in short, what in my 'Social psychology' is called
character; while his superego (with its ego-ideal contained within
I.
it) corresponds to what in my book is called 'moral character'".
McDougall then quotes from Freud's "hew Lectures": "The superego
of the child is not really built on the parents' superego; it
takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition
and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in
this way from generation to generation....The ideologies of the
superego perpetuate the past, the traditions of the race and
s.
the people."
McDougall makes the following comment; "These and a few other
passages from the "Hew Lectures" show clearly that Freud is here,
tardily and scantily, recognising that highest level of functioning
and the development of it under the influence of parents and other
elders who embody the moral tradition. There is here no sub¬
stantial difference between us; except that Freud merely points
to the essential farts, while I have tried to supply in some detail,
by aid of my theory of the sentiments, an account of the develop¬




''Op.cit., p.103. J'0p,cit., p.103. 3'0p.cit., p.104.
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There is, we suggest, reason to suspect that McDougall does
not recognise an irrational factor underlying his sentiment of
».
self-regard, of which he says in his "Character and the Conduct
of life": "This alone can perfectly fill the role of master-senti¬
ment; it alone can supply a determining motive for right conduct
in all conceivable circumstances; and it alone makes always for
strength of character, efficient volition, and enduring happiness."
We would note that McDougall speaks of "self-regard" not
"self-respect". It is perfectly understandable that in the
hierarchy of sentiments the self-sentiment should have the pre¬
dominant role. Under civilised conditions at least, and probably
in the case of all contemporary human beings, the strongest
instinctive tendency is that which causes us to pay attention to
the thoughts entertained of us by others, and so long as a person
is objectively minded, there is constantly at work within him an
interest in his standing within that circle whose views he con¬
siders worthy of respect. We have suggested that "abnormality" is
mainly the result of the individual's attempting to hide himself
away from the critical gaze of those who form part of his signif¬
icant environment. formally, the self-instinct is at work
throughout our lives, and it would seem to supply our dominant
motive. The doctrine of the "self-sentiment" as playing the
principal/
''Cf. J.O.Plugel, "A Hundred Years of Psychology", page 288,
where he says;"The second factor (introjection of narcissistic
libido into the superego, this leading to the setting up of
ideals) has obviously much in common with the self-regarding
sentiment of McDougall.
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principal role in human life appears to be well established.
But when we read the above quotation, we are unable to equate
the prosaic though all-embracing self-sentiment as discoverable -
ideally at least - in normal individuals, with that sentiment of
self-regard which "alone can supply a determining motive for right
conduct in all conceivable circumstances"; and which "alone makes
for strength of character, efficient volition, and enduring
happiness."
We cannot here pursue the point further. In the last resort,
in these matters, we can only fall back on a statement that the
writer personally, as a result of "empathy", thinks a certain con¬
clusion is justifiable. The most we can say is that in our view
the self-sentiment, as a rational component of the human psyche,
cannot be appropriately the object of idyllic reference. The
superego, with its counterpart of the sentiment of self-regard,
on the contrary, would appear to stand in need of a good deal of
eulogising if it is to be regarded as an intellectually respectable
I.
part of the human mind.
To return to the main line of our discussion. Speaking of
J.
taboo, in the article to which we first referred, McDougall says
that "through emotional contagion we share the emotional attitudes
of our circle to the tabooed actions, and the attitudes become
habitual/
'"Hote: It is interesting to compare Professor Drever's treatment
of the self-sentiment with that of Professor McDougall.
(See "The Psychology of Education" p.70, and pp.80-112).
"'
"Sex in Civilisation" p.86.
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habitual; in short, we acquire moral sentiments of repugnance
or aversion'." This in point of fact is how our characters are
built up, whatever part we think repression plays in human life.
We would suggest here that if the Freudian superego has a biological
function, it must lie in its capacity for maintaining the influence
derived from early prestige suggestion throughout the whole life of
the individual. It is perhaps necessary, if the race is to con¬
tinue, that our more biologically significant impulses should be
outwith the power of direct conscious control. later, we find
McDougall saying: "And our sex taboos are concerned with just
this troublesome business of getting men born. There is not the
least reason to suppose that reason alone would perpetuate the
race. The begetting and the rearing of children is a most
unreasonable business. Can we reasonably hope to commit it without
a.
serious results, to the care of reason?" Those who would abrogate
repression would do well to consider carefully McDougallTs statement
He goes further: "Let us note," he says, "that no people
known to us, however advanced or however primitive, has continued
3
to exist without sex taboos." And later he refers to "The Clash
of Culture and the Contact of Races" by Pitt-Rivers, in bearing
out his assertion that "perhaps natural selection rapidly and
surely eliminates societies without sex taboos or those in which
A.
sex taboos become few or feeble."
He also makes the following apparently incontrovertible
statement: "And in view of the fact that the conduct of most of
us/
'Op.cit., p.86. aOp.cit., p.87. 30p.cit., p.87. ^Op.cit., p.88.
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us has hitherto owed so little to reason and so much to taboo, the
burden of proof must be with the exponents of the policy of reason.
For though our conduct may not on the average be veiy lofty or
admirable, nevertheless we are here, society has at least survived,
and even our much decried civilisation has shown itself to be
f.
compatible heretofore with the multiplication of the species."
It is argued in Benjamin Kidd's "Social Evolution" (1896),
that during the whole course of human history, religion has had the
function of looking after the interests of posterity. On page 64
he has the title heading: "There is no rational sanction for
progress". He sums up his position in the following words; "A
religion is a form of belief providing an ultra-rational sanction
for that large class of conduct in the individual where his
interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic,
and by which the foxmer are rendered subordinate to the latter in
the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing,
like Pitt-Rivers, Kidd discusses the harmful effects of the "clash
of cultures" on primitive peoples in that taboo sanctions are
weakened. If we agree with Freud in considering that religion
has been the traditional guardian of the taboo system, we may
regard the convincing arguments put forward in the work to which
we have just referred as substantiating McDougall's suggestion
that taboos have had a great deal to do with the continued
propagation of the race; and also, in point of fast, with the
preservation/
'"Op.cit. , p.87. 3.
"Benjamin Kidd, "Social Evolution" (1896) p.112. Ibid., p.51.
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preservation of tribal solidarity, without which a culture
quickly disappears.
McDougall pertinently says: "Take any one of the forms of
behaviour in our list of sex taboos, and in calm detatchment from
all taboo influences and emotional repugnances, ask yourself the
question, why not?....In each case a compelling answer requires a
wide range of knowledge and a wise judgment, and presupposes a
very strong interest in or desire for the continued flourishing
of the social group in the distant future. We may hopefully
estimate that one young person in a hundred might find an answer
I.
such as would prompt an effort of self-restraint." As a result
of studying the behaviour of young people in his immediate area,
where taboos are to all intents and purposes a thing of the past,
the present writer must regretfully confirm what McDougall thinks
will be the result of society's being freed from the influence of
taboos.
What is the place of repression in cultural development?
McDougall would have us believe that, if taboos disappear without
something taking their place, the veiy existence of the race
itself is endangered:,, and with it that superstructure which we
call culture.
McDougall, both in the article at present under consideration
and in the other two works to which we have here made reference,
discusses at considerable length the doctrine of sublimation.
Theoretically/
"Sex in civilisation" p.93.
.134.
Theoreticallyj he does not consider that repression is a constant
in the contemporary mind, and therefore in general he considers
that siiblimation, "the raising of the plane upon which the energy
of any instinct operates proceeds as a part of the normal
development of sentiments. But he is definitely of opinion that
in the sex sphere sublimation does not occur unless there is
restraint. "Without sex restraint, no sublimation, and without
sublimation, no culture, but rather the pleasant, lazy life of
Trobriand, of Tahiti, of Hawaii. We may say also more confidently:
j.
no restraint, then no love, but only lust."
One is not altogether satisfied with McDoiigall' s last state¬
ment. There is the suspicion that if the sex impulse were not
waylaid in the superego system it would of itself become attached
to an object which would provide its own restraints. Havelock
Ellis, in his introduction to "Sex in Civilisation", tells us that
"the cultivation of sex, being primordial, can reach a high degree
outside what we usually call civilisation. We discover that in
this field, as we have long known to happen in other fields, the
3.
■uncivilised man can be an artist." And of the Trobriand
Islanders; "Their art of love is in the best sense more civilised
than ours usually is...They are considerate of the feelings of the





"Sex in Civilisation" p.92. "'"Sex in Civilisation" p.21.
J Ibid. p.20.
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McDougall, however, would appeal" to recognise this, for he
makes the interesting statement: "The beauty of woman's form,
although it greatly adds to its power to excite the sex impulse
in man, yet in some obscure way evokes a restraining influence.
It evokes another and opposed dynamic tendency of our nature;
and this, holding the sex impulse in restraint, secures that
balanced satisfaction of opposed tendencies which is of the
I.
essence of aesthetic contemplation." But later he adds: "If then
we were all as sensitive to beauty and ugliness as Shellejr and
Byron and Dante, and if all women were as beautiful as Beatrice,
we should need no sex taboos. But unfortunately the majority of
a.
us fall far short."
It is, however, a moot point whether our falling short is
not the effect of unnatural conditions resulting from civilis¬
ation's present method of repressing the sex impulse.
McDougall, however, would seem to be right in insisting
that if, under conditions as we know them, the energy of the sex
impulse "be freely expended in the most direct and natural
fashion, it will not seek and find...alternative and higher
3 .
expression."
But McDougall's most significant statement from our present
standpoint is made in a connection which has no direct" relation
to the questions of repression and sublimation. In his "Character
and the Conduct of Life", we find the following: "The mysterious
though/
''Op.cit. , p.90. 'Op.cit., p.92. 30p.cit., p.91.
.136.
though very real process of self-control, the practice of
recognising and nipping in the bud inappropriate stirrings of
our tendencies, is here of the first importance. The power
of exerting such control may be developed in children, by wise
i.
guidance." He refers to the modifications of our original
disposition. He then speaks of "the discouragement of over-
strong tendencies. Its essence," he says, "is development of
the power to inhibit, to cut short, an impulse at the earliest
possible moment when we become aware that it is stirring within
us. Mysterious as it may seem, this power may be acquired in
Q.
very high degree, and is of the first importance."
We have discovered that when our child has, in moments of
calm deliberation, decided that he would not repeat certain
peccadilloes which appeared to have become habitual, he was able
to carry out his intention to reform. On one or two occasions,
under these circumstances, he has apparently forgotten his good
resolutions, but being reminded of the modification of his con¬
duct which he had decided to effect, he has checked the impulses
which were beginning to find expression. This only occurred
when the emotional outburst was at its inception. We have dis¬
covered that it is quite useless to attempt to reason with the
child when he is in a state of developed emotion. One of the
questions which we are here attempting to decide is whether
repression is inevitable, and our answer must largely depend on
the/
'"Character and the Conduct of life" p.26. ^Op.cit., p.30.
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the question of the child's power of self-control as a result
of rational process. McDougall supports the view that such
control is possible.
We would conclude by referring to another conception found
in the work last quoted. ''Though direct inhibition is possible
and useful, and should be practised, he who sets out on the road
of self-discipline does well to recognise that inhibition may
generally be achieved more easily and effectively by energetically
turning towards and striving for some other goal, whether as a
momentary action or as a sustained policy." Applying this
conception in the educational field, our policy will be to build
up in the child sentiments which will increasingly draw him away
from forms of unadapted- behaviour, and provide him with the
necessary conditions for McDougall's more effective means of
'■
self-control.
McDougall's position in regard to repression as a determinant
of cultural process would, then, appear to be that society depends
for its very existence on taboos (the chief predeterminants of
repression), and therefore, indirectly, repression is a condition
of cultural process. We note the similarity to the views of
5.
Professor Freud. To him, suppression of sex at least; is an
essential condition of cultural development.
.




'Op.cit., p.32. JOp.cit., p.31.
3-See section of Freud, thesis page 61-2, and 103-4.
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accepts repressions, as described by Freudians, as necessary and
highly desirable. In the main, we hold he is right in treating
of repression in terms derived from a study of normal conscious
process, but we have attempted to show that he accepts
uncritically certain psychic formations which, in our view,
have their root in the Freudian superego.
We note that McDougall stresses the possibility of self-
control as the result of rational process applied at moments
when a tendency is, as it were, just beginning to bestir itself.
And also we would bear in mind McDougall's doctrine of the
place of sentiment formation in stabilising the human person¬
ality. By combining the two methods of instinctual control,
we have to hand the means of effective prophylaxis in respect
of the development of repressed complexes. Provided the
application of the methods of prophylaxis is thorough, it is
our belief that fears for the future of society are groundless.
X
Francis A^eling.
Aveling envisages normality without repressed impulses,
and "sublimation" as controllable. He opposes the idea that
a complex should be regarded as a hypostasised entity, but
describes it as a "personal tendency radically connected with
a thwarted instinct." "The censor, 1 he states, "is the
character, as far as this is integrated apart from the complex
i.
in question." There is probably a good deal of truth in the
suggestion that a complex is part of an entire mental organis¬
ation, and is subject to a greater or less degree of control by
the integrated character.
"All abnormalities", he says, "...are in reality no more
than morbid exaggerations of quite normal mental processes.
All of us experience inner conflicts of one kind or another,
whether fully or only partially conscious. If we do not all
suffer from complexes, all of us have sentiments or emotionally
charged memories which, if they are unpleasant, most of us do
not wish to recall - even if we are able to do §o. All of us
have censors, in the shape of accepted traditions, social, moral,
or religious, which have been forced upon us, as a rule in veiy
early childhood, by the sheer pressure of our environment.
Even such morbid mechanisms as the Oedipus or ELectra" complex
have their noimal counterparts in the ordinary attitudes which
a.
a child spontaneously adopts towards his father and mother."
"in/
'Francis Ave^ing, "Directing Mental Energy" p.228.
*■ Op. cit. , p.229.
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'In normal people," he says, "we need not look for deeply
repressed complexes of this kind, which require a course of
analysis, extending perhaps over months and even years, for
discovery. The sentiments and old emotional experiences, and
desires running counter to their accepted traditions, even if
forgotten, lie near the surface, and can.more easily be recalled.
Indeed, many of them come quite clearly to awareness when what is
called an examination of conscience is made. In such an examin-
i.
ation one is really making a confession to oneself."
"Sublimation, on the other hand, is a process in which
excess of energy properly belonging to an instinctive disposition
is drained away from its connate, and in the circumstances
undesirable, outlet, to some other socially more beneficial one,
either within the scope of the instinct or outside it. Thus,
for example, the urge to anger with those who oppose his will of
the man of irascible temperament, may be diverted to the conquest
of difficulties in the arduous pursuit of some goal that will be
of service to his fellows. Thus the drive of sex may be - and,
in circumstances in which it cannot find its connate sexual
outlet, generally is - employed in other directions. Social
conditions are not always such that this instinct can have free
release in its normal channels. The disharmonies between the
time of its arousal and the possibility of its satisfaction are
notorious.?T
The/
'"Op.cit., p.231. 50p.cit., p.232.
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The knowledge that such a transformation is possible in the
case of instinctive activity enables the "normal" individual to
set about the management of his impulses and desires with a
strong and justifiable hope of success in resolving his disturb¬
ances. Not only can he pass these in review before his mind as
in catharsis; he can divert his energy and set about the
creation of sentiments also in which it is capable of being
t.
fully employed to advantage.
Aveling, then, sees repression in the light of subconscious
process, and uses sublimation as a synonym for sentiment formation.
In the main, his position seems well substantiated. He makes no
mention of repression brought about as a result of intense psychic
pain. He presumably regards such repressions as abnormal.
If Aveling is right, repressions as described by Freudians
hardly exist, and sublimation is not an unconscious process.
Though the present writer cannot wholly accept these opinions,
he realises that Aveling, as a trained psychologist, is speaking
of the facts as he sees them. One thing is at least certain;
the normal people with whom Aveling has made contact cannot have
been greatly influenced in their daily lives by Freudian
mechanisms. It is also obvious that these individuals believed
X
that they had control of their mental energy.
Our view would be that the "unconscious" of normal persons




all sublimations are subconsciously elaborated. Aveling sees
complexes in the light of sentiments which have been forced
upon us by our environment. He admits that they may be a
troublesome feature in our mental life. But why, we may ask,
does not the normal person seek to break up sentiments which
are no longer adaptive? Why continue to be influenced by our
early environment? The answer is that we cannot break up these
sentiments. If one has developed a dislike for an individual
in adult life, and subsequent relations prove that one's original
feelings were based on a false judgment, the underlying sentiment
is modified accordingly. How is it, then, that, despite all
conscious effort, despite all the new evidence we have before
us, our childhood prejudices remain? Our view is that the
explanation lies somewhere along the lines of Freud's superego
or Hadfield's self-phantasy.
Nevertheless, we consider Aveling's account of repression
and sublimation as nearer to the truth than that of the
Freudians. The average individual is veiy nearly "normal", but




The purpose of this section is to treat of the doctrine that
human nature is equipped to respond to values. In the
course of discussion it is suggested that Brown implicitly
accepts the superego mechanism as normal. Discussion of the
psychological basis of religious experience, so far as relevant
to our subject.
A. Campbell Garnett.
Further treatment of the position that values must be taken
into consideration in discussing human nature. Garnett's
views on sublimation.
0. P. Blacker.
The main object of-this article is to demonstrate that the
Freudian doctrine has no adequate philosophical basis.
Deduction drawn as to the effects of becoming engrossed in
the phenomena of the repressed unconscious on capacity for
adopting a rational attitude to wider issues. Suggestion




Dr. Brown's viewpoint on psychology is almost identical
with that of the writer. He regards repression as pathological,
but not dissociation, which he considers normal. The subject
of sublimation he leaves almost untouched. Values he considers
independent of the self. He regards repressed complexes as
preventing an objective attitude. Religion he considers is
purified by analysis, but religion is to be defined mainly in
terms of the values of truth, beauty, and goodness, although he
does not consider these values as identical with religion. As
he states in "Mind and Personality"; "The value experiences of
the good, the beautiful and the true, are not identical with
religious experien.ce although they are related to it. Religious
experience is not exactly on all fours with it; 'it is not on
the same level, but on a higher level still....Personality is
within these values which we have been describing, and passes
through them to enrich the higher of the more profound religious
attitude. It takes one beyond the time and the limits of the
individual, and that is what is meant by saying that the
personality is in the end transcended in the Absolute or God,
/.
and that there is only one complete personality.V
The present writer, however, does not profess to having
the religious insight of Dr. Brown.
We/
''William Brown, "Mind and Personality", p.303.
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We would now very briefly summarise the salient features
of 'Science and Personality". In an early chapter, we find
Brown saying: "Health, is a simple thing; it is disease that
is complex. Truth is simple; error is complex; There is one
I.
way of hitting the mark, but innumerable ways of missing it."
The neurotic personality is complex. Its phenomena, almost
baffling description in their infinite permutations and combin¬
ations, are indeed formidable. But beneath this complex mass,
we may look for the point where the organism departed from
health. In our view, the significant facts from the standpoint
of etiology are very simple, but they cannot be understood unless
a clear conception is formed of the psycho-neurotic disposition
as being, in however modified a degree, a condition of disease.
Dissociation, to Brown, is normal and necessary, but he
makes it clear that "normal dissociation is of the nature of
rational rejection or renunciation." But "in repression, the
individual, runs away from the experience, and does not adequately
face it; he pushes it aside, and yet a part of his mind continues
2,
to cling to it. The mind is divided against itself."
We would point out the essential similarity between the
views of Professor Janet and those of Dr. Brown.
Dr. Brown is a realist, and we find him saying: "Ho mind
is completely normal, since no mind completely solves its
problems from day to day, and it is the failure to solve mental
problems/
''"Science and Personality" p.25. "'Op.cit., p.65.
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problems which is one of the general causes of the symptoms of
psycho-neurosis and mental disease." And again: "In the most
normal mind there is a falling away from complete unity. There
is in the activity of this unitary mind, not only a normal pro¬
cess of disjunction or dissociation, but also a certain degree of
abnormal dissociation."
Although Dr. Brown does not explicitly say so, we may take
it that room is left in his system for the activities of the
Freudian superego. But it is quite clear that he does not con¬
sider that the task of the psychotherapist lies wholly within the
realm of the repressed unconscious and its eruptions in
consciousness. Unhaxmonious sentiments also require attention.
He says: "In addition to abreaction, I advocate the thorough
thinking out of the whole psychological situation by the patient,
so that he may be brought eventually to understand himself
a.
adequately."
One statement made by Brown the present writer considers
of considerable significance. Brown tells us: "But there is an
instinctive cognitive activity, fundamental, present at birth,
undergoing its own course of development in relation to the
other instinctive activities. This is the activity, the
instinctive urge, which has been entirely neglected by Freud
(except in the form of sexual curiosity), and by most of the
3.
modern writers on instinct psychology."
It/
'•Op.cit., p. 41. '-Op.cit., p. 45. 30p.cit., p. 77-8.
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It may well be that the tendency to which Brown refers
has a basis in the instinct of curiosity as defined by McDougall
and Drever, but it is certain that the tendency quickly shows
itself as a rational interest in persons and things which
surround the child. The impression is given that the child has
as part of his biological equipment a definite tendency peculiarly
adapted for the acquirement of his cultural tradition and a
scientific understanding of the world in which he is destined
to play a. part. We stress the point, in view of the necessity
of having a clear conception within our mind as to the nature of
the young child at the time when he becomes involved in the
conflicts which, if Freud is right, lead to the extraordinary
system of projections, introjections, identifications, further
projections and re-identifications, which are the preliminaries
to the child attaining to that "hall-mark" of human personality,
the Freudian superego.
Dr. Brown apparently accepts the sentiment theory of Shand
and McDougall, but as may be expected, he considers that the
master-sentiment should ideally be one 'related "to the universe
as a perfected system, as the full realisation of the good, the
I.
beautiful, and the true." But after all, the business of the
psychologist is to describe human nature as he finds it in
normal individuals, and Professor Drever's self-sentiment would
seem most adequately to sum up the facts as discoverable in the
normal/
'■Op. cit., p. 79.
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normal individual. But it appears that Br. Brown is fully-
justified in defining a more ideal principle of synthesis. He
states in psychological terms the ideal objective of human
existence, and his position can only be criticised in so far as
it may be proved that human nature is incapable of realising
this ideal.
nevertheless, Br. Brown sees the necessity of defining
normality from a less ideal standpoint. He says: "The normal
person is a person who is free from complexes, fixations, and
projections, and who has a clear and direct view of events
outside, sees them as they are, sees other people as they are,
and also sees himself as he isf
Abnormality and introvert ion he regards as synonjnnous, and he
describes the abnormal or the introvert as "a person who is morbid
through shocks, unsolved mental complexes, fixations, disturbances
of mental development, disharmony which attracts his attention to
himself. His mind is held and is unable to give him a clear
picture of himself." Then Brown expresses himself in the following
clarifying statement: "The interests of some people are more
definitely called out by external events, events of the outer
world. Others have interest in what goes on inside them, but
that distinction is simply a distinction like any other. One
person is special^ interested in physics, another in psychology,
but/
'•Qp.cit., p.84. J'Op.cit., p.84.
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but both are extroverted. It is a matter of classifying interests
into subjective interests and objective interests - a distinction
that is not a fundamental one. On the other hand, the dis-
i.
tinction of the normal and the pathological is fundamental. "
He then goes on to say: "like the physical sciences, psychology
is a form of revelation. Something may stand in the way. The
3,
individual may stand in his own light...." Psychotherapy aims
at freeing the patient from introversion and subjectivity.
Referring to conscience, Dr. Brown insists on distinguishing
between true conscience and "the mere feeling that certain things
3.
should be done without giving any justification for it." It is
a pity that Freudian psychologists are unable to make this dis¬
tinction. If they could, that psychoneurosis which we call
psychoanalysis would be quickly healed.
Speaking on the same subject, Brown says: "One realises
that conscience is a good thing. It is one of the fundamental
values of human life. like truth, it is not to be questioned in
so far as it is real conscience, but the fact that we may have a
A.
false conscience needs explanation. " It is surely not the
business of a psychopathologist to make idyllic references to
that false conscience which is bound up with the superego system.
\
Brown makes the point that Freudians must at least accept
one value as non-illusory, that is, truth, psychoanalysis itself
sr.
being 'qua theoxy...an intellectual construction." Brown then
adds/
'op.cit., p.84. 50p.cit., p.84. *'Op,cit., p.113-4. ''Op.cit., p.114
^Op.cit., p.115-6.
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adds; "In the same way there should be a criterion of beauty.
Some Freudians undertake to explain aesthetic processes as
'reaction formations' to sex activities from moral sources, but
they have no criterion of aesthetics, nor has Freud himself any
criterion of morals. Finally, he has no criterion of religious
experience. All through he is explaining things away, instead
of explaining them, and he is producing a theory which is
I.
impressive because it is so all embracing."
Speaking more specifically of repression as a dysfunction
in cultural life, though referring in particular to religious
experience, Brown tells us that objective experience may be
obscured in several ways, one of which is self-centredness,
self-love, which "is the enemy of every kind of love. It is the
vampire which seeks to draw everything into itself. It is the
thing from which we must obtain deliverance. It is the dragon
a.
which must be slain." We may infer that Dr. Brown refers to
secondary narcissism as incorporated within the superego system.
In our view, there is no primary narcissism. The young child
is objectively oriented.
We have only one criticism to make of what we regard as a
most satisfactory statement of the facts relating to the
phenomena of the repressed unconscious. Dr. Brown's work
requires to be supplemented by the application of the principles
which/
'"Op.cit., p.182. ^Op.cit., p.225.
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which he describes to the training of young children. There is
just the suspicion that he has not yet attained perspective in
respect of the concrete situation as it exists in the nursery.
We find him saying: "The young child has an idea of his father as
perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, etc. later on, he becomes dis¬
illusioned and finds that his father is not so powerful or
magnificent." The present writer is of the opinion that the
young child would never develop ideas so nonsensical unless he
were already seeking a compensatory ideal for inferiority feelings
which have been thrust upon him. Freudians constantly tell us
that the young child is in a state of primary narcissism. If it
were so, it is hardly likely that he would gratuitously hand over
the palms of honour and glory to his male parent. The Freudian
answer would probably be that the child does not clearly dis¬
tinguish between his father and himself. According to our
experience, nothing is farther from the truth. The child has veiy
definite attitudes towards "a present for father" and a present
for himself. As soon as he realises that he is not to be the
recipient of the present, the child's interest vanishes.
We are thus left with the problem as to why the young
narcissist should attribute to his father "the power and the glory".
If it be proved that an individual did fall into this veiy specific
error of over-evaluation, we must look for other causes. If the




view his parents with impartial objectivity, noting their faults
as well as their virtues, unless some distorting influence is at
work. This distorting influence, we suggest, is usually due to
inferiority feelings having been evoked, and in general. the
setting up of those conflicts which we hold lead the child to
being drawn within that fatal web of his own weaving, the superego
system.
Dr. Brown continues; "And yet there remains this ideal of
omniscience and omnipotence which is then projected away from
the individual, as the conception of a G-od all-powerful and all-
loving." We would, with all deference, express the opinion that
Dr. Brown does not appear to be altogether aware of the complexity
of those conditions which bring into being the repressed
unconscious, nor is he able to see the relation of those norms
which he so ably defends to the concrete situation in which both
parents and children are involved.
Meantime, at least, we must reserve judgment as to whether or
not the religious philosophy which Dr. Brown is able to accept
has its basis in a "sublimation" - that is, whether it is complex
determined. If this prove to be the case, according to the
main position talcen Lip by Dr. Brown, the religious experience to
which he refers must be regarded as suspect. It is the result of
an artificially developed need which would have little more





The purpose of this section is to give an account of
repression as viewed by a psychologist who is also a recognised
st.udent of philosophy.
In general 3 Garnett considers that ultimate values are in
no way contingent upon the process of repression. Virtually,
he does not recognise the existence of sublimation as such.
He stresses the existence of a capacity in man for acting in
accordance with ethical and other norms. We shall follow his
discussion as found in his book "Instinct and Personality'1, and
by so doing attempt to find a> basis for conceptions which we
shall use at a later stage. We shall also compare Garnett's
description of human personality with that of orthodox Freudians.
Dr. Garnett's explanation of the unconscious is of interest
because it is on the lines followed by Janet. He is emphatic
that the mind normally acts as a whole. This is our belief in
respect of normal individuals in whom is incorporated a superego.
It appears to us that Garnett's conception of the personality as
not ordinarily losing hold of the threads which go to make up our
psychic life is of considerable value.
We now turn to Garnett's reference to the ethical aspect of
experience. When the writer was recently attending a course of
lectures given under the auspices of the Workers' Educational
Association, a member of the class requested the lecturer to




reply was that "right" is that which is socially approved, and
"wrong" that which is socially disapproved. Several members of
the class were obviously dissatisfied with these definitions.
It is, of course, probably true that psychology as a science, in
the present state of its development, is justified in more or
less ignoring the plain man's conviction that the idea of social
approval or disapproval does not explain the moral sense. We
know that the psychoanalyst rushes into the breach with what he
believes to be an illuminating supplement to the view of the
"academic" psychologist. The ideas of right and wrong are
essentially bound up with the superego formation, but when
pressed for further information on the matter, the psychoanalyst
admits that the ideas of right and wrong are mediately derivative
from public opinion. In conscience, it is our parents who are
speaking, or rather a reflection of their own superegos which is
indirectly derived from notions bpilt upon what our ancestors
happened to regard as worthy or unworthy of social approval.
Catechising the psychoanalyst a little further, we have the
uneasy suspicion that the superego "right" is often wrong, and
its "wrong" often right. We are no longer impressed with the
psychoanalyst's claim that he has esoteric knowledge as to the
distinction under discussion. The plain man is thus left with
his question unanswered.
It is indeed very important for practical conduct that the
ordinary/
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ordinary individual should feel a conviction that right and
wrong are terms of more than contingent significance. This is
especially true when we enter the nursery and seek to guide the
child during the period of his early development.
We think, therefore, that Dr. Garnett's discussion of this
problem must be regarded as a real contribution to the science
of education. lie says: "In almost every language there is a
word corresponding to our word 'right'. There is no tribe of
humans, be they ever so low, and whatever the shortcomings of
their language, to whom Christian missionaries have been unable
to convey the notion of right and wrong, finding sometimes that
the idea is not unknown even though there is no special word to
I.
express it."
And later he says: "Unless custom had been judged at the
bar of this higher concept, there could have been no advance to
a higher plane, only a loosening of the group of customs and a
descent into anarchy, or else the mere exchange of one custom
3.
for another. "
We also attribute considerable significance to Dr. Garnett's
discussion on the ideals. "The altruistic motive," he says,
"satisfies something in our nature which the instinctive impulses
cannot account for, some urge which is above them or more funda¬
mental than they. This evaluation of altruism is but a particular
instance of the general trend of the human mind - the tendency to
place a higher value on the goods of the spirit. The good, the
beautiful/
''A.Campbell Garnett, "Instinct and Personality" p. 102-3.
^Op.cit. , p.lQ5.
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beautiful, the true, possess a magnetism for mankind which
I.
cannot be explained by any alchemy of instincts."
He further says: "The patient, earnest, eager seeking of
the finest minds for a philosophy that shall glimpse a little
deeper into the meaning of life, a little farther into the
whence and whither of the universe, is moved by something deeper
than the instinct which subserves the animal needs. A readily
aroused and persistent curiosity is not commonly accompanied by
3.
a compelling love of truth." On the next page we read as
follows: "The urge of the ideals is something essentially
different from that of the instincts. The instinctive end is
never ultimate, but always a means unto a further end. The end
in the service of which all the instincts exist is the preserv-
3.
ation of the individual and the species."
He says that to pursue an instinctive activity beyond the
point of satiety is to "excite pain and cause injury, but the
urge of the ideals - the desires of the spirit as they have been
called - is different. Bor them there is no point of satiety,
A.
and they can only be pursued well if pursued for their own sakes."
Gannett then refers to Arthur Glutton Brock's "Ultimate Belief".
for the human being, beauty, truth, and goodness mean life.
"The triple ideal is but an analysis of the spirit's one desire;
and that desire is the response of the life within to that which
has come to mean for it fuller and more abundant life - that
which/
'Op.cit., p.109. "Op.cit., p.110. J,0p.cit., p.111.
40p.cit., p.111.
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which means Life in the highest sense, a sense in which life
i.
transcends the little heing that conceives it."
Whoever has read the above must feel a distinct disinclin¬
ation to enter again the noise some chamber of the Freudian
superego, where all is pretence, self-deception, and where the
highest values are merely the resultant of aim-inhibited impulses.
Mankind is a prey to a grand delusional system; he only imagines
that he wants beauty, goodness, and truth, while all the time his
Caliban-like nature is feeling out for grosser sensual pleasures.
From a cosmic standpoint, according to the Freudian doctrine,
the maintenance of the delusion has a function in that it has
brought into existence civilisation and all cultural values.
But, strangely enough, the delusional system is only maintained
by that psychotically determined individual whom we call the normal
man, because he believes in the continued existence of the horde-
father who, ever and anon, threatens him with the big stick, or,
to speak more precisely, with an instrument by means of which he
will perform an indelicate operation if the individual dares to
depart from his system of internalised morality. Rather
incongruously, the female is threatened by the horde-father with a
loss of love,but let that pass. We can only breathe a deep sigh
of gratitude that academic psychologists have not so far been
driven out of the psychological field by the Freudian vampire.
What is the relation between repression and cultural
development? We suggest that it is rather unsafe to accept




reflection that the people who are in responsible positions,
especially among the clergy, are found expressing their ''utmost
I
gratitude' for the Freudian illumination.
We shall now turn to the point where we may correlate the
views of Janet with those of Dr. Gannett. Garnett's theory is
that when an instinct is in operation - and under the term
"instinct" for the present purpose, we may include the more
specifically human tendencies which he has outlined - the
instinctive presentation has within it the quality of expectant
attention. Should an idea, representing of course the instinct
presentation, or more accurately speaking synonymous with it,
pass out of consciousness without being negatived, the expectant
attention remains. To Garnett, it is expectant attention which
initiates a process and when repression occurs, the "process does
a.
not necessarily cease." "The phenomena of neurosis are neither
more nor less than effective suggestions which have become
dissociated from consciousness instead of being negatived. 'Tvery
neurotic symptom originates in some experience and persists as a
j
neurotic symptom because that experience is dissociated."
Dr. Garnett does not consider that the hypothesis of an
unconscious mind is necessary. He would rather speak of "degrees
of clearness of consciousness." While we agree that behind all
phenomena of the unconscious are "ideas" which have still the
quality of expectant attention, we cannot explain the ultimate
effects/
''Cf • P. R« Barry, "Christianity and psychology" p. 79.
'•"instinct and Personality" p.168. 3 0p.cit., p. 179.
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effects of those ideas without postulating something in the
nature of an unconscious which is outwith the direct control
of the experient. Gannett tells us that the phenomena of the
unconscious "are products of suggestion, and therefore of
consciousness." Our reply is that neither suggestion nor
consciousness can account for the elaboration of the content of
repressed ideas.
In spite of the foregoing, however, we suggest that in the
main Gaxnett is right. The normal person has far more inkling
as to what is going on within his mind than psychoanalysts are
inclined to believe. Garnett says: !The object to which it
(the mind) attends is the complex one of the conflicting desires.
The activity of its thought is initiated and guided by its
attention to that complex object. The mind is still a unit with
one activity, and one experience, however complex that activity
and that experience may be." There is far more truth in this
conception than in that of the Freudians who, to use Garnett's
words, consider the unconscious as a "blind aggregate of forces
loosely bound together and tumbling drunkenly around, now
accidentally pulling together, and now accidentally pulling against
each other."
Dr. Garnett's theory of dissociation, in the main follows the
lines of that of Professor McDougall. We refer to this view, not
in order to bepome involved in a highly controversial subject,
but because we believe that Dr. Garnett is expressing in psycho¬
logical/
'Gp.cit., p. 183. J'Op.cit., p. 183.
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psychological terms the results of his observation of ordinary-
individuals going about their daily concerns. He considers
that dissociation is explained by the fact "that the dominant
interest of the moment tends to absorb attention; not merely
in that other things are excluded for lack of room, but also in
that things contrary to that interest are specially giiarded
against. It is not true of consciousness as a whole that it
possesses a censor which shuts out from it everything painful to
it, but it is true of every particular interest which for the
time may dominate consciousness that it works in a manner some¬
what analogous to Freud's censor. It tends to direct attention
away from everything that is contrary,to it. Things forgotten
in this way are of course painful, but it is not merely because
they are painful that they are forgotten. They are forgotten
because the dominant interest of the moment directs the mind
I.
solely to things in harmony with it."
The psychoanalytical method consists in the individual's
relaxation of his normal interests, and then ordinarily submerged
S
ideas may appear in consciousness.' But he does not leave out of
account the possibility of repression of the Freudian tyre.
"Whatever the cause of the struggle," he says, 'if it be too long
continued, or too severe, then at last the overburdened mind loses
its grip upon all the conflicting threads of its problem. The
dominant interests of the personality simply shut the contrary
elements/
'"Op.cit., p.157. ''•Op.cit., p.167*
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elements out of consciousness."
What we would here stress is the conception that, under
normal conditions, in accordance with Garnett's observations,
the mind does not lose "its grip upon all the conflicting
threads of its problem." if it be true that the superego
exists in the normal mind, and the present writer is forced to
that conclusion, it would appear, in accordance with Garnett's
conception, that the individual is still conscious, however
faintly, of the conflicting threads of which, it is composed.
We would conclude by reminding ourselves of Garnett's
observation that the mind, under normal circumstances, acts as
a whole. It is "still a unit, with one activity and one.exper¬
ience, however complex that activity and that experience may be."
Dr. Garnett insists throughout his work that psychological
phenomena are explicable in terms of the psychology of conscious
process. He is not disposed to leave room in his system for
sublimation as such. He acts on the supposition that the
repressed unconscious can be explained in terms of conscious pro¬
cess, the unknown in terms of the known. It would seem that
Garnett does not take sufficient account of the complexity of
the facts bound up with the workings of the repressed unconscious,
a complexity which has led the Freudians to invent several
impossible hypotheses as a means of reducing to some sort of
order the phenomena which they study. Behind the "unconscious"
"they postulate further degrees of unconsciousness, deep seated
biological/
Op. cit. , p. 165-
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biological principles, and dim ancestral memories. Gannett
would appear to hold to a faith that ultimately such hypotheses
will be unnecessary. Once the tangled skein of the unconscious
is unravelled, it will be discovered that the threads of which it
was composed were simply part of the warp and woof of the loom of
conscious life. And, may we add, the task of disentanglement may
not be as difficult as would at present appear. A microscopic
amount of foreign matter may disarrange the functions of the eye;
how much more so an intrusion of irrationality into that infinitely
more delicate mechanism, the mind of man.
Repressions, we maintain, are a dysfunction of cultural
process; humanity shuruld not suffer from delusions, however mild
they may be. We read Freudian literature, and we are asked to
believe that our delusions are, in the last resort, biologicalljr
determined. Garnett Insists that delusions are due to conscious
process gone wrong. Freudians would consider that he had no
right to an opinion. The present writer has no option but to
range himself on the side of the ''academic" psychologist. The
probabilities, in his view, lie all on the side of Garnett's
hypothesis, viz., that the unknown will ultimately show itself
capable of explanation in terms of the known.
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C. P. Blacker.
Psychoanalysts in general consider that the process of
psychoanalysis must lead to a new synthesis, a reorientation
of the instinctual impulses released during analysis. The
usual practice is for the psychoanalyst to take little direct
part in the constructive process. The theory seems to be that
as the libido is released, new interests will be found. A
little encouragement may be given to the patient in developing
along the lines of an embryonic sublimation system, but on the
whole the psychoanalyst does not consider it necessary to supply
a "philosophy" to which the patient is advised to attach himself.
Janet is, indeed, quite outspoken as to what he considers the
folly of providing ready-made metaphysical systems for the use
of the patient. (Criticism of Dubois).
There are, of course, an indefinite number of peculiar
brands of psychotherapy which seek to convert the patient to the
views of the analyst, but it is safe to say that the Freudians
themselves are averse to influencing their patients in this way.
It is indeed quite understandable that, in the concrete
situations in which the analyst finds himself, he must regard it
as his task to assist the patient to adapt himself to his
\
immediate environment. The patient has some symptom which
interferes with his work or enjoyments, and he comes to the
analyst with a quite definite purpose in view. However much the
psychoanalyst may wish to bring in a new heaven and a new earth,
as/
''Pierre Janet, "Principles of Psychotherapy" p.65.
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as a result of his activities; the simple fact is that he accepts
payment for carrying through a vexy clearly defined task.
On the surface of it, therefore, the work of Blacker on human
values in psychological medicine would appear superfluous. The
main purpose of the book seems to be the justification of a pragmatic
attitude in relation to the process of psychoanalysis, an apologia
for the doctrine of being all things to all men. One can imagine,
however, that the individual analyst who heretofore was troubled
with rather definite philosophical beliefs might, as a result of
studying the book in question, be enabled to adopt a more
convenient pragmatism.
Our concern here, however, is not with psychoanalysis in its
professional aspects, but with psychoanalysis as a science.
Implicitly, psychoanalysis has a philosophic basis, and Blacker's
work on human values has a significance in enabling us to understand
the philosophical presuppositions of psychoanalysis.
In attempting to estimate the relation of repression to cultural
development, it is part of our task to discover what are the views of
psychoanalysts on this problem. Every writer on psychoanalysis
gives incidental expression to his views as to the partplayed by
repression in producing culturally valued phenomena, but we hope, by
following Blacker's argument, to make explicit the thebry underlying
the doctrine of sublimation.
This is not all. It is our contention here that the whole
psychological system which goes under the name of psychoanalysis is
falsified and distorted on account of an incorrect attitude towards
human/
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human nature. It is, in our view, useless to discuss the
manifold errors and self-contradictions of psychoanalytical
doctrine. We make bold to say that psychoanalysis is nothing
but a reflection of a psycho-neurosis, a somewhat pathetically
conscientious attempt to describe in psychological terms a dis¬
ease formation, which disease formation, if "adaptive'' , is
regarded as normal. Psychoanalysts are totally unaware that,
by accepting the system as normal, they are committed to a set
of philosophical presuppositions which, in our view, are entirely
erroneous.
We submit that the facts which form the basis of a doctrine
I.
of ultimate values are discoverable by the ordinary process of
introspection and the observation of the conduct of others. We
do not suggest that the student of the human mind should necess¬
arily be involved in metaphysical subtlety. Everything that is
essential to our doctrine of values can be imderstood by a little
child, and, in fact, is imderstood by a human being at this stage.
We would, indeed, reduce our philosophic conception of values
within the compass of a single proposition, viz., that there is
an ultimate distinction between truth and error. The child
knows perfectly well when it is speaking and acting in accordance
with the truth. It does not for one moment confuse the realm of
imagination with the realm of fact. The world is divided between
"pretend" things and 'real" things. Every psycho-neurosis would
immediately collapse if its possessor again became truthful, and
with/
''See section on William Brown, p. 145 & 148-9.
Also section on Campbell G-s.rnett, p.153-156.
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with it the necessity for the highly elaborated doctrine of
psychoanalysis.
Both biological and historical arguments for repression as
having function are entirely irrelevant. The psychoanalyst
himself who has not attained this insight is necessarily involved
in a tissue of false value judgments; and his attempts at
philosophising constitute a mere process of rationalising. He
is, indeed, as much in the grip of compulsions as the patient
whom he seeks to cure. Por the practical purposes of the
analytical process, this perhaps does not matter, but it does
matter when we attempt to evaluate psychoanalysis as a body of
scientific opinion.
How, the extraordinary thing about "Human Values in
Psychological Medicine" is that the critical student may find
within the ideas elaborated, statements which may be used in
attacking the views which are more specifically bound up with
the doctrine of psychoanalysis. Other striking instances of
this kind of thing are to be found in Roheim's "Riddle of the
Sphinx" and Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality".
We are driven to the conclusion that we are in the presence of
dissociation phenomena.
Blacker gives us an excellent account of the nature of the
aesthetic. We read the following: "But though aesthetic
emotions would, from the genetic standpoint, appear to have
arisen in connection with the evolution of secondary sexual
characters/
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characters, and though they are still to a large extent related
to sexual functions, they have subsequently, by various processes
of biologically neutral variation, moved in certain directions a
long way away from purely sexual functions. This is especially
clear of music. Pleasure in hearing most music has no relation
to sexuality in the ordinary sense of the word. Here there would
appear to have taken place a differentiation along biologically
neutral lines of an emotion which originally was biologically
useful. Many beautiful objects, many aesthetic stimuli, have a
value per se. So far as can be observed, this value has no
relation whatsoever to the stimulus of sex in the usual limited
I.
sense of the word."
And later we read; "Originally this function mas'" have been
nothing more than an accessory to the sexual instinct. But
whatever its origin, it has undergone differentiation, and now
has a value that is largely, though not wholly, independent of
sex. it has acquired a qualitatively distinct value of its own.
A person may be moved more deeply, and more memorably, by aesthetic
emotion that has no -ulterior biological aim, than by experience
of direct sexual gratification. Most people probably go through
their lives without ever having their affective aesthetic capacities
evoked to their fullest. The completely adequate stimulus does
a.
not often occur."
And he further states: "The conception here suggested of a
fontal source of beauty within the mind, a source from which beauty
can/
'"Human Values in psychological Medicine" p.123. '"Op.cit., p.125.
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can overflow and permeate the manifold experiences of life, has
K
been given eloquent expression by Mr. Aldous Huxley."
We also find this striking statement: 'Consciousness of
guilt" (an invariable ingredient of the superego system) "seems
to close the mind to aesthetic experience. Melancholiacs
a.
frequently complain of a total paralysis of the aesthetic sense.
We have here an account of aesthetic development which, it
would seem, proceeds independently of repression and sublimation.
We have implicitly, also, a doctrine of some cosmic force working
for ends which have a value other than the purely biological.
In passing, we would point out that if the aesthetic sense
developed along biologically neutral lines, and was thereafter
transmitted from generation to generation, we are led to suppose
that our primitive ancestors had a keen appreciation of the
beautiful. If such were the case, there is additional reason
to suppose that repression had no function in the creation of a
love of the beautiful. According to Roheim and other anthrop¬
ologists, primitive man as we know him to-day is relatively free
from repressions.
But Blacker tells us that the aesthetic sense is in large
\
measure inoperative in the ordinary man and woman. "In the
lives of the majority of my working-class patients," he says,
"aesthetic values play a small part. I have found it very
difficult to devise a suitable series of questions to ask with
a/
'op.cit., p.127. 30p.cit., p.126.
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a view to throwing light on this matter."
Then follows this delightful passage: "When I began
enquiring into this subject, I asked a series of about twenty
patients whether they were at all sensitive to beauty in nature,
or in music or literature, particularly poetry. Most of the
patients were embarrassed by the question. Two, however,
answered volubly in the affirmative. The first, a girl of
eighteen, replied (irrelevantly to my question) that she loved
beautiful fireworks, especially Catherine wheels that threw
coloured sparks about. Another said that she loved beautiful
"pictures' (i.e., the cinema) when the orchestra played languorous
music (''lovely music that makes you go all dreams'- like'). Another
liked beautiful colours such as you see at dances when people put
on paper hats and the balloons come down. One young man of
twenty said that he liked to sit in churches at evensong. He
and the young lady with whom he was walking out used to spend two
evenings a week in this way. Three of the women said that they
loved beautiful flowers. One woman could not remember ever
having seen a sunset in the country. One man, after looking at
me uncomprehendingly, said that the most beautiful thing he knew
was a pint of beer in a mug, with a head on it, when you were
holding the mug in your right hand. I eventually gave up asking
these questions, as they seemed to be a waste of time. By the
majority of London working-class patients, aesthetic values are
probably not often recognised as such. My impression is that
comsciously/
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consciously, at any rate, they play a very small part in their
lives. In a few instances, however, aesthetic values play a
very notable part in shaping the ideals and the aspirations of
working-class people!'"
But Blacker fails to draw the obvious conclusion. In
accordance with his theory, aesthetic sensibility was developed
through long eras of a classless society. If the effects of
the mutations which he presupposes were to be cumulative, we
are led to the conclusion that the possession of the aesthetic
sense must have become a constant in the vast majority of our
ancestors. Though it is probably true that the progenitors of
the individuals with whom Blacker.has come into contact had
belonged to a slave class for several centuries, it is unlikely
that so short a period would in any way modify inherited char¬
acteristics. In that case, a capacity for the love of the
beautiful should be present in the ordinary populace of
contemporary Britain. If Blacker discovers that the powers
of aesthetic appreciation are wanting, the conclusion surely is
that some interference factor is at work which prevents the
aesthetic sense from becoming attached to its rightful objects.
Blacker himself has indicated the negative relation of
repression to aesthetic experience. The logical conclusion
would seem to be that, if we could clear the mind of repressions,




permeate the manifold experiences of life," and would become
attached to beautiful objects which "have a value per se."
But unhappily, we soon discover that we are once again being
drawn within the vortex of psychoanalytical fatalism and material¬
istic gloom. We have just breathed a sigh of relief, thankful to
find that the aesthetic sense is after all not bound up with the
workings of endopsychic censors and superego formations. In the
not long distant past, mankind had a relatively clean slate and
his vision was not obfuscated by vapours arising from the unconscious
But Blacker proceeds to nail the censor, or superego, on to
biological process. He perceives a new function in the endopsychic
censor, or as he himself states, "in a later terminology, the
superego." He says; "If dreams are the disguised fulfilments of
repressed wishes, we should be enabled bjr a successful psycho¬
analysis in which the repressions are removed and the disguises are
made superfluous, to dream the undisguised fulfilment of wishes
that are no longer repressed. We should be able to gratify all
our unrealisable sexual aspirations in glorious and all-satisfying
dreams. But this does not apparently happen, however thorough
the analysis. Psychoanalytical theory has never afforded a
I.
satisfactory answer as to why not."
In parenthesis, the present writer would suggest that the
reason why "this does not apparently happen" is precisely because
.




The removal of repressions is relative, a mere superficial
modification of the superego system. We shall further elaborate
this view in our main critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, in our
discussion of Alexander's "Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality>|
Blacker continues: "We are the surviving products of counties^
generations of ancestors who, through inability to derive sexual
satisfaction from phantasies, were driven to find it in exogenic
reality....in the highest degree, therefore, survival value
attaches to the capacity to be influenced by exogenic rather than
i.
by psychogenic reality in the satisfaction of sexual needs."
The superego was then the "biological trustee of our racial
future", and Blacker further hypostasises the superego by stating
that "he will not allow us frivolously to squander our capital in
phantasies. By him we are mercilessly forced towards effective
a.
action in the external world." And we also discover that the
praiseworthy biological mechanism is the determinant of salutory
philosophical views in modern man. "Despite the unescapable logic
of the solipsist and the idealist, this racial censor may help to
keep the average man firmly grounded in a robust phenomenal
3
realism." The neurosis is enlarging its sphere of influence.
Now we proceed to an ultra-Freudian description of values.
Values, we are told, are "as various and as multitudinous, as
ephemeral and as permanent, as conscious and unconscious, as are
psychic needs." We are then given a list of a variety of things
which/
'
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which, are valued, - food, money, a national flag, titles,
privileges, legal rights; aptitudes and accomplishments which
are socially prized, these including "intellectual, artistic,
athletic, and other endowments, knowledge, general and special,
I.
and skills of all kinds." Persons and relationships with
persons may be valued, and also imaginary relationships, such
as when a psychotic woman thinks that someone is in love with
her. And, to sum up, "the universe is the universe, its goodness
a.
or badness depends on the colour of our vision. '
We would suggest that the racial censor must have been' off
duty when the above passage was written. Surely we have here an
extreme instance of solipsism. We repeat our view, that values
are essentially objective, and in all significant conduct and
experience they have a compelling power, being "firmly grounded
in a robust phenomenal realism. !l The major problem of psycho¬
analysis is to explain how and why human conduct is no longer in
accordance with objective norms. It is true that the neurotic
disposition plays fast and loose with objectivity, substituting
illusion and delusion for sound sense and rational orientation.
The psychoanalysts claim that the normal person has incorporated
within his psyche a greater or less amount of the constitution
revealed in an extreme form in neurotic or psychotic patients.
The most significant fact about the neurotic constitution is that
value judgments have gone awry.
P sy choanalysts/
''Op.cit., p. 18. "op.cit., p. 138.
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psychoanalysts, however, make a cult of regarding such
judgments as "normal", accepting in justification of their
irrational attitude a specious doctrine of philosophic prag¬
matism. As far as psychology goes, one belief is as good as
another. For certain purposes, psychology has a right to its
abstractions, but the individual psychologist is wrong if he
builds a philosophical system on the basis of such abstractions.
Virtually, the psychoanalysts are saying that as far as they can
see, people's beliefs and value judgments make neither rhyme nor
reason, which may be more or less true, but when on the basis of
this finding they draw the conclusion that beliefs and value
judgments as found in the "normal" are the reality, they have,
we suggest, quite outstepped their sphere.
Having disposed of values as adventitious, Blacker is free
to approach the problem which has been before him in discussing
human values in psychological medicine, in a thoroughgoing
pragmatic spirit. He thus states baldly: "There are two
possible approaches to the problem of values. Which is the
I.
most convenient for the psychiatrist?" One possible line of
approach is through what Blacker describes as "the transmissive
view", this equipping the psychiatrist "with a philosophic
optimism, and a force from which his patients may benefit. The
belief that the essential order of things is good, and that
failure to perceive its goodness is due to certain remediable




between the patient and the physician is such that the physician's
point of view is readily assimilated by the patient. in the dis¬
orientation of a neurosis, a robust optimism on the part of the
physician can come near to a pivotal value for his patients."
The second line of approach is what he describes as "the
reactive view", according to which the world is "axiologically
neutral", and values are purely a matter of personal idiosyncrasy.
Blacker inclines to think that the second viewpoint has certain
advantages; the psychiatrist being "detatched and free from
moral preconceptions, his outlook is not determined by any
particular ethical system. It will therefore be impartial, and
•objective*". Blacker considers that a reconciliation of the
a.
two points of view "is more or less possible".
With almost melodramatic swiftness, we discover that Blacker
has alligned himself with the ultra-mystics, although of course,
we are warned that the reconciliation of the two points of view
is only "more or less possible". The psychoanalyst qua philos¬
opher, Blacker tells us, may accept the following theory without
doing violence to his scientific conscience, and without in any
way incapacitating himself in his task of adapting his patients
to the civilisation in which they live. A reconciliation may
be effected "if we regard man's affective life as capable in
various degrees of being 'inspired'. Both the transmissive and
reactive hypotheses are compatible with a philosophy of
'instrumentalism'. We can think of the individual being utilised,
as/
''Op.cit., pp.138-9. "'Op.cit., p. 139.
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as might an instrument, by forces operating through the foimtains
of his affective life, forces like the elan vital, or the Phusis
of the Stoics; or, in more familiar language, like the Holy
/.
Ghost or the Spirit of Christ."
We can understand certain uncritical religionists being
enamoured by the psychoanalyst's "confession of faith". The plain
man, however, would, we fear, be somewhat forcible in expressing
his opinion of a psychoanalyst who accepted a "faith" on such
purely utilitarian grounds. He would probably use an epithet
directed towards certain scribes and pharisees, by one whose name
Blacker has not hesitated to use in the "confession of faith"
above referred to.
In our view, Blacker completes his in many ways valuable work,
by lapsing into an attitude at once naive and ingenuous. We ask
why? Here is our explanation: We take the liberty of using one
of Slacker's many valuable conceptions. "Personal idiosyncrasy",
he tells us, "resides in peculiarities of the transmissive
apparatus of the psychological prism." We suggest that Blacker,
as psychoanalytical theorist, identified himself with the viewpoint
revealed through the "peculiarities of the transmissive apparatus".
Prisms, psychological or otherwise, are a poor medium for those who
\
wish to become apprised of the essential facts of the objective
world. notwithstanding, the psychoanalyst as such must view his
patients through the queer lenses of his own superego system,
otherwise understanding would be impossible. During the period
when/
AOp.cit., p.140. a0p.cit., p.139.
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when "the analyst is in search of troublesome complexes, he must
stimulate into activity that part of his mind which is least
rational. He is obliged to form a body of systematised con¬
ceptions to assist him in his work - he is fully justified in
doing this - but these conceptions refer only to the elaborations
of an unhealthy imagination. The psychoanalyst's "reality", when
in the consulting room, is a land of make-believe. fie is in
constant contact with a dream world whose images have little
significance in so far as they happen to have attained causal
efficacy in interfering with the ordinary life of the patient.
There is a strong tendency for the analyst to become superego
obsessed, and in his theorising he is more than usually under the
influence of that regrettable institution which, in the writer's
view, has found its way into the normal mind of the contemporary
individual. Amongst its many imperfections, the superego is the
embodiment par excellence of the principal of hypocrisy. We
suggest that Blacker, in enunciating his "confession of faith",
is essentially "under the influence" of a psychic institution which
will one day become the object of the strongest prohibitions of
those to whom love, beauty, and truth, provide the key for the
understanding of what in man is most specifically human, and that
by which he is qualified to attain the status of the divine.
It is not by the study of needs springing up from the
repressed unconscious that we shall discover a clue to the nature
of objective reality. The repressed unconscious is no fountain
from which flows the elan vital, the Phusis, or the Holy Ghost.
That/
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That it acts as the wellspring of many of our actions the
writer would not care to deny, but he would state bluntly
what he regards as simple truth, that the wellspring is
poisoned, not by "all uncleanliness'' but, what is infinitely
more reprehensible, by a mass of lies, of half-truths, of
hypocrisies, the very negation of all those values by which
man. lives, in so far as he has a life independent of the super¬
ego system, and by which he must live if he is ever to outgrow
the dwarfish stature, the evidences of which are writ large
across the page of history.
Some anthropologists hold that a Golden Age existed in the
past before men became civilised. If it were so, we must take
it that the values to which we have referred were in great part
realised in the lives of our primitive ancestors. However that
may be, there can be no Golden Age in the future unless the
entire superego system is abrogated.
Blacker's philosophy will not assist us in the task which
confronts our race, if we are to put away childish things. To
him, repression is inevitable and therefore its necessary
concomitants. He says: "In this process of inter-adjustment (he
refers to the process of social adaptation) some impulses,
\
particularly those of violent and undifferentiated character which
express themselves at an early age, will undergo repression."




which cannot be controlled by reason if the necessary conditions
are provided in the psychological environment of the young child.
Once again we are puzzled as to why Blacker should betray such
seeming callousness in committing human nature to the dogs of
unreason. There is only one reply. The psychoanalysts are
less conscious of the unconscious than is the intelligent layman.
Their very preoccupation with the unconscious has, by a process
which we shall later attempt to describe, blinded them to what
should appear obvious. The repressed unconscious, and its
presiding daemon the superego, is not the determinant of human
values. It has no function in producing phenomena of vital worth.
It is indeed the very acme of dysfunction in relation to cultural
process, and if we may be pardoned the use of somewhat strong
language, the terrestrial residence of the Father of Lies.
It is well, however, that Blacker enables us to track down
the philosophical implications of psychoanalytical theory. It is
a philosophy engendered within the superego system. It is based
on compulsive thoughts, and it is precisely what Freud claims as
the essence of all cultural process, an illusion. If our
cultural values are indeed superego determined, we may as well
accept it as probable that cultural values are illusions. We are
like the denizens of the cave of Plato's famous allegory, witnessing
the movements of mere shadows. And if repressions are inevitable,
the black cap of the cosmic judge has already indicated that our
doom/
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doom is sealed: we were already condemned when the superego was
nailed to biological process. Freud's still small voice of
reason has but one function, and indeed a diabolical one; it
can only increasingly make us aware of the horror which awaits
us, of our impending doom.
It is a cheerless prospect. As Schopenhauer long ago
pointed out, our only morality is in the nature of a little
sympathy for those who are placed in a like desperate plight with
ourselves. What love can we feel for each other when our souls,
stripped of the glamour of illusions, are revealed as "poor, nasty,
brutish" things, which answer in every respect to the haunting
description given us by John Buchan in his novel, "The Watcher on
the Threshhold." Buchan's picture is in no way overdrawn, it is
as real as the phantasmagoria of the Freudian unconscious. It is
indeed an expression of that unconscious. The psychoanalytical
theorist would commit us to the conception of an unspeakably evil
deity, and as a consequence to a fatalistic and hopeless philosophy.
The wellsprings of the repressed unconscious are indeed
poisoned, and in neurotic mood we are inclined to subscribe to
the tenets of the Freudian faith in a diabolus ex machina - or
should it be in machina? But we are reminded of Harvey's poem,
"Ducks", in which the author elaborates the thesis that, when God
had been engaged on the more serious tasks of creation, He decided
that it would be appropriate to introduce the element of the
comic/
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comic. He therefore created ducks, lest man should
so forgetful of his Maker be,
As take even himself quite seriously. '
We venture to suggest that there is just a possibility that the
Freudian will find his soul's salvation when he has the good
fortune to unearth the repressed complex of the humorous..
We shall not pursue the topic further here. It is even
believed that the psychoanalyst has within himself the antidote
to his solipsist philosophy. This is not the racial censor
of Blacker, but the ordinary good sense which the psychoanalyst
reveals when his mind is not befogged by the emanations of the
psychoanalytical den. Will it always be necessary to conduct
analyses in a !!dim religious light" ?
The Ethical Aspect.
J. A. Hadfield.
The main purpose of the article is to show that a rational
discussion of ethical problems is rendered difficult by the
presence in the mind of superego-determined distorting
influences. Suggestion that psychoanalysts have only begun
to analyse. Criticism of theory of sublimation.
Edwin Holt.
In this article we describe an attempt to correlate psycho¬
analysis with the science of ethics. Holt's main position
is that present methods of child rearing lead to the parent
figure coming between the individual and that part of
experience which requires to be organised in accordance with
ethical norms. We develop Holt's viewpoint in the light of
Freudian teaching, seeking to demonstrate that Holt's
position should be interpreted in terms of conceptions used




Hadfield, in his "Psychology and Morals"', and in his
introduction to "Psychology and Modern Problems ', views
repression as having the purpose of relieving psychological
pain. He does not discuss the historical origin of repression,
or the more remote societal forces which bring it into existence.
•He believes that repression can be given up through the intro¬
spective process under psychoanalysis. But there is reason to
be suspicious of his claim that this is possible. He instances
the bringing to the surface of repressed impulses which continue
to operate with their former strength; or converse^, he says, if
an impulse has been under-developed in childhood on account of
repression, it will still be weak when the repressive psychic
infPaences are removed, and will be capable of adding but a small
quota to the total psychic organisation.
"If" he says, "as a result of childhood experiences our
observationism was developed, we should follow our bent and become
scientists^, if our exhibitionism, then we should become actors,
lecturers, or artists, recognising the while the instinct to which
I.
we are giving expression."
\
'A woman with a maternal instinct completely repressed in
childhood would make a poor mother, even when this is liberated
a.
in later life by analysis."
It would seem more probable that, if the repressed impulses
referred to were really brought into the full light of conscious¬
ness/
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consciousnessj they would, at once attain normal proportions,
despite any adventitious over- or under-development in child¬
hood.
What seems to lie behind sublimation is a compulsive element
which complete analysis could theoretically remove. If the
impulse continues after analysis, in its original strength,
the presumption is that the compulsive mechanism continues to
operate. There appears to be a difference between the recog¬
nition and acceptance of a compulsion, and that insight into
the formerly hidden structure beneath the compulsion, an insight
which would, to all intents and purposes, destroy the concealed
tendency. A public speaker who is fully conscious of the origin
of his self-display impulse, would not continue to any extent in
the use of this psychic component. The associations with the
original situation would be embarrassing. The psychotherapist's
I.
reassurance that "instincts are not low" would help him but
little. He would be aware that his audience held very
different views as to exhibitionism, and it is difficult to
imagine anyone, under the circumstances, who would not lose self-
confidence, and thereby unfit himself for his task. If he were
to continue as a public speaker, he would cease to be an
\
exhibitionist.
If a clergyman was in a real sense aware of the part played
by "self-importance" in his calling, he would realise the folly
and injustice of imposing himself upon others. The "superiority"
will/
''Op.cit., p. 174. J'Op.cit., p. 174.
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will inevitably react upon others, either in producing negative
self-feelingj or contempt. It a slum worker discovers "a social
snobbishness which urges him to seek the society of people
f.
amongst whom he will be 'somebody'", we suggest that he will be
completely irrational if he continues in his activities. Instincts
in this case are not "ennobled in their uses". A person going in
among the submerged section of our community with an attitude
of snobbishness will only further embitter those who have been
broken on the wheel of our social system. The end motive does
not justify the gratification of an urge to social snobbishness.
It is, indeed, only too obvious that a person who is fully aware
of a member of a lower class as a personality to be respected and
loved could not go into his presence with an attitude of social
j,
snobbishness. The saint with his 'self-righteousness ', we
suggest, is hardly a saint, and if analysis has not convinced
him of this, we can only suggest that the analysis is far from
complete.
Hadfield regards irrational intrusions into the psychic
system as normal. "We find, in fact," he says, 'that these
healthy people (he refers to individuals undertaking training
analyses) have complexes, repressions, and abnormalities of
character differing very little from those of patients; and,
A.
indeed, one soon forgets that they are nbt patients."
Repression, then, according to his findings, is universal.
The/
''Op.cit., p.173. a'0p.cit., p.174. 30p.cit., p.173.
4-0p.cit. , p. 4.
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The most significant fact revealed by psychoanalysis,
Hadfield considers to be the part played by the self-phantasy
throughout life. The picture a child has of himself at three
"is destined to remain throughout life and determine the
I.
character of the individual." The conception thus formed,
however, tends to be of an extravagant nature and "is therefore
repressed." "phantasies of moral perfection are extremely
common and are least suspected by those who have them."
He distinguishes between the ideal as "part of a consciously
accepted sentiment" and the phantasy which "is the result of a
a.
morbid repressed complex." It is the phantasy of the self
4 s-
which represses. Repression is therefore an unconscious activity,
"the abnormal elements in us" being far more due to a morbid
self-phantasy than to other repressed emotional complexes.
He regards complex-formations as incompatible with self-realisation,
"the complete and full expression of all the instincts" and
impulses within us. "In a fully realised self, there will be no
conflict of purpose, no complexes, no repression, but the harmon¬
ious expression of all the vital forces towards a common purpose
4.
and end."
He finds within human beings a "craving for completeness and
self-realisation" which "compels us to moral endeavour and the
development of character..'.... The craving for fulfilment.. .is the
most potent force which drives us to live and strive with persist¬
ent/
"Op.cit., p.53. *0p.cit., p.56. aOp.cit., p.56. ''Op.cit., p.59.1Op.cit., p.6o. 4Op. cit., p.65.
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persistent energy till the ultimate goal of self-realisation
is reached." The true ideal should involve the expression
of all the instincts. But we must discover 'ways of so
expressing our instincts that we seek after ideals of objective
3.
worth, such as "beauty, art, virtue, and religion."
In morality, the objective ideal is supplied in a rough
way by racial experience, giving rise "to what we call the
moral code", this being "embodied in such conceptions as honour,
A.
justice, altruism, generosity, and liberty." He appears to
adopt the utilitarian doctrine of right being that which pro¬
duces the greatest happiness, but suggests that, to date, an
ultimate ideal has "not yet been determined or generally agreed
5'.
upon by all men." -That there is such an ideal, he considers
"scientifically probable."
Hadfield envisages the possibility that, during the process
of analysis, "we may be reduced to the level of the savage, but
there is one thing to be said for the savage - it is that he
rarely, if ever, suffers from nervous breakdown, for his instincts
are rarely repressed." But he foresees that the cure of a
patient's nervous ills will be "at the expense of destroying his
L .
morals."
Moral laws are, however, "the enunciation of the higher
v
laws of biology. ' And because of this we must hesitate in
throwing/
Op. cit., p.65. a' Op. cit., p.89. * Op. cit. , p. 94. 'Op.cit., p.96.
^Op.cit., p. 97. Op. cit., p. 99. y- Op. cit., p. 103.
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throwing the individual back on his mere instincts, because
civilised man has developed a need for the organisation of the
instincts under the moral self. He cannot, therefore, find
happiness by a return to "*che chaotic condition of soul typical
I.
of the savage."
One cannot help having the suspicion that Hadfield's brief
for morality and civilisation is the result of a very normal
superego morality system. There appears to be no truth in the
notion that civilisation evolved in the ordinary sense, and
racial experience extending over a period of a mere six thousand
years is not likely to develop within us new fundamental needs.
It is also untrue that the soul of primitive man is in a "chaotic
condition." There is far more reason to suppose that he has
3.
attained to a very satisfactory synthesis of his impulses.
It is indeed strange that Hadfield, who maintains the thesis
that repression can be and should be dispensed with, sees anything
but his beau ideal in the savage whose instincts are rarely
repressed and who does not suffer from nervous breakdown.
prom what, we may ask, does he derive his notion of the
sanctity of "morals"? They are, we presume, necessary to
maintain civilisation which, he says, has been the "purpose of
man's evolution". The present writer's sympathy rests rather
with preud, who asks, "is it worth it?" And he must also insist
that a rational treatise on morals to-day could hardly accept
■uncritically/
'Op.cit., p.108.
ACf. G. plliot Smith, "Human History", p.199.
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"uncritically what passes as the ethics of civilisation.
Hadfield appears to pass over the very artificial nature
of morality, this being somewhat surprising in a psychologist
who has specially interested himself in studying the ethical
aspect of human life. It is said of George Stephenson that
he replied to his critics who pointed out the danger to cattle
of his new invention, that "!it would be a bad job for the coo."
It would appear that it would be only logical if Hadfield
expressed himself in a similar manner when considering the
effects of the abrogation of repression on morality. Morality,
as we know it, is surely an artificial product. If a thorough¬
going analysis did bring us to what Hadfield describes as the
level of the savage,- we should no longer desire morality, and
the individual analysed would not consider that anything of
value had been destroyed. It is our opinion that Hadfield is
by no means sufficiently analysed for his superego system to be
abrogated, otherwise his critical faculties, obviously of a hi$i
order, would not allow him to adopt the illogical attitudes to
which we have dram attention.
Hadfield tells us that "the will has no direct control over
any Impulses of the mind except those which are constituted as
part of the self Self control is the conscious and voluntary
direction of the instinctive emotions to the will and service of
man....In self-control, we not only recognise and accept our
impulses/
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impulses, and give them expression in conduct by re-directing
f
.
them to higher ends...." "it is only in so far as we admit our
instincts that we can control them and sublimate them.11 ye can
only suggest that Hadfield is bat giving us counsels of perfection.
According to his own showing, everyone has complexes3, and
presumably a mischievous self-phantasy, unless of course the
individual has had the privilege of a thoroughgoing psycho¬
analysis, which the present writer believes has never jret been
carried out. Pie would, indeed, suggest that wisdom lies far
more in the acceptance of our irrationality than in attempting
to modify it. it is also by no means certain that the conscious
will is without direct control of the repressed unconscious.
Even if the word "direct" is too strong, it is probable that the
norma} person has a very effective control of his irrational
*
impulses for all practical purposes. Matters are not improved
by turning the attention on to the self, by becoming introspective.
Hadfield deals with the subject of sublimation. He accounts
for the surplus energy which we have at our disposal for sublim¬
ation as due to the fact that the instincts are hot required at
s:their full strength for their original purposes. Surplus energy
"gives rise to all those activities of culture, of art, and of
learning, which adorn civilised life." It is doubtful, however,




''Op.cit., p. 144. 3'0p.cit., p. 145. 3 0p.cit., p.4.«■ Cf. Section on Campbell Gamett, thesis p. 158.
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He treats sublimation and sentiment formation as identical.
"Sublimation" he says, "is a natural process to be observed not
only in the play of the j^oung, but also in the natural develop¬
ment of music and the arts which we find even in lower phases of
/ .
evolution, for example, amongst birds and savages. ' "Any kind
of activity may serve as a sublimation." We have referred to
his views as to how sublimation is not affected by psychoanalysis.
In discussing altruistic conduct, he states that "altruism
means that we find our joy in doing things for others...So long
as the pleasurable impulse (relating to some private concern, of
our own) is directed towards the service of others, it is altru¬
istic; as soon as the gratification of the instinct becomes
itself the end motive as well as the motive force, it becomes
3
selfish. " Oui" only remark is that, in the case of the higher
sentiments at least, a disinterestedness must be attained with
*
which the existence of any considerable degree of what Hadfield
describes as "motive force" is incompatible. The impression is,
as we have suggested,that Hadfield is to all intents and purposes
accepting repression and its resulting compulsive behaviour as
normal, and that his self-realisation ideal implies the acceptance
of what Freudians describe as superego motivation.
The urge to self-realisation may be present in Hadfield as a
motive force of considerable power, but we suggest that the ideal
of self-realisation does not provide a motive for self-synthesis
which can be regarded as having any deep ethical significance.
True/
''Op.cit., p. 153- ^'Op.cit. , p. 153. 30p.cit., p. 176.
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True ethical behaviour is not concerned with self-realisation,
but with the welfare of others or the appreciation of others
based on an attitude which is entirely objective. The artist
who is realising himself would, we feel, have little sensitivity
to beauty. In those moods when we attain to new truths, our
minds are not concerned with ideals of self-realisation. If
they were, we should arrive at few significant conclusions.
Hadfield concludes by suggesting that we should "abolish
our phantasies of ourselves" and realise that we are "for the
I.
most part extraordinarily ordinary." "One of the greatest acts
of daring a man can perform is to be himself: it is humbling, but
a.
ennobling, whereas pretence is humiliating and degrading." Our
opinion is that the most effective way to attain the desirable
states which he appraises is not through reductive analysis.
Such analysis is far more likely to inflate phantasy than to
lessen it.
In the main, however, we are in agreement with the position
laid down by Hadfield. But "Psychology and Morals" was
published in 1923, before the year of Freud's epoch-making
work, "The Ego and the Id", and therefore Hadfield was relatively
uninfluenced, at the time of writing, by the later trends of
psychoanalytic teaching. In our opinion, his work is all the
more interesting, in that he gives us a doctrine of the self-
phantasy as the key to the understanding of the "unconscious.
We are by no means certain that advance in our understanding of
repression/
'"Op.cit., p.181. ?0p.cit., p.182-3.
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repression will not be on the lines of developing Hadfield's
conceptions rather than Freud's.
"Psychology and Morals", in our view, omits the most
fundamental facts of modern psychology in its bearing on morals.
This was, of course, inevitable at the time of its publication.
We refer to the essentially immoral nature of the superego or
self-phantasy, as Hadfield calls it. In our view, a meaningful
moral philosophy is impossible until such time as the civilised
human mind is freed from the influence of the repressed
unconscious.
What, then, to Hadfield, is the relation of repression to
cultural development? He would, in general, seem to think
that repression should be abolished, but when "moral issues"
are raised, we discover that he virtually accepts repression as
desirable, and implicitly the whole doctrine of the superego as
being the prime determinant of our ethical life.
We also suggest that Hadfield's attempt to develop a
significant theory of ethics fails completely in its intention.
This is not due to any lack of capacity on his own part, but,
as we suggest in our appendix', the civilised human mind is
meantime precluded from developing such a theory, this being
due to the presence of the superego formation.
'See Appendix, section on the detrimental effects of repression
on cultural development, p. 504.
Edwin B. Holt.
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In his book, 'The Freudian Wish 5, Holt considers the
bearing of what he describes as "wish psychology" on ethics,
a matter on which, he says, Freud has said little, but which
Holt believes leads to "very interesting and practically use¬
ful conclusions" He states that since the wish is the unit
of conduct, ethics ought to regard the wish "as its funda¬
mental unit of discourse, whatever its further argument is to
be as to the nature of the good or the source of moral
sanctions."
He sets out to enquire "whether conduct which is compounded
3.
of such purposes has ethical significance." In the discussion
that follows, he adopts the behaviouristic viewpoint. He gives
an illustration of a child stretching out its hand towards a
flame. He suggests that, provided the child is allowed to
receive a burn, or at least discomfort, as the result of his
action, he will be conditioned so that in the future he will
avoid the now dangerous object, because he has discovered that
the objective situation justifies caution. If, however, the
mother interposes herself as a forbidding agent between the
child and the flame, the situation will assume a triangular
relationship, and the child's attention will be divided between
the actual dangerous object, and the forbidding mother. In
the first case, "the child's conduct towards fire becomes
integrated/
'"Edwin B. Holt, "The Freudian Wish5', Preface, p.viii.
aOp.cit., p.100. 3 Op.cit., p.101.
• 193.
integrated, and is solely a function of the actual properties
i.
of fire.,! In the second case /'the child is frustrated, but
not instructed," and the mother has actually engrained "the very
tendency which she wishes to curb.55 What is objectively danger¬
ous to the child is "an intrinsic property of mother and not of
fire....When mother and flame are together, it perceives the
9
situation where flame cannot be touched." The mother has left
unexercised the conservative tendency to withdraw from heat....
and has prematureljr got the child to respond to herself as an
object of the environment, with qualities of her own, and needing
3
suitably to be studied and dealt with." And during the plastic
period of childhood, the child will continually tend to pursue
his original interest and "no amount of actual burns will ever
correct it." This, says Holt, is a paradigm of Freudian morals.
" The child's withdrawal has become'a withdrawal from
the mother's hand, and not, as it ought to be, a response to (or
function of) the flame itself." Here, says Holt, we have
dissociation. Whereas the "precautionary response" should be
associated with fire, it becomes transferred to something else,
being dissociated from that part of the situation to which it
really should belong, namely, the fire. If the mother is with¬
drawn from the entire situation, should it again arise, the child
will have no caution with regard to fire, and will indeed be
more liable to approach the dangerous object than he was on the
first/
'op.cit., p. 102. * Op.cit., p. 103. 30p.cit., p. 104.
xOp.cit., p.105•
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first occasion when fire attracted him.
Holt suggests that two complexes have been formed which,
though related to each other, have "more internal cohesiveness"
than they have cohesion with each other. "Between the two
there, is relative dissociation." The mother has committed two
errors. First, the right and wrong category was not applicable
in the situation which arose, and second, she has transferred
a,
"the role of truth to her own person." The burning qualities
of fire should be part of the child's own objective experience.
Those qualities do not depend on the mother's opinion; authorit-
ativeness is out of place. The mother has become "an obstacle
between it and fire," and as far as the child's experience goes,
the "fire is not hot". She has "put herself in the position of
an alien force frustrating the child." "And moreover," adds
Holt, "non-grustration is the condition for sympathy: frustration
3.
obviously for antipathy."
Thus a barrier has been set up between the child and reality.
That barrier is apparently an unreasonable parent, and the
child therefore develops hatred for the parent, and the tendency
will be for the child to pursue the forbidden line of action
whenever the parental sanction be removed. Here we feel
that Holt has laid his finger on the root cause of that irration¬
ality in humanity which leads both to inappropriate responses
in many so-called normal" relations, and also may cause the
individual to become entrammelled in neurotic and possibly
psychotic/
''Op.cit., p. 105. 50p.cit.i, p. 106. 3'0p.cit., p. 106.
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psychotic conditions. The predominating part of a child's
reality has become an authority which he more or less rightly
regards as irrational. That authority looms large in his early
yearsj and his principal habit-responses, at least when at home,
are directed towards the alien guardian, not towards the material
environment which surrounds him; and moreover, not towards any
personalities which happen to be in the environment who behave
in a more rational manner than those in whose care he finds
himself.
I.
According to Janet, the whole of neurosis springs from the
individual's continued attempt to pursue ends which were origin¬
ally impracticable owing to their being forbidden, this attempt
ultimately becoming automatic.
A child conditioned on the lines suggested by Holt's
illustration will tend to adopt the same attitude towards each
■'moral" situation as it subsequently arises. As he gets older,
he may in many instances be able to evade the parental taboo,
and in this way he would have the opportunity of learning the
actual properties of objects; but in so doing, he will have
present in his mind two factors which will relatively unfit him
for dealing wisely with the objective situation. First, he will
have a sense of guilt, in that he is disobeying authority, a state
of mind which is apt to vitiate judgment; and secondly, he will
tend to .pursue the forbidden activity, not on account of its
intrinsic/
''Pierre Janet, "Principles of Psychotherapy^ p. 192.
/,
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intrinsic interest, but as a means of "getting even" with the
unreasonable adults. But, as Holt points out, this is not
the worst feature. During later life, many situations will
arise where it is necessary, in the child's own interests, that
he should accept the findings of authority. Dor instance, if
he should wish to experiment with tobacco. At such a juncture,
it is pre-eminently desirable that he should accept the parental
admonition; in this case, should he attempt experimentation
with tobacco, it is very probable that he will not discover the
injuriousness inherent in tobacco until it is too late. The
child who has developed an antipathy towards authority will
often refuse to accept the injiinction of the parent.
The situations as described do not, however, seem to
involve repression as it is ordinarily understood. The
positions could be described in terms of 'conditioning", and
the point could be raised as to why the child of ordinary
intelligence does not revise his irrational attitudes, why he
should not himself reduce the triangular relationship to a
directly lineal one. Is it not to be expected that reflective
self-consciousness will be capable of correcting the errors of
previous training? Holt's answer to-day would probably be that,
by the time the child is five, the harmful responses have been
incorporated into the superego system, and that the original
situations are no longer subject to rational thought, being
overlaid by the infantile amnesia.
The/
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The present writer, however, would, suggest that later
additions to Freudian psychology in no way detract from the
de facto position as described by Holt. What Adlerians would
describe as 'the training formulae" continue to act throughout
life. As we suggest later in this thesis, Holt does not
describe the whole story. provided the child has contempor¬
aries who form an implicit alliance against the "stupid" adults,
he may have, and usually does have, sufficient moral strength
to ignore parental influence in most of his objective relations.
Holt rightly suggests that behind neurotic manifestations
there is an ethical problem. But we cannot follow him in his
attitude of criticism of the adult personality. It seems
irrational to adopt an attitude of blame to adults on account
of "the hidden lie" within the soul. Moreover, with our minds
as they are, ethical conduct consists in a wise adaptation to
our irrational psychic intrusions. To attach blame to ourselves
as the possessors of imperfect personalities only leads to an
attitude of morbid introspection. The most satisfactory
individuals, from an ethical standpoint, are those who are free
from self-consciousness.
There is probably a good deal of truth in Holt's idea as to
the harm which results from a morality "from above", when 'the
i.
moral sanction is somehow super-mundane." "These egregious
ethics of the air", he says, "have produced other .tangible and
all-pervading consequences." Our remark in passing is that the
"ethics/
'"Op.cit., p.148. 30p.cit., p.150.
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"ethics of the air" happen to be very completely incorporated in
our psychic make-up, and wisdom, as we have said, lies in adapting
ourselves to them. They are as old as civilisation, and though
not the cause of civilisation, have certainly been concomitant
with it.
To continue. "Since ethics is such a floating vapour, many
sober-minded persons conclude, and not illogically, that it is
quite apart from the practical conduct of life'." (This is true,
as far as theories of ethics go, but in practice they are taken
into consideration in the conduct of life.) "And," continues
Holt, "they lead their lives accordingly. Thus the Teutonic
races, in their vigorous fashion, have codified this conclusion.
Ethics, they explicitly say, have no part to play in politics and
statecraft. "
We agree that ethical science cannot, as we are at present
3
constituted, deal with realities. But we are not sure that Holt
is differentiating sufficiently clearly between the implicitly
accepted ethic of the ordinary man and the attempts to codify
these ethical beliefs. In the first sense, the "ethics of the
air" are not effete.
Holt's position would seem to be similar to that of Janet.
Repression is the result of our not dealing with our psychic
conflicts in a rational manner. Like Janet, he has no doctrine
of repression proper which seems to be preceded by intense psychic
pain, usually, though not always, due to unresolved psychic conflict.
What/
'Op.cit., p.150. ^Op.cit., p.150-151.
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What Janet considers unusual, Holt thinks is normal. All
civilised human beings have failed in the task of solving their
problems rationally, the reason being that no child brought up
under traditional methods can succeed in reacting rationally to
the psychic situations which are thereby created. His problems
are all emotionally envisaged. He does not recognise the
justice of parental injunctions, and strives against them. His
opinion is that the parent is in the wrong. Why, then, should
he exert control over his impulses? Nevertheless, he is in
the grip of his own desire to stand well in the sight of his
educator. A rational solution of his problems is therefore
impossible. The child is committed to continual dissociation.
He is two persons - one striving to please his parents, and the
other seeking out his personal ends.
If the facts are as stated by Holt, the child in his
opposition to his parents is in part acting in accordance with
ethical norms. He opposes them be cause he considers them
unjust. If finally he has to resort to embodying the parents
within himself in order to secure mental peace, accepting as
his ideal the image of the parent, the obvious implication is
that he is led to accept as an ideal a person whose conduct he
regards as unethical. If, in his superego, he enacts the part
of the parent, it is patent that he is behaving in a way which
his ethical sense condemns as morally wrong.
To/
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To Holt, then, repression leads to unfortunate results
from the ethical standpoint. It is not, therefore, a
function of cultural process from the ethical aspect.
Irrational responses towards the environment become incorpor¬
ated in the child's personality, these later leading to social
maladjustment.
Finally, Holt is unsparing in his condemnation of the




Herbert gives a simple statement of the Freudian doctrine
of the part played by repression in determining cultural
process. Our discussion especially deals with the




In his book entitled 'The Unconscious in Life and Art ',
Herbert treats of repression and sublimation from the Freudian
standpoint. In his opinion, man started with a crude animal
mind. The original, instincts were repressed at the time of
the formation of the Band of Brothers'. In the individual to-day,
the original instincts are present, but repressed, and do not
appear in consciousness, there being an intermediate region
between conscious life and the primal instincts which "remains
2
entirely unexplored."
The instinct school of psychologists are in error in
thinking that instinctive impulses find "direct expression in
3
behaviour". There-is, he says, "but a thin veneer superimposed
k
upon the fundamental features of our animal nature." He asserts
that "the whole process of social culture is based upon the
successful repression of the unconscious complexes." He states
plainly that the purpose of the repression is that "we may become
<to
social."
The method by which man develops his "thin veneer" of
7
sociality, is through "sublimation and reaction formation."
"The crude sensual feelings...disguise themselves, as it were,
under a cloak of respectability, and thus gain entrance into
our conscious by what is called sublimation. In this way they
can attain satisfaction in some manner, yet without entirely
giving/
'"The Unconscious in Life and Art" p.122. J Op.cit., p.16.
3 Op.cit., p.16. * Op.cit., p. 17- s'0p.cit., p.19.
4 Op•cit., p.35. y Op.cit., p.26.
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giving up their original purpose!"
Among sublimations formed in this way he mentions religion,
which "derives its driving force from unconscious complexes*. "
"Our spiritual life is the outcome of our deepest complexes,
forming the core of our very being". " In our enjoyment of art,
our "tastes and preferences are influenced by subtle unconscious
complexes that colour our feelings and beliefs at their very roots,
4
long before they reach the sphere of conscious thought." In this
connection he also refers to politics and religion. "We make
believe," he says, "that we have rational reasons for expressing
this or that judgment, but in reality we are swayed by deep-rooted
prepossessions - and we do not even know that we are thus suborned
s
beforehand."
Intellectually, the main activity of reason is rationalis¬
ation! He rightly asks the question: "If the unconscious has
such a preponderant share in the make-up of the mind, what function
7
is left to rationality in man?" He admits that "the artistically
minded person will no doubt look first of all for artistic
qualities in a work of art, and enjoy it because it gives him this
aesthetic satisfaction!" "Reason," he says, "may act as a check
on precipitate action," but immediately takes back what he has said
by stating that "the inner forces of the ego repress, side-track
and transform the unconscious impulses into actions which are in
conformity with conscious reason", but, "as the conscious self is
unaware/
'Op.cit., p.20. 'Op.cit., p.32. 30p.cit., p.26. "Op.cit., p.26.
4' Op. cit. , p.26. kOp. cit., p.34. 70p.cit., p.34- *0p.cit., p.26.
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unaware of the changes that take place within the mind, it is
unable to assess the actual conditions'." The inference is that
the"ego" is also acting unconsciously, in accordance with the
method described in accounts of the workings of the superego
found in the later teaching of Freudians.
There is obviously little left for consciousness to do.
The human mind can be explained in terms of crude repressed
instincts, and their unconscious elaboration. The thin veneer
of our moral and rational self is to be accounted for as the
product of processes with which consciousness has little or no
connection. The unconscious is the determinant of both life
and art.
"The real forces which supply us with our energy are deeply
embedded in our organic nature." But nature appears to have
been reasonably successful in producing the varied phenomena of
civilised existence by elaborating these basic instinctual
impulses, without the co-operation of conscious personalities.
The obvious inference is that we should leave well alone.
Nature has never, to date, invited our co-operation in the
development of personality, and a wise policy would be to accept
gratefully what nature does for us; we should not presume to
interfere with her benign activities. In any case, what cause
have we to think that the untried faculty of reason has the
necessaiy knowledge and experience to improve on nature?
But/
'Op.cit., p.34. u Op. cit. , p.16.
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But we are startled by Herbert's statement that ''it
would bring us a good step nearer to true social feelings if
we learnt to understand our unconscious motives. We would
then be able to recognise how much they mar and distort our
outlook, leading us to wrong judgments about ourselves and our
neighbours. Increased insight into the working of our
unconscious mind and a proper knowledge of psychoanalysis will
do a good deal in future to resolve the many misunderstandings
between human beings that are now a constant source of dis-
I.
agreements and quarrels."
It is also asserted that "the unconscious which in health
is repressed and kept in bounds by the counterpoise of reason,
a
is let loose" when the mind is in disease. But, as we have
seen, it is the repressed ego, the superego, that controls the
instinctual impulses3. Herbert is thus illogical in suggesting
that it is reason which controls the unconscious: the unconscious
controls itself. It follows that, if pur mind is free from dis¬
ease, it would be extremely unwise to understand more fully our
unconscious motives. According to Herbert's finding, it is
not reason that keeps us sane, and if, by introspection, we
modify the superego which, according to his teaching, is the
real determinant of sanity, there seems a greater likelihood
that self-knowledge will bring on insanity rather than avert it.
We have thus in Herbert a clear expression of the Freudian
position/
'Op.cit., p.35. 9 Op.cit., p.37. 3 Op.cit., p.34-
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position. Repression, we are told, has been and is responsible
for cultural development. And yet in the same breath we are
informed that repression should be dispensed with as a means of
psychic control. We shall later see the manifold absurdities
to which the psychoanalysts are led by their extraordinary
capacity for dissociation. In recent works by such writers as
Roheim, Rank, and Nicole, we have a further elaboration of the
views implicit in the teaching of Herbert, an elaboration which,
to the critical reader, amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of the
belief that repression is a function of cultural process.
To Herbert, art and other cultural activities are determined
by unconscious process. Thus, in his view, complexes supply at
once the motive and the energy for humanity's search after the
good, the beautiful, and the true.
A complex, we have suggested, could be defined as conscious
process gone wrong. The probabilities would appear to be
against the acceptance of Herbert's theory as revealed in "The




lay is an example of a Freudian who develops an educational
theory on the basis of the Freudian doctrine of repression




At some length we attempt a criticism of the attitude of
Freudians to the problem of child rearing.
.206.
Wilfrid Lay.
In his book, "The Child's Unconscious Mind", Lay contends
that the aim of psychoanalysis is "to unite the individual with
his kind." He considers that the task of the teacher should be
to bring the child into a better relationship with society as a
result of the educator's insight, developed in the study of
psychoanalysis. The new type of training for the teacher which
he envisages will be "to make the work of the teacher more
efficient, his relations with parents and children more profit¬
able, and his position in the present social organism more
I
valued than it is."
He presents as the basis of a newer science of education
"the hypothesis that the unconscious portion of our human mind,
child or adult, is an activity which plays an extremely important,
if not an exclusively controlling, role in the life of every
a
individual." His emphasis is th&s on the unconscious as being
the pre-determinant in the praduction of the phenomena of
consciousness, and the efficient educator "must adopt this new
3
point of view."
He suggests that, in the past, the educator has guessed at
the facts of the activity of the unconscious in his pupils, and
"human conduct has always been modified by the unconscious desires;
but no conscious cognizance has been taken of it except in a very
indefinite/
'Wilfrid Lay, "The Child's Unconscious Mind" p.325.
«0p.cit., p. 2. 30p.cit., p. 2.
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indefinite and unproductive way."
He would ask the teacher to view the unconscious mind as
composed of mental states which are not inert, but "are
activities, energies, or groups of forces which are operating
by mechanisms of which only the special student knows anything
a
definite at all."
There are, however, in daily life, "frequent examples of
the conscious results produced by those elaborate and complic-
3
ated mechanisms." The teacher should therefore concentrate
his attention on the hidden reaches of the child's mind. Only
by an understanding of the inner mechanisms can he adequately
perform his task in imparting knowledge and developing
A
character.
The unconscious mind is universal, being "an element in
the constitution of every normal human being." He states
that the nature of this unconscious factor may be "described in
one word: desire. It constantly desires my superiority to my
lo
fellowmen in all the relations of life." It has been compared
to a current of power which is for ever flowing and ready to be
applied to any purpose for which the human body is a suitable
machine. But it loves "gratification which comes from the
worsting of any contestant, and in a certain sense everything
with which and everyone with whom I come in contact is taken by
it as a possible or actual rival. It feeds on a feeling of
power which it gets by making me overcome or outwit my
adversaries. If I do not think of this or that man as an
©pponent/
3 'Qp.cit., p.2. J0p.cit., p.4.
Op.cit., p. 4. * Op* cit. , p. 4. ~fOt).oit. . n-7. "nn.cit. , p.7.
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opponent, my unconscious factor does and makes me unconscious
i
for a brief moment."
Lay here stresses what is probably the most outstanding
component of what Freud later described as the superego. His
description would almost equally apply to the Adlerian tendency
to ego-maximation, and also we may detect the kind of phenomena
described by Stekel in "The Beloved Ego". We may take it,
then, that the teacher should realise that this desire for
superiority is hidden within the mind of every child, and
should, adapt his methods of teaching to this inward force.
The moral would seem to be that the teacher should work out a
system whereby the child's emulative impulses should provide
the drive for the attainment of knowledge and the acquisition
a
of moral sentiments.
Even the things we most desire are not those we consciously
seek after. "The greater number of our desires are absolutely
5.
unknown to us." The things we most desire, however, are those
things sexual which "have been tabooed in many civilisations".
These desires can never enter into consciousness except in a
disguised form. "All the unconscious wishes are forms of the
creative wish for reproduction" but on account of the barrier
created by society, these desires express themselves in a
groping manner 'like a blind animal, or like a blade of grass
stretching forth...under a board towards the light."
lay/
'op.cit., p.7. ^Op.cit., p.7. 30p.cit., p.15.. *0p.cit., p.16.
Lay would seem to accept uncritically the forces which
have led towards the changing of sometime desires into a form
where they must grope "like a blind animal". He, indeed,
justifies repression of the sex instinct as a very proper way
of dealing with a dangerous situation. we have the idea, he
suggests, that having to do with sex is like "playing with fire
with the implication that all those who play with such fire are
likely to be burnt. Furthermore, that it is a bad thing in
every way to be burnt. A state of society is conceivable in
which such a fear of being burnt did not exist, and in which
therefore there would be plenty of people in evidence who had
been burnt and been disfigured by their burns.
How the fact is that, in avoiding the one kind of burns,
we are suffering another kind. What we are really doing is
exchanging a physical for a mental burn. This, it would seem,
is all to the good. But the matter does not rest here. 'The
is an absolute law of the conservation of energy in the mental
well as in the physical world. What we gain in the way of
physical advantage by our constant curbing of the natural
I
instincts" should be turned to "mental advantage". In many
cases, this does not happen. This is doubly a mistake, first
because our conscious desires "are the fewest in number and the
weakest in dynamics" and secondly because "the unconscious







The result is that we are only partially energised and we
have "failed of the spiritual union within (ourselves) which is
so rare a thing."
lay would seem to suggest that it is the task of the teacher
to provide an ideal of personality which will enable the child to
express his unconscious wishes. How this lean be done without
raising the taboos to which the child has been subjected, it is
difficult to see. It would rather seem to be the task of the
teacher to prevent the child becoming conscious of such an ideal.
His business would be to hoodwink the child into imagining that
he no longer desires the forbidden lines of activity.
lay considers that one of the fundamental purposes of education
is to "enable each individual to take at will into consciousness as
many and as diverse thoughts as possible, which the uneducated
person is unable to face'." The educator should aim at enabling
the individual to face as much reality as possible. Reality, he
appears to think, is to be found in the unconscious, and under
ideal conditions of early education, the unconscious impulses
would find their various concrete ends. In this case the
individual would have developed "naturally without help from the
outside4." There is, he days, in human beings, an innate tendency
"from the earliest days of infancy...to repress reality, to forget
it voluntarily, to drive it from consciousness and keep it out
of/
'Op.cit., p.59. a Op.cit., p.59.
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of consciousness. Because reality is largely, and more in
nervous persons than in others, a source of pain and distress
And so we go on from year to year accumulating in the
unconscious all the painful and distressing experiences."
Lay may be in part describing what exists under present
conditions of early child education, but surely the emphasis
in a book on education, directed partly to parents, should be
on those conditions which cause reality to have the quality of
being painful. He envisages natural development "without
help from the outside", but offset against the desirability or
possibility of such development, we have his reference to the
dangerous quality of the sex impulse which, as far as we can
see from Lay's viewpoint, fully justifies the substitution of
an unconscious burn for a physical one. There his only plea
is that we should sublimate the energy bound up in the
repressed instinct.
Conscience in children Lay describes as being due to "the
voice of their fathers and mothers heard in reality in earlier
days, but now heard in imagination. ' He is thus committed to
an intuitive view of the moral life. While he is in part
correct, it would seem that conscience in children is far more
than this. This point we discuss more fully in our critique
of Freudian psychology based on Alexander's "psychoanalysis of
the Total Personality."
Referring/
'•Op.cit. , p.60. J-Op.cit., p. 119.
.212.
Referring to sublimation, Lay states that "the aim of
education is the sublimation or adaptive transformation of
i
physical into psychic energy." What differentiates a sublim¬
ation from other displacements arising out of repressed sexuality,
is this, that "sublimation of a trend of the psjrche is nothing
more or less than the selection by society of that particular
trend for its own use or amusement!'"
We suggest that Lay's definition of the aim of education
would be sound were the word "sublimation " omitted. Why, may
we ask, should the "adaptive transformation" be beneath the
threshhold of consciousness? That is, why should the emphasis
be on complexes rather than on normally developed sentiments?
And, moreover, the suggestion that the adaptive transformation
is merely in relation to that which society selects "for its own
use or amusement" would seem to cut the ground from beneath the
educator to whom the vital ends of education are in relation to
things which have intrinsic value quite independently of utility
or entertainment value.
We consider it a mistake to suggest to the teacher that the
educative process should be related to the unconscious , which,
according to Lay, contains all the energies which consciously or
unconsciously are used by the teacher during the child's period
of school training. Surely all our energies are not lockedup
within what Freud later described as the superego system. And,
in/
'dp.cit., p.151. 1 Op.cit., p.150.
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in any case, sublimation, according to Freudian authorities,
is an unconscious process and is beyond the control of either
the child or the teacher. Wisdom would seem to lie in placing
before the child ideals which he may consciously assimilate,
and as far as the unconscious is concerned, patiently awaiting
the harnessing of any forces which happen to be locked up
therein.
Lay seems to be completely unaware that, if the facts are
as stated by him, the child does not really desire to realise
the ends which are bound up in the educational process. He
is, indeed, an unconscious dupe in so far as the educator
succeeds in "sublimating". It is probably true that any
educator who really- believes that his job is to manipulate the
inner psychic mechanisms of his pupils, will cease to have the
ability to inspire in the children a desire for the conscious
pursuit of ideals of vital significance. A thoroughgoing
belief in mechanisms leads to materialism and. obscuration of
ethical values, and a conscious acceptance of insincerity and
chicanery.
It is, of course, not true that the educator who accepts
the theory of Freudian psychoanalysis really acts on the
philosophic assumptions which lie at the base of Freudian
psychology. Happily, he is the subject of dissociation, and




Towards the end of his book, Lay engages in a talk on
hypocritical education in respect of sexuality. Fe says that
it "is very rarely considered until it is too late...how a boy
or a girl should feel...about the things concerning which the
deepest and most pervasive feelings are right and proper...and
the sexual feelings, which should be kept for sexual things, have
gotten detatched from those primal experiences and transferred to
incidents which never in the world should have had attached to
them feelings of sexual intensity In a sense, then, our
civilisation is based and the vast fabric of it is erected on a
sense of shame, for repressed sexuality works itself out in
excesses of every sort, in enormousness of cities, and commerce,
and all the great things which so astound the individual when he
looks at them in large. It may thus be that our shame-civilis¬
ation has resulted from a shunting off of power from reproduction
of species to production of externals of life and that, had we
had our sexiiality less repressed, we should have been a simple
!•
people like the Chinese."
Once again we have the doctrine of repression being harmful
if in excess, and desirable if only existing in a modified degree.
The general reader must indeed be baffled by a perusal of a book
of the type of "The Child's Unconscious Mind". At one time
the implication is that repression is a necessary, and perhaps




attacked as being at the root of many of the world's major
evils. The only effect on those who seek guidance in their
dealings with children is to develop within them a vacillating
and inconsistent policy. And moreover, there is a tendency to
accept the implied materialism of the Freudian position which
sees in the young child a mere animal, something to be
"conditioned" with a corresponding lack of any appreciation of
the child as having ethical and aesthetic sensitivity, and also
a desire to bring his experience into rational relationship.
What is the relation between repression and cultural
development? lay's whole position would lead us to the con¬
clusion that, in all essential activities, we are complex
driven. Hence his educational corollary that the teacher
should provide for the child opportunities of sublimation.
Our position is, on the contraiy, that the child should be
encouraged to develop sentiments by placing before him ends
which have an intrinsic appeal. Education must be an active
process in which the child consciously accepts ends which to
him are of felt value, and thereupon seeks out and adapts means
by which these ends may be realised. Only when the character
has attained stability as a result of this process is it profit¬
able for the educator to concern himself with the repressed
unconscious, but not with the intention of effecting sublim¬
ations. Rather must the end be to eliminate the repressed




Fritz Wittels might be described as a Freudian with a
mission. We have before us his book entitled -'Set the Children
Free"j an article on "Narcissism"in "sex in Civilisation", and
one on "Sadistic Tendencies in Parents" in "The lew Generation".
He is out to inform the lay public that it is high time they
modified their methods of child rearing. lo one can doubt
Wittels' sincerity; but the reader gains the impression that he
is still anchored in the dismal philosophy of the Freudians,
implicit in whose teaching is the belief that if child rearing
methods were altered the race would quickly be destroyed.
"Repression is civilisation". Moreover, all cultural process
is dependent on impulses which are aim-inhibited as a result of
repression.
In our opinion, wittels, on account of his Freudian pre¬
suppositions, does not fully grasp the problem which he wishes
to resolve, because of false beliefs as to the nature of the
young child. The essential prerequisite of dealing more
intelligently with children is to have a clear understanding of
their nature.
Wittels, like many other writers whose views we-have dis¬
cussed, subscribes to the belief that there is a stage in the
child's development when something catastrophic occurs, but he
does not give a very adequate description of how and why this
happens. It is probably the main distinction between thinkers
like/
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like McDougall and Watson, and those whose interest is mainly
centred in the unconscious, that whereas the former regard
development as proceeding gradually by sentiment formation or
the conditioning of primary impulses, the latter have formed the
belief that at some point in the child's development there is a
sudden rift, and what takes place at this time is the principal
determinant of subsequent character formation.
Wittels makes many illuminating statements, and since he
represents the ''reforming" spirit as found in many Freudian
writers, we shall follow fairly closelj" the viewpoint illustrated
in the writings at present before us.
Writing on narcissism, in "Sex in Civilisation", Wittels
tells us: "The primary narcissism forms a normal part of sound
development" but "secondary narcissism is a dangerous thing, and
i
in its higher degrees may even become a disease." Secondary
narcissism is the result of identifications bound up with the
catastrophic event in the child's development, the factual
existence of which is, we believe, implicit throughout Wittels'
writings. But, as we have stated in other connections, there is
grave reason for doubting if the condition of primary narcissism
ever is present in young children. Young children are not in
love with themselves. Our three-and-a-half year old child does
not appear to have noticed himself as a person. There is every
reason to suppose that his interests are objective, even in so far
as/
'"Sex in civilisation" p.441.
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as he reflects on his own psychological processes. His
"libido" is certainly not on himself. it is attached to the
objects, animals, and persons in whom he is interested.
There is, of course, the personal point of reference, but
merely in so far as Professor Drever's "general appititive
I
tendency" is at work, in that he seeks pleasure and avoids
unpleasure.
There appears to be no factual basis for the Freudian
belief in primary narcissism, and the impression we gain is that
Wittels, on account of his Freudian viewpoint, throws a cloak
over the true nature of the young child. Wittels' child would
seem to be a projection of his own unconscious processes. We
have an extreme instance of this kind of thing in McCurdy's
description of the infantile nature. It is becoming more and
more evident to the writer that the Freudian as such is badly
equipped for the task of instituting reforms in traditional
methods of bringing up children.
When Wittels describes secondary narcissism, we feel that
he is on surer ground. We find.him saying: "He (the narcissist)
feels more respect and more love for himself, tiny as he is,
than for the great universe by which he is surrounded-. Here we
perceive the egocentric standpoint which leads, on the one hand,
to defeat by insanity, and on the other to the hero who has
succeeded repeatedly in changing the world, especially in the
spiritual/
'j. Drever, "The Psychology of Education" p.57.
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spiritual realm5'. We are reminded of Ktinkel' s viewpoint', as
exemplified in the symbol which we shall describe when referring
to this author. But Kunkel has no mention of the hero as con¬
ditioned by a narrowing of objectivity, and an abnormally large
degree of egocentricity.
Wittels goes on to say: "So we see narcissism triumphant,
the solitary man victorious over the outside world, and we would
like to draw a sharp line between such summits of achievement and
the errors of the human mind. But it is not possible to make a
sharp distinction.
It is our contention in this thesis that, on the findings
of students of the unconscious, it is possible to make a sharp
distinction between the errors of the human mind and the con¬
ditions on which cultural process depends. This can only be
brought about if we study the total personality of the young
child and perceive the ethical significance of the process of
repression. A solution can be found only when we appljr to the
problem the touchstone of the apparently old-fashioned concepts
of right and wrong, the true and the untrue, and distinctions
based upon the aesthetic sense.
In his article on "Sadistic Tendencies in Parents!, Wittels
makes several interesting observations to which we shall briefly
3.
refer. Like Bertrand Russell, he regards the "fall of man' as
taking/
'
See section on Fritz Kunkel, thesis p. 300.
3 'Sex in Civilisation" p.451.
3Bertrand Russell, "Marriage and Morals" p.136 et seq.
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taking place when the institution of property was brought into
existence. In Arcadian days, the child had "run beside its
mother like a young colt", but under civilised conditions he
became "the property of his parents" and was "treated as such".
Besides having economic functions, the child was regarded as
being destined to acquire the property of his father, and must
receive appropriate training. But as time went on, a class
grew up which had no property, and by the rules of right reasoning
the proletarian child should have regained that ancient inheritance
which he ceased to receive as soon as he became the heir to
property. But Wittels points out that things did not work out
this way. He says; "Proletarian children are not heirs, they
are nothing more or .less than property, the only property the
proletarian owns. The right to box his children's ears, because
they: are his children, has remained a proletarian right, and no
one has a right to object. He does not wish to be considered
lacking as compared to the father of the wealthy, so he 'brings
up' his child. He vents his own ill-humour on his children, and
the property owning classes have no interest in disturbing him in
this possession by enlightening him.'"
Wittels goes on to say: "The children must accustom them¬
selves in good season to hawing their ears boxed, so that they
will not be surprised when life, later on, turns out to be an
affair of cracks and cuffs. Then, in their turn, they will
regard/
'"The Hew Generation' p.42.
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regard children as defenceless property, when they have become
fathers!"" Wittels here has become a realist.
In the article previously discussed, Wittels tells us that
fear in childhood is due to pbylogenic factors'!' We suggest
that, above, Wittels gives us a far more adequate account of
the factors which lead to repression than when he seeks for
efficient causes of childhood's fears by peering into those dim
corridors which represent our racial past.
On the following page, Wittels again is almost unpleasantly
realistic when tracing the factors which give rise to repression
Perhaps the writer will be forgiven if he indulges in a little
anecdote which was recently related of a tradesman in a small
town, who, like most other persons in the community,had suffered
at the hands of the local gossips. In his braid Scots, he said
"Ye ken, the,}'- tell an awfu' lot o' lees aboot me, but I never
heed them. But if they started to tell the truth aboot me, I
wad hae to tak' notice l" ?/e suggest that if psj^choanalysts
told us the truth instead of indulging in mythology, their
influence might be commensurate with the significance of the
facts which they have brought to light.
We find Wfittels sayingl Yet where is there a power that
is not liable to be misused, should it give us pleasure to
3.
misuse it?" If we would account for repression, we n©ad not
look much farther than into the minds of ordinary human beings
when/
'"The Pew Generation' p.42. 2 "Sex in Civilisation" p.455.
3"The Pew Generation"p.43*
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when no longer under the eye of public opinion. Wittels also
speaks of "the degrading of the child to the level of a mere
chattel" and moreover says: "Slavery and serfdom have been
abolished, but children are slaves. ! And he proceeds to tell
us: "Our education will always train slaves - human beings inwardly
and externally not free - so long as the sadistic element is
present in that education."
Wittels refers to masochism as "an enthusiastic subjection,
I.
a spirit of servitude....inbred in the nursery," And yet, in the
eyes of most Freudians, masochism is an essentially respectable
part of the superego, an institution which they regard with the
pride of the archaeologist who has unearthed the foundations of
some ancient temple the existence of which had heretofore been
unsuspected.
later, Wittels tells us: "Drilled children are a sin against
the Holy Ghost. An eight-year-old boy, the son of an officer of
high rank, said to his father at the table: 'The beating you gave
me has already vrorked, hasn't it father? I'm sitting a good deal
straighten'". On the next page, Wittels says: "Hot only inhuman
parents, but nearly all parents take a sadistic attitude with
regard to their children; they derive pleasure f rom torturing
3
their children." Once again, Wittels is realistic. Sadism,
whatever be the explanation, is part of our original equipment;
this fact is forced on evexy unbiassed witness of the behaviour
of children. Most parents take steps to instil into the child a
belief/
'"The Hew Generation" p.43. ^Op.cit., p.46.
30p.cit., p.47.
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belief that cruelty is "wicked"; henceforth, the tendency is
viewed within an emotional setting, and therefore is no longer
subject to rational control. It has become a complex,
strangely enough a respectable one, and in adult life it finds
"legitimate;f expression in correcting young children, not only
in respect of their "cruelty", but also in connection with any
impulse whatsoever which is traditionally regarded as "wrong".
The present writer makes this statement as a result of
observing the conditions in numerous homes, chiefly of the
working class. Elsewhere in this paper, he ventures the
opinion that disgust conditioning has far more to do with
repression in our own society than Ereudians appear to realise:
he would here emphasise his belief that sadism is a powerful
detexminant in the development of the preconditions of neurosis,
and of normality in so far as normality has an admixture of the
irrational. Malinowski considers that in primitive society we
need not look into the past for an explanation of the mores of
that society. The existing organisation may be explained in
terms of present utility'.
Although it would probably be vain to seek for a "biological"
explanation of contemporary family organisation, we might do
well to apply Malinowski's conception in the sense of looking
for the causative factor of repression in the concrete conditions
of present-day families. Those who are obsessed with, the super¬
ego system seem almost incapable of realising the relatively
simple/
'Bronislaw Malinowski in "The Hew Generation" p.143.
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simple and easily observable factors which are responsible for
repression. Most Freudian explanations, we suggest, are
irrelevant. It is refreshing to find Wittels drawing our
attention to real ontogenetic factors, rather than to imaginary
phylogenic ones.
Also in another instance, Wittels deals realistically with
a prime causative factor in inculcating irrationality into our
children. We read: "We cripple the intelligence and courage
of our children by tales among which the cruelties of the Old
and New Testaments occupy the place of honour. The crucifixion
of Christ, the slaughter of the Innocents of Bethlehem, the Flood,
the Egyptian plagues, and much else, are presented to the child
hall-marked with the- deepest reverence and the utmost solemnity.
We demand of the child that it accept these religious cruelties
as true, actual happenings, either because we ourselves believe
them, or, in any event, act as though we believed them. In
fairytales one should at least leave open the loop-hole that it
I
is all poetry and play of the imagination." In point of fact,
most children, if not all, reach a stage when fairytales etc.
cease to have an influence over their characters. But the type
of story from Holy Writ to which Wittels refers, remains in the
minds of a great number of adults as being fundamentally true.
We then find Wittels saying: "The love which the child
requires must be as well regulated as a luke-warm bath whose
i.
invariable temperature is always maintained. ! McDougall tells
us/
'Op.cit., p.50. 3 0p.cit., p.51.
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us of the effect on parents of this kind of advice'. They
become afraid to show any affection to their children, lest
their love passes the , "temperate" point of the Freudian ther¬
mometer. We are inclined to agree with McDougall in this
matter. Wittels appears to be influenced by seeing in the
child a tendency towards sensuality in his attachments to his
parents. From what we have ourselves observed, the young child
is simply not interested in sentimental affection, any more
than the boy of ten, and quickly rebuffs tendencies towards
sentimentality in his parents.
When sexuality is repressed, or at least when something is
repressed, attachments to parents previously almost unemotional
take on, within the super-heated chamber of the repressed
unconscious, a strength which did not exist when the attachment
was directed towards the real parent. It probably matters vezy
little,if a child's impulses are to be repressed, whether the
attachments to the actual parents were greater or less. There
can be no question, however, that the child loses his sense of
security if he is not continually reminded that his parents bear
an affectionate attitude towards him.
Wittels' book "Set the Children Free" runs into .almost two
hundred pages, and although much of what he says is relevant to
our present discussion, it will be impossible here to do more than
make brief reference to a few of the salient points.
Wittels/
'
"Psychoanalysis and Social psychology", Appendix V., p.195.
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Wittels repeats his belief that we "come into the world
i
loving ourselves". only gradually does the child's interest
stray into the outer world, or rather, the world to the child
is himself, and its external happenings mere dreams. But in
process of reducing his seemingly psychological world to order,
he becomes aware of others as having egos, and from that point
he has a dim conception of himself as an ego, but it "is a
fragile asset....The recognition of the personal ego constitutes
a turning point in life. Up to that moment, the child was a
creature which had not felt any difference between itself and
2
the outer world."
Speaking of identification, Wittels states that it "is as
simple as can be. - A boy is interested in a locomotive; he
is himself the locomotive." Our comment is that, from a very
early age, the child knows quite well the difference between
himself and the things with which he becomes identified. He
is "only pretending". We are told that the feeling of
inferiority "can never be looked upon as a primordial feeling
among mankind. How could a being which feels itself to be
unique, which feels that it, indeed, constitutes a world in
itself, how could such a being ever come to look upon itself as
i.
inferior?" The child is born with "a cuirass of self-satisfaction
to protect it against the mortifications from which its sensitive
little mind would otherwise suffer."
We/
'"Set the Children Free" p.65• JQp.cit., p.65* JOp.cit., p.65.
l- Op. cit. , p. 68.
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We reiterate that the child has no such extraordinary
belief in its own uniqueness, and cannot in any sense whatever
be regarded as loving itself. Against this view, we would
point out that a child of a month old is able to respond to
emotional expressions in others. Philip smiled at his
attendant when only twenty-eight days old. It is a well-
known fact that children are influenced by the emotional
expressions of others from a very early age. How the child
is able to interpret facial expressions, in view of the fact
that he has, as a general rule, never seen a reflection of his
oral face when emotionally roused, is a complete mystery, but
the fact is there, and since the capacity is so obviously
innate we have every reason to think that the child quickly
gains a notion, however hazy, of the existence of other
personalities.
Philip, at the time of writing, heard his mother sigh.
He had previously heard it said that she was worried on account
of her sister who had just returned from abroad in a state of
ill health. Interpreting the sigh, Philip enquired: "Are you
worried about Auntie Nancy?"
The child is surely equipped for objectivity, and the whole
conception of his being shut up for a considerable time in a
narcissistic dream, and protected by a feeling of self-satis¬
faction from the attacks of an alien world, is a theory which is
in/
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in the highest degree improbable. Yet this is the basis of
the psychology of the author of ''Set the Children Free". if
parents accept his doctrine, they are, in our view, accepting
an illusory system of beliefs, a projection of so-called secondary
narcissism into the life of the young child.
Parents have, indeed, a fair intuitive knowledge of the
workings of the minds of their young charges. It is to be
feared that false theoretical conceptions such as those enunciated
by -fittels will make parents far less effective in the treatment
of their children than they would be if simply left to the guidance
of their intuition.
According to Wittels, the child is surrounded bjr what he
describes as the "T.u" . At one time in our life, we represented
Sod. We were the whole of existence. We read the following:
"Maybe we premise here that the consciousness of the Ego comes
to us from without, and-that the great Tu from which this self-
consciousness arises requires that the Ego shall be reabsorbed in
itself. We are then 'gathered to our fathers' or our mothers;
we rest in God.'" We would ask here, what has all this got to
do with human development? The child presumably does come to
have an idea of himself, which idea we may call the ego. But
should not our attention be fixed on the self as an organic
unity? is there not a basic ego, and is it not probable that
the child has within him at an early stage that totally




knows what is going on in himself just as much as he knows of the
events taking place in the outer world through his senses'. Once
again, is not Wittels' ego a projection on to the child of a con¬
ception merely found within the highly elaborated consciousness
or unconsciousness of the adult? After all, is not the superego
a mere complex, essentially a part of that self which is an
organic whole, even though it does contain within itself a false
idea of the self which causes a break in what Kunkel calls its
organic continuity?
To 'Wittels, the child and the adult at all times retain a
hankering after the pristine belief in self-perfection, this being
the original idea of the self in early childhood. But surely if
we wish to get back t-o our first idea of ourselves, we should find
this idea bound up with our introspective knowledge, a knowledge
however implicit, of the self as experienced during the early years
of childhood.
According to Wittels, the child does a number of extraordinary
things in order to get back his feelings of self-importance and
self-satisfaction. When he comes to realise that his ego has
weaknesses and limitations, he compares himself adversely with that
grand and glorious being which he previously imagined himself to be,
and thereupon sets up within himself "an ideal ego set apart from
our everyday ego, and retaining in the fictional world of the
ideal/
'of. J. Yarendonck, "Evolution of the Conscious Faculties',
Chapter on 'Reduplicative Memory".
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ideal its divine and omnipotent qualities. Everything a man
feels to be good and right he brings into the mansion where
dwells his ideal ego, The ideal ego is also in control of
our conscience, and upon the decisions of this higher tribunal
depend both our happiness and our unhappiness throughout life'. 1
We can only confess to feelings of astonishment. The
child tells to itself a deliberate lie, and can plead in
extenuation of the fault only that the lie is comforting? on
the basis of this lie, on his creation of a picture of a
fictitious self, there is constructed that which controls our
conscience, our higher tribunal, and the determinant of our
sorrows and joys. And Wittels follows this up by stating
that "good breeding, behaviour, and gentlemanliness, depend to
a large extent upon this ego ideal - or superego as Ereud calls
3.
it." We are sufficiently proletarian to believe that 'gentle-
manliness" has some such basis, but we totally demur when
Wittels calmly informs us that all worthy conceptions spring
not merely from human error but from sheer baseness and total
disregard for truth.
Speaking of the child as he emerges from this state of
Arcadian bliss, Wittels says: "But however beautiful-and
paradisial this stage of development may be, it is bound to
come to an end sooner or later. The child of a civilised
community strives to circumscribe its ego in order to become
"unique. Again, it encounters so many annoyances in the course
of/
1
Op. cit. , -0.69. 2 See section on Alexander, thesis p. 412-3.
^ op.cit., p.69.
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of its upbringing, annoyances coming pre-eminently from the
beloved Tu (chiefly the parents), that doubt begins to germinate
in its mind, with the result that the first conflicts are
implanted'.
Thus to Wittels the child of two or three is already a prey
to illusions. Surely the truth is that a child of this age has
no tendency to over-estimate his own importance in the scheme of
things. Wittels then goes on to discuss the conceptions of the
pleasure principle and the reality principle. The pleasure
principle he identifies with the child's gratification of his
belief that he is all-important and all-powerful, and reality is
that which convinces him that his pleasurable idea of himself
cannot be maintained. His state of bliss is disturbed by the
Tu's insistence that he is less important than he previously
imagined. The child has taken comfort in the thought that the
Tu has accepted him at his own evaluation, but when he discovers
that his environment adopts a critical attitude towards him, he
looks round for a substitute for the rather disappointing Tu
institution. The community obligingly supplies the child with a
series of religious conceptions, and thus !'the father's place is
taken by God the bather; the mother's place (at least In catholic
lands) is taken by the Virgin Maiy; the inefficient ego which has
to undergo so long a passion is replaced by Jesus Christ, the Son
of God." we accept religion in order to bolster up a false con¬
ception of our own importance.
This/
'Op.cit., p.72. 50p.cit., p.74.
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This tendency to take refuge in authorities has, it would
seem, a distinct function in leading the child to accept
societal organisation. "All forms of authority have arisen out
of this kind of childish substitution - teacher, mayor, king, etch
Hence also arise other concepts, such as the sense of belonging
to a certain nation, countny, town, or class. Such substitutes
likewise, if they early take root in the child's mind, are not
i
amenable to extirpation by the rational faculty." It would seem
that our eternal preoccupation is to defend our pristine ego
conception.
According to Wittels, there is good reason, for if "doubt
....invades the sanctuary of the ego", ego-consciousness becomes
completely extinct, and "we have to do with veritable insanity.
So far as normal beings are concerned, doubt cannot penetrate
into the core of the ego, but merely gnaws at the outside rind.
Even so, however, there arise feelings of inferiority from which
hardly any child is wholly free."
Our opinion is that the above statement is merely an implicit
confession that psychoanalysts have not, to date, succeeded in
effecting any vital analysis of the psychic stiucture. We shall
not discuss Wittels' reference to the condition of the insane, but
according to his statement, no individual who has been under the
analytical process has ever brought reason to bear on that
illusory system of ideas represented, by what Wittels describes as
the/
'Op.cit., p.75. 3 Op.cit., p.77.
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the ego. It seems absurd to imagine that if an individual
lost his illusions he would become insane. Rather would he be
left with the young child's ordinary psychological equipment,
which includes the power of introspection and the formation of
a true idea of the self on the basis of that introspection.
Wittels then proceeds to explain everything in terms of
the child's attempting to defend his primary narcissism, just as
Rank founds his psychological edifice on the theory of the "birth
trauma". Wittels' ostensible purpose is to "set the children
free", but like almost all other Freudian writers, he gives us
the impression that the person to be emancipated is caught in
the toils of a fate from which it is well-nigh impossible for
him to extricate himself.
Rank has his "biirth trauma", Melanie Klein and Susan
Isaacs an aliasignificant superego which develops inexorably
whatever educational methods may be employed; Subtle sees in
weaning the decisive factor - one also relatively uncontrollable;
McCurdy has his "tendency"' to form an Oedipus complex, and here
we have in Witt els' "Set the Children Free ', perhaps the most
stultifying conception of all. "We are born blind, and at the
i
seme time we come into the world loving ourselves. ' -Illusion
is natural to us, and complete disillusion spells insanity.
We have seen that the child fits himself in to the social
order on account of his "need" for substitutes, these being




of his own personality. as a means of defending himself against
doubt - for which, of course, there is every reason - mankind
rather paradoxically seeks knowledge, and thus science comes into
being.1' "But when a child feels that its title to ownership is
being threatened, then do we witness the first hint of scepticism;
thereafter, becoming alarmed, it starts passionately on the road of
enquiry. The wiseacre's saw, "Knowledge is power", finds no more
enthusiastic believer than a child. Nevertheless, it only wants
to obtain knowledge in the realm where the love of those who rub
shoulders with it in daily life does not suffice to satisfy its
A
craving for pleasure."
Wittels is soon involved in the usual type of absurdity which
springs from adopting false premises based on Freudian misconcep¬
tions. We read; 'Doubt is born from an insufficiency of love,
and bitter experience is the driving force which puts the child's
3
enquiring mind into action." The obvious cornllory is that we
must see to it that the child has "an insufficiency of love" -
this presumably being the luke-warm variety referred to earlier in
our discussion. Otherwise, human beings will no longer have
interest in scientific pursuits. Any unbiassed observer of
children is fully convinced that the child's desire for, knowledge
is one of his fundamental attributes, and that it has no ulterior
j,
motives.
If what Wittels says of the young child is true, he might
evoke/
'
Op.cit., p.83. 3 Op.cit., p.84. 30p.cit., p.85.
A See section on Wm. Brown, p. 145-j also section on Campbell
Garnett, thesis p. 155-
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evoke our pity, but scarcely our love. The child is a congenital
egoist, committed to a career of untruthfulness and deceit; his
ostensible motives have always an ulterior motive behind them, and
his sole concern in life is to maintain an inward condition of
self-love. His religion consists of self-worship, but his
breviary translates the words of a traditional prayer into more
appropriate form; not "Thine is the Kingdom", but "Mine is the
Kingdom, the power and the Glory." Wittels does not give us a
picture of a child but of an infantile monstrosity, another
creature of the superego system turned loose into spheres where
no objective counterpart can be found.
We shall now very quickly summarise the remainder of the
views found in "Set the Children Pree :, in so far as they are
relevant to our present purpose.
We have suggested that we cannot accept the theoretical
basis of Wittels' teaching. But in much of what follows, it
would appear that his powers of observation have not been obscured
on account of subjective factors. We find him saying that
parents often force their children "into an unequal combat whence
i
the youngsters emerge with a sense of guilt" - and, we may add,
with a "training formula" to the effect that it is hopeless to
resist authority, and often, also, that it is hopeless to attempt
the achievement of any ends whatsoever. Wittels tells us that
punishment/
'Op. cit. , p. 102.
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punishment is irrational, and that the child never accepts the
justice of punishment until his personality has been crashed.
"The right to punish rests entirely upon the right of the
stronger'. "
We find Wittels saying that "during its early years, the
child cannot see that there is any difference between God and his
own father and mother Grown-ups are never naughty, they are
3
unfailingly good." from experience, we suggest that the young
child can be very critical of the behaviour of his parents.
Adults do not do wrong, we are told, because "there is no one in
3
authority to forbid the doing of this, that, or the other." We
would express the view that the child has a very keen sense of
justice and injustice, and that adults, in his estimation,
certainly do wrong when they act unjustly.
Wittels argues that on account of the child's ideal of the
parent as perfect, he has, when that ideal is incorporated into
his own psychological system, saddled himself with a striving for
the unattainable. He has "a primary and unattainable ideal in
the underground regions of the mind." It would appear that
Wittels is here referring to phenomena which require another
interpretation. If the child considers his parents In the light
suggested by Wittels, it must be presupposed that his .judgment
has been influenced by emotional factors.
Towards the end of Wittels' book, we come across a curious
statement/
'Op.cit., p.lo6. JOp.cit., p.123. 30p.cit., pl23.
Op.cit. , p. 123.
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statement. He says; 'Agreed, that culture and civilisation are
impossible without the renunciation of many freedoms, all the
same, the inner freedom must remain inviolate." Ho objection
can, of course, be taken to this statement, but we are a little
baffled when we read on; "internal freedom is a splendid feeling
being equivalent to a sense of omnipotence produced by the con-
i
.viction that one has entered into alliance with the divine power.
We have no hesitation in suggesting that if anyone experiences
the inner freedom described by Wittels, he has the characteris¬
tics of a person in the positive phase of circular insanity.
Wittels is describing a state of mania, not normality as found in
either the adult or the child.
Yet Wittels does not hesitate to apply his findings as to
the psychological conditions which should exist if a person is
to have "internal freedom". "See to it, parents," he says,
"that 3rou, regarded by your child as its divine Tu, do not
poison for it this most important of cognitions which is the
first, the most primitive element, of a child's philosophy.
Ho doubt the child will ere long recognise your inadequacy, and
thus become aware of its own. But first of all let it absorb
your sufficiency, this meaning your love. 'Honour thy father
and thy mother' - but then, as Anzengru.ber justly remarks, the
a
parents must be worthy of honour."
Comment would almost seem to be unnecessary on such
perverse/
'Op. cit. , p. 153. Op.cit. , p. 153.
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perverse teaching. The first thing a parent must do if he
would give justice to his child is to come off that absurd
pedestal, to the elevation of which he has heretofore considered
himself entitled, and admit to himself, and if necessary to the
child, that he is in every vital essential the equal, if indeed
not the inferior of those who have been accidentally committed
to his care. Thus do we find false Freudian theory causing
those whose ostensible purpose it is to "set the children free"
to bolster up the traditional system tohich, unless modified,
threatens to engulf our civilisation in possibly irremediable
ruin.
Wittels has also views on the function and nature of
religion, but we do not think that the clergy will in this case
be specially inclined to accept his contribution to a better
understanding of the psychological bases of theological belief.
"The religious sentiment," says Wittels, "is a regurgitation of
the swallowed and ruminated divinity of the primal authority,
the primal perfection, which is now extrojected into the skies.
The religious phase of development is a necessary one, and the
child will spontaneously bring it to a close by adopting a
i.
peculiar, quasi-humorous attitude towards its own piety."
Thus do we attain normality I
In conclusion, we would remark that the impression we gather
from reading Wittels' "Set the Children Free" is that, from




child is crazy, the adult is crazy, but the latter, by accident,
happens to be called normal. if, as a result of analysis both
of himself and his patients, Wittels has formed the conclusion
that civilised humanity is characterised by the manic-depressive
state, even if in a somewhat mild form, we are willing to allow
that he is entitled to his opinion. But we would be emphatic
that only harm can come when conceptions derived from the study
of the abnormal in human development are projected into the lives
of our children. Up to the present time at any rate, it is not
regarded as an essential part of the training of a teacher that
he shculd make a special study of the aberrations of the insane,
supplemented by periodic visits to a mental hospital, as a
preparation for the- correct envisagement of the nature of his
future charges, though at times the practical educationalist
may gain the impression that such training might not altogether
have been inappropriate. But we would at least be emphatic
that only harm can come when those in charge of young children
are taught to see in their natures, psychic structures which are
only to be found in the minds of the insane or partly insane.
By implication, Witt els would seem to consider the normal as
among the last named class.
We shall not attempt specifically to relate the position
taken up by Wittels to our subject. Our main purpose has been
to show the inadequacy of the Freudian whose attention is turned
to the problems of child rearing. Repression, we hold, is a
djrs function/
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dysfunction of cultural process. The Freudian reformer, on
account of his theoretical presuppositions has not, in our
opinion, the necessary clarity of vision to inaugurate an
efficient campaign towards the highly desirable and vitally




Kolnai deals with the relation between psychoanalysis and sociology.
He wrote in 1921. He takes the line that the aim of psychoanalysis
should be to reform society by persuading it to give such insight
into its impulses that rational control may be set up instead of
control by the repressed unconscious. We suggest that contemporary
psychoanalysis has succeeded in so obscuring the issues that a con¬
sistent policy may no longer be envisaged.
Marxist.
Francis H. Bartlett.
The purpose of this article is to show the relation between Freudian
psychology and Marxist philosophy. like the Adlerians, the
Marxists claim that they are in a position to free the mind from
the harmful effects of the repressed unconscious. We seek to show
that their policy cannot alone effect the desired results.
Samuel Schmalhausen.
In the course of this article the Marxist position is again
examined from another angle.
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Aurel Kolnal.
In 1921, Kolnai attempted to inter-relate psychoanalysis
and sociology. His work is interesting in that it gives us a
straightforward attitude to repression, as the opposite of
self-critical judgment. "Repression," he says, '...is far from
being a final settlement of anti-social wishes. It merely
i
carries them forward to account without destroying them...."
He rightly discovers "that purely individual psychological
categories are solely explicable through their relationships to
i
the environing community." Psychoanalysis has been led 'to
recognise the existence of an intimate mutual determinism between
j
individual and society
Kolnai makes an interesting point. Under conditions of
repression, a private wish may still be retained without inter¬
fering to any extent with social relationships. "We know,
indeed," he says, "that persons can collaborate even when they
have sharp differences upon matters of feeling, and upon matters
b
of opinion." In a primitive community, "solidarity cannot
tolerate any hostile acts (thoughts) that stand so close to
realisation." The expression of anti-social wishes would imply
anarchy and atomisation^ the social organisation is inelastic;
solidarity, therefore, represses any such expression. But a
social organisation on the primitive type of solidarity holds
the community in the grip of what Briffault calls custom-thought"
and/
'Aurel Kolnai, "psychoanalysis and Sociology" p.59.
*0p.cit., p.10. J0p.cit., p.10. *0p.cit., p.57.
^Robert Briffault, "The Making of Humanity" Chapter V.
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and progress is resultingly slow. I\Tew ideas are an extreme
rarity.
Although Kolnai does not specifically draw the deduction,
there would appear reason to think that there would be a dis¬
tinct advantage from the standpoint of evolutionary process if
anti-social wishes were internally controlled. This would make
possible a relaxation of control by public opinion, and the
individual would therefore be freed to think independently of the
rest of the community, and the prime condition of social progress
could then be fulfilled, viz., the application of rational thought
to the environment - this, of course, at the expense of the
locking up of certain trends of thinking, and rendering
inaccessible large tracts of the psychic organisation.
Kolnai then proceeds to make a further interesting state¬
ment. The problem of the primitive community was to prevent
the appearance of anti-social trends in overt behaviour. They
had to discover means of maintaining extensive dissociations in
the individual mind. The group hit on a very simple method of
effecting its purpose. It was forbidden that any mention of
the anti-social wishes should be made: dissociation was
effected by dint of seeing that no associations were formed between
the disturbing tendencies and ideas which were acceptable to the
life of the social group. Provided there was no public dis¬
cussion of a subject, the mind of the individual would be
uncultivated in respect of that subject. They adopted the
policy/
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policy 01 leaving the inhibited wishes ''wholly undiscussed ',
and therefore undisturbed. The anti-social wishes could not
even be formulated. The primitive wishes would form a kind of
I
'Sally 1 personality without her "eyes open1', with this differ¬
ence, that whereas 'Sally' was fairly well organised on a
primitive level, the forbidden wishes of the primitive would
never have had the opportunity for organisation. It is
interesting to note that in our present-day sex education, we
adopt precisely this policy of preventing the formation of
associations with the impulses which we wish to eliminate.
According to Kolnai, then, modern society repeats the
method of the primitive in dealing with socially unacceptable
tendencies. But he does not consider that this is desirable,
stating that "sexual evolution lags behind the general progress
a
of civilisation". He considers that the function of psycho¬
analysis is to lead to the sex instinct being placed under "self-
j
critical judgment". Psychoanalysis he describes as a 'powerful
international spiritual movement."
This was written in 1921. psychoanalysts to-day would not
seem to be quite as certain that psychoanalysis may be regarded
as having a social programme. Explicitly or implicitly, they
appear to be of the opinion that the attempt to resolve the
repressed unconscious by raising the conflicts to the conscious
level would destroy civilisation, this despite a certain amount
of/
'Morton Prince, "The Dissociation of a personality Chapter II.
' Op.cit., p.75. J Op.cit., p.82. <Op.cit.,. p.83.
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of half-hearted propaganda in "the direction of modifying the
methods used in the nursery.
To Kolnai, then, repression is of environmental origin,
and he considers that instinctual control by this method is a
relic of the state of savagery. Instead of facing our
desires, we leave them "wholly undiscussed. " He sees a con¬
tingent use in repression since it internalises instinctual
control, and therefore society can afford to tolerate a certain
amount of private opinion. The suggestion is plausible, but
history would not appear to bear out the theory. Culture,
including a high degree of social organisation, was first
attained without repression 1'
We might enquire if the theory holds in respect of civil¬
ised societies. Our answer is in the negative. Repression
did not make rational thought possible, rather did it act in
such a way as to delimit its application. The most we can
say is that rational thought was not entirely incompatible
with the existence of the repressed unconscious.
But Kolnai is right in suggesting that society cannot
afford the continuance of control of an impulse by leaving it
wholly undiscussed, even though the mind is rendered proof
against its deeper layers being disturbed by the existence of
no less august a body than the Freudian Superego.
The superego, to Kolnai, by implication, represents a
force/
1
See section on pre-nyhastic Egypt,
thesis p.367.
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force which maintains our race in a state of savagery, psychic
control being effected by leaving certain impulses wholly
undiscussed. He rightly inveighs against the status quo of the
civilised mind. Rational thought is the only method of
individual control which is compatible with, our attaining our
full stature as members of a race which has taken upon itself
the title of homo sapiens.
.246.
Francis H. Bartlett.
In 1938, Francis H. Bartlett published a book entitled
" Sigmund Freud: a Marxist Essay". Writing from the viewpoint
of a Marxist, like Schmalhausen he sees in repression the effect
of a social disease. Concepts such as the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat are found throughout his work. He does not go into
detail in showing how capitalist society produces neurosis and
other harmful phenomena in the human mind. His main position
seems to be that Freudianism is irrelevant in the understanding
of human life in its entirety. He does not deny the facts to
which Freud would draw our attention, but considers that the
theories based on these facts are imaginative creations, the
result of an inadequate philosophy of human life.
Bartlett gives lis an excellent and comprehensive statement
of Freudian psychology, and appears to have a full knowledge of
Freudian literature. He contends, however, that Freud is in the
fangs of the "melancholy mechanism of the nineteenth century
i
bourgeoisie". "Bourgeois" he says, "is the correct term by which
to designate a thinker whose point of view is essentially the same
as that of an active practising capitalist."
The psychologist under the dominance of bourgeoisie thinking
sees human nature from the same myopic and limited standpoint.
He looks for mechanisms by which to explain an individual's
reactions/
'"Sigmund Freud; A Marxist Essay" p.28. JOp.cit., p.28.
reactions to the existing system. That system is the
psychologist's reality, and to him the problem is to discover
why the neurotic or other ill-adapted individual is prevented
from taking his place as an effective member of a capitalist
community. His presuppositions will lead him to seek for the
explanation of ill-adapted conduct in some hidden departure
from the norm.. Beneath the surface phenomena are the potential¬
ities of normality. He will adopt as a working theorjr that
behind experience is a natural man, with certain definite trends
i
and impulses. There will be an ''ineradicable animal nature"
which, however, is capable of being readjusted to outer reality.
Thus, says Bartlett, "the essential development is determined not
in a social milieu, but almost exclusively from within....The
natural man is always with us, whatever the social influences."
3.
"Freud's affinity to Hobbes is astonishingly close."
In his chapter on the animal nature of man, Bartlett states
that when Freud cannot account for the child's development in
mere terms of the unfolding of an ineradicable original nature,
he has to fill in "the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric
truth", this the result of his having no adequate conception of
the societal forces on which the child's development or maldevelop-
ment depends.
To Freud, "the id can produce varying social expressions
without itself changing....The mental representatives of the id,
both/
'
Op.cit., p.34. J Op,cit. , p.34. 5 Op.cit., p.36.
A Op.cit., p.69.
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both in the conscious and the unconscious, may vary, but that
which they represent, the id itself, is in the fullest sense of
the word immutable'... .The bourgeois point of view leads inevit¬
ably to a separation within the person between the biological
and the social, the hereditary and the environmental. In
Freud, it has led to the separation between the instincts and
their mental representatives, between the 'sexual function' and the
3
'social, training'". "The ego is a surface modification of the
3
id, which does not transform the rest of the id."
Bartlett then goes on to suggest how, in a capitalist
society, the child is thrust into a sj^stem of inherent contra¬
dictions, economic, social, intellectual, and emotional. "The
child is as incapabl-e of dealing with them as the bourgeoisie is
I,.
of dealing with economic crisis." The difficulties spring from
an antagonism which grows up between husband and wife in a
patriarchal society. The wife has an inferior status, but
according to the patriarchal norm, she should love her husband
''romantically". "The bourgeois family is. . . .a focal point for
s
the contradictions of capitalism. ' The family also "in some
ways.... contradicts the system of which it is a part." Bartlett
goes into no detail in order to substantiate his position as to
the influence of the capitalist system upon the mind of the child.
Bartlett then considers class society in relation to the
superego. He refers to Freud's "exasperated determination to
get/
'
Op.cit., p. 72-73. ^Op.cit., p. 76. 30p.cit., p.79«
Op.cit., p.85. *'Op.cit., p.85.
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get society in somehow." The superego, according to Freud,
contains traditional and age-long values, but since, as Bartlett
points out, the superego is formed before the age of five, it is
difficult to understand how traditional values are transmitted.
"Freud," he says, "simply asserts that the father is the
embodiment of social tradition." Bartlett follows the descrip¬
tions of Freudians of the superego in the young child, and in
its later developments, and states that he is forced to the con¬
clusion that "the superego is a hypocritical moral standard
enforced by irrational authority. We may well ask," he goes on
to say, "if such a region of the personality is a permanent
feature in human beings." He sees in the superego a"function"
of capitalist society. The ability of the fictions bound up
with the superego to "maintain the established social relations
intact....is the ultimate criterion of their truth" to the
psychologist who is steeped in the bourgeoisie ideology. "The
whole organisation of an exploiting society, the very conditions
of existence, the contradictions and confusions, all make for the
development and acceptance of false conceptions of reality."
And to-day, he thinks, there is even a greater need from the
standpoint of the possessors to "redouble" their "efforts to
confuse the issues, since intellectual clarity is one condition
of successful proletarian revolution."
Bartlett/
'Op.cit., p.111. sOp.cit., p.112. 30p.cit., p.114.
"Op.cit., p.115. 'Op.cit., p.116. "Op.cit., p.116.
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Bartlett next; enquires as to what becomes of the
repressed impulse of hostility which is the concomitant of
the child's forced acceptance of the parental authority.
According to Preud, he says, it is turned upon the self, as
the punitive component of the superego, causing an irrational
sense of guilt, with a resulting "unconscious need for punish¬
ment" tormenting the ego on account of "mere evil intentions",
and in many cases driving the individual to the committing of
immoral or criminal actions. But, adds Bartlett, "the hypo¬
critical morality and the undisposed of hostility, are bound up
inextricably with the patriarchal authority of the father,
interwoven with the savage categorical imperative of Puritanism,
and altogether set in a matrix of exploiting class relations."
He states that in the Soviet Union, the family situation
which in our society gives rise to the superego system, is fast
disappearing. There, "the moral code is not an irrational,
impossible, categorical imperative. It is a guide to human
relations. Its function is to reveal and make conscious, not
to conceal, the real relationships. under such circumstances,
sex does not have to be repressed in favour of a fictitious purity.
Hostility does not have to masquerade in saintly garb. Aggressive
impulses which may be produced coincide with reason. Hate is
directed towards those things which are hateful. Ho subterranean
hostile urges need be turned against the individual himself.




irrational sense of guilt, no hyper-moral hypocritical
substitute for social conscience, need arise."
Bartlett does indeed give us a picture of an ideal
society. How far this is realised, even in part, in Soviet
Russia, is another matter. He bases his statements on a
book entitled, 'Russia, Youth, and the Present-day World", by
Dr. Frankwood Williams, who, however, according to Bartlett,
"was never able completely to rid himself of the conception
that the complexes of infancy are invariable traits belonging
A
to the nature of man."
We suggest that there is a reason why Dr. Williams still
found evidence for the belief as to undesirable factors in the
child mind, even in Soviet Russia. Of course, it can be
claimed that there has been no time for any fundamental re¬
organisation of the mentality of Russian people, in a period
covering less than two decades. TJnwin is probably right in
his claim that it takes a hundred years to make any profound
modification in the human psyche. Bnt we suggest that there
are other reasons for suspecting that the Soviet Union has not
ushered in a new regime of perfected methods in dealing with
young children. The whole system would seem to be infected
with the disease which fawney describes in his "Acquisitive
Society". The emphasis is still placed on productiveness,





existence a "wealthy ! society, even though that wealth is to
be shared by all.
Throughout Bartlett's whole work, there is no reference to
the sensitive child nature against which the "crimes" of the
bourgeoisie are directed. There must the emphasis be placed;
in the soul of the child, the alive educator will see the end to
which all activities are subservient. Equally with Freud,
Barllett's attention is rivetted on non-essentials.. like
Freud, he is under the dominance of materialistic preconceptions
of existence bred within that society which we call civilised.
Dispose of the evils arising from the asceticism brought into
existence within our modern society by the Puritan; destroy
the last vestige of.that capitalist system which has spread
itself over the face of the world as a consequence of the
industrial revolution: the human mind will still contain within
itself the virus introduced when civilisation assumed the pro¬
portions of a vast societal organisation. The essential tragedy
of the last six millenniums is that the emphasis has been placed
on things rather than on human values. The human soul has been
measured by what it possesses rather than by what it is. The
Soviet system would still seem to place the emphasis on possessions,
even though these are to be owned communally. Russia appears to
be largely actuated by the closed system of the superego. If
society is to be changed, our attention must be fixed on human
nature for its own sake.
Bartlett/
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Bartlett insists, and on the whole rightly, that much which
passes for human nature is a malformation, a psychic artifact,
brought into existence by conditions which may be subjected to
fundamental modification. But he is wrong in drawing the con¬
clusion that the "natural man" is a figment of the imagination.
To him, human nature is entirely dependent on cultural tradition.
Such tradition he regards as the cause of the forms which human
nature takes in this, or any other, tjrpe of community. But if
we are to attain to a correct perspective when considering the
problem of re-creating human nature, we must realise that cultural
tradition should not be regarded as the cause of human development,
but merely as the occasion. We must, in short, form a conception
of "homo" as having intrinsic qualities which are peculiarly his
own.'
Bartlett has shown that the natural man of Preud is unnatural,
but all unwittingly he has substituted a conception of human
nature which is equally unnatiiral. The task still remains to
discover the nature, qualities, and potentialities of man as he is.
Repression, says Bartlett, is evil; it is not a function of
cultural process. Indeed, repression leads to the formation of
the superego, an institution which is a decided dysfunction of
cultural process.
So far, Bartletl is right, but when we enquire what are his
suggestions for effecting changes in civilised mentality, we
discover/
'Cf. E.J-D.Radclyffe, "Magic and Mind" p.88.
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discover that he is to all intents and purposes superego-
determined in his viewpoint. The individual would still seem
to exist for the State, not the State for the individual.
.255.
Samuel p. Schmalhausen.
Schmalhausen, in "The hew Road to Progress"; seeks to
place the phenomena of repression in their wider societal setting,
As in 'The hew G-eneration" he pleads his cause with great elo¬
quence; and the impression is left that we are in the presence
of a partisan. We have the suspicion, however, that Schmal¬
hausen neither takes himself nor his subject altogether seriously,
In his introduction, he sets forth his position. 'Communism'
he says, "is the one adequate psychotherapy, social sanity being
a prerequisite of individual sanity. We should aim at a
'mens sana in societates/ sana'".
Be speaks of 'the major neurosis called competitive
acquisitive capitalism" and states that preudianism will itself
be cured fay Marxism. Racism, he asserts, represents cultural
regression. He states that, in accordance with the Preudian
view, "man's instincts are bad, sadistic, destructive There
is no help for it," and the "patently reactionary and regressive
character of this thinking is richly in evidence in the bourgeois
i
human nature sciences." The human mind bred under our present
system has paranoid mechanisms. He speaks of our "inferiority
haunted state of mind" and a "compulsion to seek some object on
which to pin one's indignation."
"Rivalrous hate," he tells us, is the "unsolved misery of
personal frustration." He speaks of our 'psychopathic ceremonial
of/
13.D.Schmalhausen, "The Hew Road to Progress" p.16.
J Op.cit., p.16.
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of joy, symbolising the triumph of the ego bathed in delusions
of grandeur: the flooding back ox ego elation and the sense of
importance, the hated rival reduced to submission and ignominy,
vanquished, destroyed."
"By means as foul as the occasion requires, the paranoid
mechanism of the balked mind strikes at the enemy (within the
brain) by a technique of vengeance as viscious as it is com¬
pulsive, over-compensating for a gnawing sense of inadequacy
that threatens to destroy the brain's equilibrium, since self-
regard has been so wounded and rebuffed as to endanger the social
integration of the mind, its consolatory vanity, and self-
I
approval." Italy and Germany, he states, are illustrations
of this.
The new psychology, he informs us, can only trace back our
neurotic tendencies to the home, where "parents have the divine
right to mutilate" our "personality on behalf of their own semi-
demented taboos and values. The largest social unit that
modern psychology and psychiatry studies for therapeutic pur-
it
poses, is the family."
But, he says, "beyond the family, around and beneath it, are
forces, relations, determinants, that must themselves be studied
first before the unit called the family which surely lives with
a hot and urgent context of historic and cultural reality, not
merely as a static specimen in a psychoanalyst's glass Jar, can
be/




It is, he says, the 'economic and social pathology of our
age that draws in its train of disintegration the little band
of victims called the family Social revolution, therapeutically
envisaged, is the most intelligent method available for lifting
the repressed and ego-dwarfed masses from their inferior and
servile status."
He is not afraid of the inevitable logic of the doctrine of
non-repression which must lead to the acceptance of incest as no
more blameworthy than other means of sexual gratification.
"Incest," he says, "is natural innocence viewed by strange com-
3
pulsive logic as most unnatural guilt."
Schmalhausen is not impressed with the pessimism of the
Freudians. He believes that human nature is capable of illimit¬
able modification "under new incentives and appropriate social
conditions. ' Freud and Mcfougall, he asserts, regard human
nature as inherently pre-determined, and goes on to state that the
former "dodges sex and the latter outlaws it." He, Schmalhausen,
is willing to carry Freudian doctrine to its logical conclusions,
even to the point of accepting incest as normal, but he believes
that the abolition of the deleterious effects of sex repression on
human life can only be brought about by modifying the entire social
milieu in which the family is placed. Through the institution of
a thoroughgoing communism, and by that means only, can mankind be
again set on the road to progress.
Schmalhausen/
'Op.cit., p.39- JOp.cit., p.40-43. 30p.cit., p.116.~
< Op.cit., p.335.
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Schmalhausen does not regard repression as. being a determin¬
ant of cultural process, rather does he view it as a disease of
civilisation. Change the social organism, he says, and the human
mind will rediscover normality.
The present writer is by no means satisfied with Schmal¬
hausen' s panacea for human psychic ills. Rather would we assert
that the human mind is sick because it has, to a greater or lesser
extent, failed to use reason as the supreme arbiter when psychic
difficulties have arisen. Nay, more: it has been definitely con¬
ditioned not to use reason in adapting itself to the more signific¬
ant parts of its environment. Social revolution or no social
revolution, the forces of psychic inertia will cause the mind to
remain in its comatose condition unless the educator adequately
diagnoses the .malady, and thereupon takes the necessary steps for
effecting a cure.
There is one solution, we suggest, and only one, the deliberat
arousal of conceptual process in relation to the prejudices and
preconceptions of which we have the misfortune to be the possessors
Civilisation's disease is the partial paralysis of rational thought
the cure, the application of a thoroughgoing rationalism to all
aspects of our experience. The task which lies to hand need not




In this article we follow a Freudian statement on repression and
sublimation. Especially do we attempt to show the sheer
inadequacy of the Freudian when approaching problems of child
education.
H. Banister.
This article deals with the views of a non-medical psychologist,
who holds the Freudian viewpoint. It is Suggested that
implicitly he accepts the superego mechanism as normal and
desirable. Reference is made to his views on the high intelli¬
gence of the young child.
R. Money-Kyrle.
The purpose of this article is to study a Freudian attempt to
propound a policy by which the evil effects of repression may
be lessened without sacrificing those cultural advantages which,
according to Freudian theory, accrue from repression. The
difficulties of the Freudian reformer are demonstrated.
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John T. Mccurdy.
McCurdy is a psychopathologist who departs but little from
the orthodox Freudian position. Instead of a real Oedipus
complex, based on actual conflict within the home, he substitutes
what he describes as "an imago", an "idealised imagined parent
rather than the real one.'" We mention this as evidence that
Freudians themselves are by no means convinced that at all times
they are dealing with realities.
Mccurdy tones down the notion of infantile sexuality, con¬
sidering that because the child has no physiological capacity for
sexual relations, the "genital stage cannot be reached at this
period." One has the suspicion that McCurdy is taking con¬
siderable liberties with the foundation stones of the Freudian
edifice.
From our personal observation of young children during early
school days, we are by no means convinced that McCurdy's amend¬
ment of Freudian psychology is sound. Children do appear to
attain the genital level during the pre-school period. However,
according to McCurdy, "the Oedipus complex is not an unconscious
memory but an unconscious fabrication." But he considers that
the individual has "a tendency" to form the concept, at least
this is a useful hypothesis; and he adds: "A materialistic
minded reader may be shocked by the suggestion that anything can
he held to exist which is recognised simply as an hypothesis to
explain certain phenomena. ' McCurdy, suggesting that an analogy
may/
'j. T. McCurdy, "The psychology of Emotion" p.94.
' Op.cit. , p.94. 3 Op.cit., p.95.
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may make his point clearer, then say,s: "I venture to state that
the evidence for the Oedipus complex as a tendency is more
easily demonstrable than that for the existence of the gill
tendency in the human body.''1 We cannot see how the ''material-
way
istic minded reader' is in any/enlightened by the analogy. The
gill theory can at least summon in its favour a long chain of
facts gathered by those who propounded the theory of evolution.
At what point in our racial past the Oedipus tendency came into
use, and for what purpose, and for what reason the fully developed
Oedipus complex shrunk into a mere tendency, it is impossible to
imagine.
Prom what we know of contemporary primitives, there seems
no evidence that they have a special hate of the father and an
incestuous fixation on the mother. Malinowski's frobriand
Islanders laughed at the notion that anyone could entertain
erotic feelings for his mother.3' Primitive man appears to have
been peaceful and had not, it seems, a great font of repressed
father hate which required to be displaced on to surrogates.
We do not dispute the right of a psychiatrist to adopt any
hypothesis, as a means of systematising the phenomena towards which
his attention is directed, but it is absurd to imagine that the
hypothesis of the Oedipus-complex-forming tendency can be
rationally applied in other fields of study. According to
McCurdy /
'Op.cit., p.95. 3 Bronislaw Malinowski, "Sex and Repression
in Savage Society" p.95.
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t
McCurdy himself, the most significant concept of psychoanalysis
is an -unconscious fabrication, and it would seem that the whole
psychic superstructure built on this fabrication is likely to be
equally foolish, and removed from the world of reality.
McCurdy refers to the suckling as a pure egoist, "a kind
of parasite who depends for his maintenance on the maternal host
or nurse'." Roheim discovers in flea-catching one of the primary
sources of culture'. McCurdy goes one better in describing the
child as of the same nature as the creature to whom, indirectly,
according to Roheim, we owe a great deal of those things which
we value most. We can only remark how far the psychotherapist
who is immersed in Rreudianism is removed from a sane, rational
and humane attitude to young children.
On the same page, we are met with another statement which
is somewhat surprising. McCurdy says that "we are....still
learning to distinguish between thoughts and things, between
thoughts that are pure imaginations and thoughts that duplicate
actual or potential experience. The child or savage has pro¬
gressed but a little way on this latter road, hence the behaviour
of either towards a pure imagination may be identical with his
3,
behaviour towards the material environment." As far as we know,
no responsible present-day anthropologist would bear out this
statement in respect of the savage - any savage who did not
distinguish between his imaginings and the material environment
would be quickly eliminated. The savage's imaginings are
supplementary/
''Op.cit., p.96.
'G-eza Roheim, "The Riddle of the Sphinx" p.204.
•'•Op.cit., p.96.
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supplementary to his practical life, and when It comes to
serious business, he is far more efficient than the majority of
civilised individuals'.
As for the child, McCurdy's statement is in no way borne
out by facts. We have quoted Banister's opinion of the
intelligence of the child on another page of this thesis, and on
the basis of knowledge dexived from the study of our own child,
we are quite definite in asserting that Philip, at the age of
three-and-a-half, has a very clear conception as to the difference
between "real" things and "pretend" things. His mother recently
enquired of him if his "teddy" were real. The reply was an
emphatic "Ho." But when asked the same question in respect of
Sheila, the dog, the child answered in the affirmative. The
writer enquired of the child whether, when he grew up, he was
going to have a school like Daddy. He replied that he had one
already, but added that it was "only a pretend one." Instances
of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely.
McCurdy then states the theoxy that, "if the health of an
organism be in any way affected, the first functions to be
3
altered will be those of most recent acquisition," and that the
alteration will be in the direction of reinstatement of more
pixmitive functions. in neurology, McCurdy tells us, this
tendency is called "devolution", but in psychoanalytical theory
it is described as "regression", and he adds that "whenever
imaginations are not utilised in planning, but become an end in
themselves/
'of. l. Levy-Bruhl, "The Soul of the primitive, p.19.
*See section on Banister, p.268. . 30p.cit., p.96.
.263.
themselves, regression has taken place." The sane adult has
relapsed to the level of the child or the savage. And later,
we read: "Sanity and insanity are, roughly speaking, states
where progressive or regressive thinking rule. The essence of
a functional psychosis is a flight from reality to a retreat of
easeful unreality!"
Speaking of infantile sexuality, McCurdy tells us: "There
is no lawful, direct sex outlet in childhood, so such tendencies
must be repressed to the unconscious where the instinct continues
to grow until it can gain outlet in adult life?" We have no
fault to find with McCurdy's statement as to fact, but why the
"must"? Psychoanalysis is surely without function, at least in
its scientific aspect, unless it enables us to obtain a clearer
and more humane view of the young child straggling to bring into
order his impulses. May we be pardoned the use of rather forcible
language when we say that McCurdy tends to see in the child a
miniature lunatic, not a perfectly sane human being with easily
injured feelings, with the beginnings of an ethical sense, with
nascent aesthetic appreciations, and most of all with a longing
for truth. The statement that impulses "must" be repressed,
when applied to the young child as a member of a household where
the parents are acutely aware of the nature of the sensitive
little being who, for a time, is committed to their care, appears
harsh, and, we may say, almost blasphemous.
Referring in a later chapter to regression, McCurdy says
that/
'■Op.cit., p.105. a Op.cit., p.186.
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that in certain psychoses, the patient falls back into free
associational thinking, that is, in accordance with McCurdy's
earlier statements, the child is characterised by this form of
thinking. nothing is further from the truth. The child, from
a very early age, is concerned with adapting means to realise
ends of felt value. His thinking is purposive. Moreover,
his desire for knowledge is essentially logical.. In our view,
if the insane had regressed to the child's way of thinking, they
would make an immediate and complete recovery. But according to
McCurdy, the child is already complex-ridden. He has within
I
him tendencies to murder and incest. These must be repressed.
The child, however, is not called upon to deal consciously with
these impulses, the crimes to which they would lead being
"unbiological", and kindly Nature, mindful of her own, performs
the psychic operation of repression without either the inter¬
vention of the parents or of the child himself. Parents,
knowing this, have good reason for supposing that there is a0
possibility that Nature may, on occasion, be a little forgetful,
and the child may at any moment be transformed into a criminal
lunatic. What a dreadful inheritance we carry with us I The
old-time doctrine of original sin was mild compared with the
phantasmagoria emanating from the minds of contemporary-
psychiatrists.
We conclude this section by a brief reference to McCurdy's




through the humanising process of sublimation, has already
developed attachments to his parents, but presumably, as these
affectionate relations become strengthened, the child finds
himself involved in a process which, if continued, would lead to
incest. According to what McCurdy has already said, a biological
mechanism is brought into effect, and the incestuous attachment
is drawn into the unconscious. The repressed then "tends to
come into consciousness in a distorted form, the sublimation'."
It seems that the incestuous tendency was "sexual and selfish",
but it gains "a substitutive outlet". He gives as an instance
of this the woman who devotes her life to nursing. "/hat she
really wants is physical contact with father or brother, but
without herself knowing the reason why, she accepts a substitute
activity. "At the same time," continues McCurdy, "and this is
the important point - the objective interest primarily directed
within the family is turned to strangers, or towards society as a
3
whole." This, leading to the process of sublimation, must
include a "-union of selfish and social tendencies in some activity
which is a substitute for more primitive and selfish ones. ' As
far as we can see, in the case of the socialisation process
described above, the interest in strangers and society as a whole
is just as sexual and selfish as when the same impulses were
directed towards individuals within the family.
McCurdy then proceeds to apply his conception of sublimation
to/
'Op.cit., p.186. aOp.cit., p.186. 30p.cit., p.186-7-
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to :the sublimation of war, where originallj*" repressed cruelty
is allowed outlet to the soldier, and applauded by society,
because it now serves a social end!" We have questioned soldiers
who took part in the Great War. Prom a description of their
mental attitude when engaged in killing others, we fail to see
that the ordinarily repressed impulses had attained an admixture
of sociality despite the applause of society.
McCurdy would appear to think that the suhlimation processes
as described by Rank and Jung are of an inferior order to his
own, for, "the symbol stands for something physical, or at most
a circumscribed concept, something which is purely selfish; the
sublimation 011 the other hand is a substitution of a higher,
more social activity, for one which originally had in it merely
1
the elements of potential altruism. ' We again contemplate his
illustration of the "sublimation of war".
We now go a stage further. "If we look on sublimations as
socialised childish objectivation", he says, "we can see how
adult sex interests, culminating in marriage, are really to be
grouped with them....Psychological analysis demonstrates these
adult objects to be surrogates for the earlier recipients of
the affection." And to complete the proof, he adds that
psychotic patients declare that those whom they thought they had
loved were really substitutes for their parents, or other members
of the family.
We suggest that if what McCurdy has stated is true, the
psychotics/
'
Op. cit. , p.187. * Op. cit. , p.187- 3 Op.cit., p.187.
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psychotics alone are sane. They at least know with whom
they are in love.
We submit that here we find the reductlo ad absurdum of the
whole Freudian doctrine of sublimation. McCurdy, despite his
belief that he is dealing with factors bearing on the lives of
children and normal adults, is but moving within the closed
system of the psychotic disposition. We have shown the inadequacy
of his views as to the facts of child nature. We have perceived
the crassness of his theory of the development of higher interests.
And we ended by noting the extraordinary absurdity of the view
that married relationships have, as their essential basis,
attachments to persons with whom the partners do not happen to
be married. We are reminded of the music-hall situation in
which the person of feeble mentality denies relationship with
his partner on the grounds that she is "only his wife."
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H. Banister.
The writings of Dr. Banister are chiefly of interest to us
in that they represent the views of a non-medical psychologist.
In the main, he seems to accept the tenets of the orthodox
Freudian, hut in the course of his discussion he raises several
interesting points.
Early in his work on "Psychology and Health", we discover
the following: "It is not generally realised how intelligent
the normally endowed child is. I believe he is often, in fact,
more intelligent at the age of five or six than he will be ten
years later when his intellectual growth may have been cramped
by incorrect methods of teaching." And he adds: "Within his
limitations, he is frequently the most intelligent member of his
r.
household, and has usually considerable logical ability."
The present writer can bear this out by a reference to a
recent incident in connection with his three-and-a-half year
old boy. A motorist had run out of petrol, and he called to
enquire if he could borrow a sufficient quantity to see him on to
the next petrol pump. There being no free petrol on the
premises, petrol was drawn off from the autovac of our own car.
Philip was an interested spectator of this operation. Before
allowing the motorist to take away the petrol, the car engine
was started on the drop of petrol which was still in the carbur¬
ettor, in order to make certain that sufficient petrol was drawn
up/
'■H. Banister, "psychology and Health" p.33.
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up Into the autovac for immediate purposes when the car was
next required for use. The petrol drawn for the passing
motorist was still available if the carburettor required to be
refilled before the autovac was sufficiently replenished.
Several hours later, Philip surprised his parents by the
following enquiry: "Daddy, were you trying to see if the car
would start without petrol?" Philip had observed that the
autovac had been emptied, and not knowing the principle of this
piece of mechanism, he put forward a perfectly intelligent
hypothesis. That he was not entirely satisfied with his
hypothesis was proved by his later referring the matter to his
father. Six hours had elapsed since the incident, during ;hich
time his scientifi-c curiosity had remained active. Given a
fair chance, it is suggested that the young child will be able
to solve his emotional problems without resorting to the
intellectual legerdemain which, if preud is to be believed, goes
into the formation of the superego.
Dr. Banister draws the correct conclusion as to the
immediate effects of irrational treatment as applied to the
child. When frustrated, the child will expect a logical explan¬
ation, and if this is not given, resentment will be felt. "This
is one step towards the formation of a sentiment of hatred in
however mild a form.....In consequence, he will become, with
frequent repetitions of the frustrations, morose and non-
co-operative, and when opportunity offers he will manifest more
act ive/
.270.
active forms of non-co-operation1." And, we may add, if the
child has adopted this attitude, there is little chance of his
again being in the position to resolve his emotional diffi¬
culties. We suggest that repressions will be a thing of the
'past just as soon as we are able and willing to treat the child
as a rational being.
Dr. Banister gives practical advice in respect of early
education. He states that "the child must be helped through
his various stages, not delayed in any, or frightened out of
them^." And he adds that, "his questions as to the origin of
babies are but one more example of his curiosity, and should be
answered frankly Any thwarting of natural curiosity is
3
almost bound to defeat its object."
Banister thus assumes the role of reformer, giving guidance
on problems of child rearing. He thinks it desirable that a
definite course of prophylaxis should be undertaken. In
"Psychology and Health" he is not only demonstrating how faulty
psychological attitudes lead to psychic ill health, but he is
assuming the role of educator enunciating principles which, if
put into practice, will ensure that the future individual will
be free from psychological disturbances. He would initiate a
campaign aiming at building up in our midst a new generation
free from limitations such as he describes when he refers to
the neurotic, the over religious, and the statistically normal.
It/
''Op.cit., p.33. 3Op.cit. , p.59. 30p.cit., p.60.
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It is a psychological truism that no end will be
energetically sought unless those who are seeking it have
confidence that what they wish to realise is possible, that
by adopting certain means there is a high degree of certainty
that the desired, results will be forthcoming, But Banister
holds out but a faint hope of our ever re-creating human nature
in accordance with the ideal which he implicitly outlines, for
he says: "There is, and must probabljr always be, a large amount
of repression just as the psychoanalysts maintain, since all
conflicts are not capable of solution; and these repressed
sentiments, or complexes, will have their own expression, and
will affect the character and behaviourNot only so, but
the campaigner who enlists under his banner will be influenced
by a gnawing sense of doubt. Banister accepts the Freudian
doctrine, stating that "many...think that all that is best and
highest culturally and morally in human life is the outcome of
repression". And later he states: "If the energy (derived
from a repressed complex) is led away through useful channels,
2
we get 'sublimation', all that is best and highest in life."
Then, specifically stating his own opinion, he says: "A very
large number of symptoms and sublimations arise in this way
(through endopsychic conflict) and in the realm, perhaps more
especially, of creative art and social refoxm, the drive behind





Op. cit. , p.233- 3 Op. cit. , p.230. 3'0p.cit., p.231.
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He further adds: "in fact, it is almost axiomatic that
all new discoveries are the outcome of conflict, and in the
sciences particularly, of conscious conflict^"
The corollory is evident. Take away those conditions
on which repressions depend, and the individual may be deprived
of urges towards creative art, social reform, and also those
qualities which go towards ensuring success in contemporary
society - we refer to qualities of forcefulness; and also
the implication is that the urge to scientific discovery will
be diminished if repressions are abrogated.
We suggest that the position of our campaigner is equi¬
vocal, or, to use the psychological term, ambivalent. There
is little likelihood that he will be effective in the task of
reforming society.
Banister even discovers a new use for the inferiority
complex, a psychic component which is generally deprecated both
from the standpoint of individual happiness and that of effective
social relations. The possessor of such a complex is usually
regarded as being inclined to moroseness, "superego-ridden" and
in general requiring the attention of the psychological specialist.
But Banister is not afraid of being unconventional. "Whatever
the cause," he says, "most individuals have a more or less
strongly developed 'inferiority complex'. The individual who
had none would be a most objectionable person socially, though
a.
he might go far in his business or professional career."
Once/
•Qp.cit., p.232. ^Op.cit., p.86.
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Once again we suggest a corollory. The parent must see to it
that the child has a due proportion of "inferiority complex"
instilled into his psychic organism. Our campaigner, we would
imagine, would be subject to feelings of discouragement when
he realised that his non-repressionist policy should not be too
thoroughgoing, otherwise the child may become "a most objection¬
able person socially."
Banister is thus an example of a writer who inveighs against
repression and yet, on account of Freudian presuppositions,
leaves those to whom he addresses himself in a position of doubt.
Repression is to be understood as an evil, but it also leads to
the highest things in human life. The person without an
inferiority complex will be an objectionable person, and there¬




Money-Kyrle is a writer of the Freudian school, but he is
distinguished in attempting to find a practical solution for
the quandary in which, according to psychoanalysis, man finds
himself. On the whole, he is cautious in suggesting remedies,
and has before his mind the full significance of the repressive
systems as understood by Freudians. He does not actually
envisage a state of things in which no superego exists, but like
the practising psychoanalyst in his relations to his patients,
he thinks it might be possible to modify the superego in all
individuals by control exercised at the time of its formation.
Flugel writes an introduction in which he states that the
morality of the superego is archaic. It has included in it a
strong element of cruelty, which is "the most unsocial and
devastating of our pleasures - whether it is directed against
i
ourselves or against our fellow-men."
Money-Kyrle would seek to control, from a quantitative
standpoint, the aggressiveness which finds its way into the
superego. Though sublimation of aggressiveness is satisfactory,
it is not practicable unless present methods of education are
changed sufficiently to re-direct the aggressive tendency into
social channels. Something must be done to lessen the amount,
or part of the aggressiveness will act in a harmful manner by
being/
' J. 0. llugel, Introduction to "Aspasia, or The future of
A-morality", by R. Money-Kyrle, p.11.
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being incorporated within the superego. He sees the root
cause of aggressiveness in frustration, of which it is "a
t
natural and inevitable reaction.1' His problem, then, is, how
may we set about reducing the amount of frustration in the life
of the young child? Frustration, he suggests, is to-day
chiefly in connection with the imposition of taboos connected
with sex, these leading to "some of the fiercest aggression....
3
breeding resentment."
He reminds himself, however, that in accordance with the
Freudian doctrine to which he himself subscribes, there is a
strong probability that all culture is due to the repression
of the sex impulse, but adds that repression has certain dis¬
advantages, as our capacity for sublimation is limited, and as
a result repression is responsible for neuroses and "corresponding
3
diseases of the body politic."
His problem would therefore seem to be, how to retain
culture and yet prevent the harmful effects of repression, both
desirable and undesirable features of human life springing from
the same source, ultimately from the frustration of the child's
desires. He then makes an extremely pertinent criticism of
psychoanalysts, saying that they have "taken little trouble to
discuss the ethical implications of their own discoveries in
recent years" and "they have been looked upon as unprogressive
by the more advanced reformers." And he goes on to say that,
"since/
'
R.Money-Kyrle, "Aspasia" p. 13. sOp.cit.,: p.13. JOp.cit., p.14.
* Op. cit. , p. 14.
!
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"since human destiny is determined by innumerable factors,
i
some vital influence may well have been neglected."
"Psychoanalysis", he tells us, "has shown that depression
and discontent are derivatives of hate. Therefore, a Utopia
in which happiness and contentment predominate must be a society
based on universal love. This is a familiar description of the
Golden Age of the past ox- future." He proceeds to trace bach
aggressiveness to a hypothetical stage in man's development, when
3.
he was a member of a primal horde. The largest ape-man foi"bade
sex-expression in the weaker members, thereby giving rise to
aggressiveness. He suggests, however, that in those days, the
situation was mitigated by the acceptance by the weaker males of
the pleasures of passive homo-sexuality. This led to stability
4
in the group.
Aggressiveness was thus first prohibited by an outside
authority. In the days of primitive man, the prohibition was
largely external, and even in the mediaeval age, the internalised
factor was less at work than in contemporary man. He states that
now "a precipitate of this authority" is set up within in the form
of "a conscience or superego, and when aggressiveness is inhibited
and unconscious, it is liable to be invexted against the self.
In extreme cases, the resulting depression leads to suicide, that
is, the murder of the self. But more often the inverted
aggressiveness fuses with an inverted sexuality to form some
neurotic/
Op. cit., p.18. s- Op. cit. , p.19. Op. cit. , p.21. 'Op.cit., p.24
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neurotic symptom or masochistic perversion. Sometimes the
masochism may be projected and enjoyed by proxy. In this way,
the refined sadist whose sadism is not merely the expression of
hate but of a pleasure in the vicarious enjoyment of pain, is
developed. "Only extreme cases of these perversions are
apparent to the ordinary observer, but the psychoanalyst has no
difficulty in detecting them in a disguised form, in all the
habits and institutions of mankind."
Thus, then, internalised aggressiveness pursues its
destructive path in our midst. The pure Freudian, as Money-
Kyrle reminds us, can envisage no solution for the impasse in
which we discover ourselves. He tells us that Freud speaks of
the "law of the indestructibility of hate", and is resultingly
pessimistic. There is apparently, according to Freudian
findings, "a certain fixed amount of aggression which can never
be diminished."
Money-Eyrie at this point ventures to disagree with
Professor Freud, stating that he thinks "that aggressiveness is
the servant of other instincts," and thus has "no fixed amount."
Phylogenetically, aggressiveness has a capacity for being trans¬
ferred from one activity to another. . At one time, it entered
into the sex instinct proper, at other times it was used in
overcoming the female and the driving off of rivals, and during




Op.cit., p.26. 3 Op.cit., p.27. 30p.cit., p.28. 'op.cit., p.28.
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Aggressiveness, he contends, may be lessened by reducing
frustration, frustration being, we may presume, merely another
of the types of stimuli which may evoke the aggressive instinct.
If this can be done, the psychoanalyst is "not confined to the
recommendation of sublimations which he has no power of
i
inducing anyone to adopt."
By reducing frustration, he may hope to "reduce the total
i
aggressiveness of mankind." Societjr to-day is based on a
repetition of the history of the primeval family. To-day, as
of yore, we have the jealous old man who interdicts the
sexuality of the sons. Frustration leads to hatred in the
sons, which is partially diminished by their adopting an atti¬
tude of passive homosexuality to the father. There is a
recurrence of their hate, and its transference to other groups,
or its inversion towards themselves. The inverted hate once
more breaks out in the form of sadism, which attaches itself
undiscriminatingly to any external object. "These," says
Money-Kyrle, "are the old themes which recur throughout our
i
culture."
He nww proceeds to discuss means of lessening frustration.
During the oral phase, he thinks that perhaps thumb-sucking
4
"can be gently discouraged without harm." in the case of
cleanliness training, he considers that by showing more toler¬
ance, we may leave the child to outgrow impulses which are con¬
sidered undesirable. Onanistic activities may be similarly
dealt/
Op.cit., p.28. ^Op.eit.j p.28. 30p.cit., p.29. *Op.cit., p.86
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dealt with. Thus will resentment be lessened.
As things are at present, "the various frustrations to
which infants are subjected for their supposed good, by their
mothers and nurses, have two far-reaching effects, namely, pre-
genital fixations and ambivalence towards subsequent love-
I
objects." He suggests that when we arrive at the stages of
object-choice, we should remember that "the early loves of
children are even more selfish and intense than those of their
elders, and they are treated with less consideration."
We should not snub or punish children for exhibiting
jealousy, otherwise the child will carry into later life a
repressed hatred of parent figures. Sexual curiosity should
also be treated tactfully. in regard to sexual play among
young children, he points out what he regards as the evil results
of the suppression of "naughty" activities, leaving behind "the
dissociated and unfinished impulses of the infant and the child.
His disappointments of later life are apt to reactivate those
forgotten yearnings which, in so far as they are satisfied, give
rise to neurotic symptoms or perversions, and in so far as they are
frustrated to depression and discontent." In a footnote, he
states that "sublimations also occur, but we are here concerned
5'
with the less desirable effects of repression."
He further criticises the undesirable effects of
repression, stating that "moral intolerance is directly pro¬
portional to the normality of the impulse which it condemns."
"Morality/
'Op.cit., p.88. sOp.cit., p.89. 3Op.cit., p.89.
4 Op.cit., p.91. r0p.cit. , p.91.
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"Morality", he tells us, "as usual, regards its own offspring
with disgust and endeavours to repress that which it has
itself produced."
We quote Money-Kyrle as a Freudian who has made some
attempt to free himself from the fatalistic attitude of
orthodox psychoanalysis. He at least asserts that there is
not a fixed amount of aggressiveness to be expended in attack¬
ing the self or others. And what aggressiveness we have, being
in part dependent on environmental conditions, is to some extent
curable. But our racial prospect is still dreaiy. The horde
father still dogs our steps and we shall have to be satisfied
if future reports on the progress of humanity merely state that
it is "as well as.can be expected".
The educator, reading Money^Kyrle's book, would, we fear,
receive little inspiration. Indeed, his contact with this
slightly more optimistic member of the psychoanalytical group
would, we feel, merely stir up morbid trends in his mind.
Money-Eyrie* is right in insisting that psychoanalysis has
social implications, and his methods of reform are soundly based.
What he is unable to supply is the necessary confidence for the
carrying out of his reforms - repression has also its desirable
aspect, he says - and moreover his picture of the child is in
accordance with Freudian preconceptions. What is vitally
necessary is not so much that the parent should strive to act
"ethically"/
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''ethically" towards the child, but that the parent should see
the child as itself ethically endowed. Otherwise, no reforms
can be effective. If the child is so envisaged, the
educator's morals may be left to take care of themselves. ho
one who understands a child will offend, but with the best
intentions in the world, the educator will commit blunders
unless he is able to love the simple humanity, the sensitivity
of spirit, of those little ones who have within them all the
potentialities of man as he may some day become. The child
must be set in the midst.
Other Special Viewpoints.
J. D. TJnwin.
To Unwin, implicitly at least, repression is the condition of
cultural development. His position examined in light of our
thesis that repression is not a determinant of cultural process.
Charles W. Hayward.
Hayward is a writer who emphasises that the situation in the
home which gives rise to repression is intolerable from the
standpoint of the norms of justice and truth. we accept his
position, but suggest that the problem needs to be envisaged in
a wider setting. The view is expressed that an attitude of
ascribing blame to parents is harmful.
fritz Kunkel.
This article deals with a theory of repression to which we
attach great value. In our view, Kunkel's description of the
effects of repression on cultural development is the best pro¬
pounded to date. His position is that objectivity is in
direct proportion to the degree of repression set up in the
mind. We apply Kunkel's findings to our theory of the
ontogenesis of the superego.
Trigant Burrow.
In this article we see that Burrow considers that the repressed
unconscious is due to the application in child education of
irrational norms. on the basis of his findings, we describe how
the superego is instituted in the mind of the child.
J. D. Unwin.
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Dr. Unwin, throughout his volume on "Sex and Culture",
maintains the thesis that the development of culture is depend¬
ent on the amount of continence which is imposed on sex expression
outwith marital relations. He speaks only of compulsory contin¬
ence, and at all times regards the individual as a unit in a
social group whose behaviour is determined by the sanctions at
work in that group. One of his most interesting statements is
that it takes a hundred years before the full effect is felt of a
change in the group attitude towards sexual expression'. It is
here that Unwin's theory may be linked up with the doctrine of
repression. As far as we can see, he does not himself attempt
to show how societal sanctions become so engrained in the minds
of the individuals of a society that even after the sanctions are
withdrawn, their effects continue for three generations. Unwin
states that this is the case, and in support of his viewpoint he
takes eighty separate peoples and seeks to demonstrate that in
every case their degree of culture has a direct relation to the
a
amount of continence insisted upon by the society.
It may be said in general that unwin's method is descriptive
rather than analytic, and when we come to the end of his work, we
feel that we are in no better a position than when we started in
respect of the understanding of the vital causative factors under¬
lying cultural process. In a sense, on the basis of his findings,
we/
'j. D- Unwin, "Sex and Culture," p.322. JOp.cit., p.324.
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we might feel that we are justified in predicting that the
present undermining of taboos and the increase of prenuptial
intercourse will lead to social decline, and yet it may well be
that such expectations will not be fulfilled. Unwin has pro¬
vided little more than a demonstration that in the past the
increase or decrease of taboos has been followed by changes in
the cultural life of a people. But so long as we are ignorant
of the psychological laws which have given rise to variations in
cultural attainment, we cannot be sure that the taboo was the
really efficient cause of the resulting phenomena.
Dr. Unwin says; "I submit, therefore, that the limitation of
the sexual opportunity must be regarded as the cause of the
i
cultural advance." But is it not more likely that the real cause
of cultural advance lies in those rational activities which are
seemingly at work in most young children before they are influenced
by the taboo system? I£ as Freud says, much of the child's mind
by the age of five is reduced to mechanism, and if on the workings
of this mechanism depend those social phenomena which go under the
name of sublimation, it is conceivable, indeed even probable, that
the less opportunity the individual is given for overt sexual
activity, the greater amount of energy will pass over into the
repressed unconscious, and, in this way, find expression in
cultural process. But it is by no means certain that the human
intellect, if allowed to develop without having to encounter the
wall of traditional negatives, would not find means of making
direct/
1
Op. cit., p. 317 •
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direct use of sex energy through the ordinary process of
sentiment formation.
It may be that Unwin would not rule out this possibility,
but his reply would be that the "rational" method has not been
tried. In this he is at one with the majority of Freudians.
Our suggestion is that much of human development has, through
all ages, proceeded on the lines of sentiment formation. At
first sight, it might be thought that Unwin's theory would
still hold even if this were the case. Minimise the amount of
"A
sexual energy expended in direct biological activity, and the
more energy will be left over for other pursuits. But it must
be remembered that Unwin's theory is imp^icitljr bound up with
the doctrine of repression. It is only after three generations,
during which time repression has been internalised, that the
human mind breaks forth in higher forms of social activity.
Thus, according to Unwin, it may be concluded that the increased
energy available for cultural process is due to an increase in
the extent of the repressed unconscious, with an inevitable
decrease in the amount of energy available for sentiment' form¬
ation. It may thus be fairly said that Unwin's outbursts of
energy are due to the process of sublimation. They are not the
result of restraint at the conscious level, this, of course,
involving conflict.
We would suggest that there are certain cases of extra-
ordinajy cultural advance for which TJnwin's theory does not
account/
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account:. As we shall point: out; later, there appears to
have been an almost entire absence of sexual repression when
the foundations of civilisation were laid both in Egypt and
Crete. It is inconceivable that the emergent savages of these
early days should have adopted attitudes totally dissimilar to
the vast majority of food-gathering peoples. In each case the
peoples were, it would seem, at the matriarchal stage of
development; therefore, the husband's authority would be at a
minimum. Though it is true that neither the Egyptians nor the
Cretans ever spent time and energy on the building of temples,
it is evident that in solid human progress their respective
eras outstripped all others. v
We have suggested that Unwin's theory is inadequate,
because he does not show precisely how the limitation of sexual
opportunity creates repression. His only complaint against
those conditions which, according to his statements, have pro¬
duced the highest types of development, is that they have been
dependent on the virtual enslavement of women and children.
This he considers intolerable, but he is quite willing to
envisage a new type of society in which we shall reduce sexual
opportunity to the minimum, and by this means the world may
witness outbursts of cultural energy which will transform and
revolutionise every aspect of human life. Implicitly, he
wishes to extend the repressed unconscious until almost all our




being left for direct sentiment formation.
If Unwin had sought to remedy the striking omission in
his doctrinal system to which we have drawn attention, he might
have discovered that the objection to the reduction of overtly
expressed sexuality through the construction of a "repressed
unconscious" is bound up with norms of justice and truth as
applied to young children at the time when they are chiefly
under the influence of the mother. We suggest that it is
totally impracticable to institute Unwin's condition of com¬
pulsory continence without arousing in the young child bitter
resentments as a result of over-riding the ethical sense with
which the child is endowed, and also without undermining the
child's desire for clear understanding of facts both in relation
to the physical world and to psychological processes in himself
and others!
Whatever else is doubtful in modern theories of the uncon¬
scious, this at least would seem to be proved, that there is no
repression without intense psychic pain, and in general, no
psychic pain without conflict. If Unwin's system is to work,
conflict must be created within the child's mind. In the past,
such conflict was the result of blind impulses on the part of
parents. There may have been purposiveness, but it was without
foresight. If Unwin is to have "compulsory continence"
engrained in the psychic organism, then he is definitely
committed to a policy of the artificial creation of complexes
in/
*0f. Section on Money-Kyrle, tresis p. 282.
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in the child's mind. Such a line of action would necessarily
be incredibly inhuman, and the child, realising the deliberate-
ness of the process, would harbour intense resentment towards
his society, and his ethical susceptibilities and truth-loving
impulses would be completely destroyed. We should quickly
produce a race of criminals.
It is interesting to note in this connection that a Russian
psychologist, Luria, has experimented with methods for inducing
artificial complexes.' His activities appear to be both harmless
and instructive. notwithstanding, the average person would be
inclined to feel shocked at the notion of the deliberate incul¬
cation into a girl medical student of the belief that she had
performed an illegal operation, under conditions of deep
emotional stress caused by it have been "suggested" to her that
the "wrong act" was justified by humane considerations of a
peculiarly poignant order; moreover, leaving the impression in
her mind that the operation had been unsuccessful, having led to
a haemorrhage. We suggest that the cold-blooded creation of
conflict in the young child's mind is far more "unthinkable"
than luria's psychic operation, especially when we remember that
the Russian scientist finally dissolves the complex during
subsequent hypnosis.
We are by no means certain that Unwin's conclusions are
helpful/
'gee Francis Bartlet^, "Sigmund Freud", p.22 et deq.
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helpful as a contribution to present-day discussions on the
subject of repression. His work appears convincing, and seems
to call for the practical application of his theory in child
education. He is probably right in suggesting that repression
in the past few millenniums has had a great deal to do with
certain forms of cultural development, but in our view his
findings have little relation to the practical problems with
which we are faced. All that we are justified in taking from
his work is that once civilisation had set up in the human mind
specific types of repression, certain types of cultural advance
depended on the extension of the repressed unconscious.
At the end of his book, Unwin states that no one has
proved that increased energy is beneficial.' This statement,
however, is beside the point. The objection to the extension
of the repressed unconscious is that it involves increasing
malformation of the human psyche, and a further encroachment on
the amount of energy available for sentiment formation under the
control of normally conditioned conceptual process.
Dr. Unwin sums up his conclusions in the following words:
"If a vigorous society wishes to display its productive energy
for a long time, and even for ever, it must re-create itself, I
think, first by altering the economic and social organisation in
such a way as to render it both possible and tolerable for
sexual opportunity to remain at the minimum for an extended
period/
'
"Sex and Culture" p.431.
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period, and even for ever. In such a case the face of the
society should be set in the direction of cultural process;
its inherited tradition would be continually enriched; it
would achieve a higher culture than has yet been attained;
by the action of entropy, its traditions would be augmented
and refined in a manner which surpasses our present under-
i
standing. "
We venture to suggest that Unwin's Utopian dream will
never be realised as a result of applying methods by which
compulsory continence will be tolerable; because, according
to his own showing, cultural energy of the type required for
the realisation of his dream will not be developed unless
repressions are set up within the individual during the process
of child rearing. in the last resort, conflict, the pre-
determinant of repression, is, to put the matter simply, set up
in the child as a.-resuit of irritable parents. Prom what we
know of human nature, neither the institution of legal equality
nor
between the sexes,/economic security,nor opportunities for
"sublimation", will allay human irritability if the sex impulse
cannot find reasonable expression.
Unwin pictures a highly "moral" society; such a society
would inevitably develop even more highly "moral" parents, and
the child would be treated with an ever increasing lack of
sympathy and understanding. The final outcome of the applic¬





In his book entitled ''Recreating Human Nature ', Hayward
adopts the attitude that repression is due to irrational methods
of training children, and he emphasises that the root cause of
repression lies in a departure on the part of educators from
the norms of truth and justice. He says; "I maintain that
every individual psychology is formed solely by the environment
with which we, as adults surround our newly born infants and
i
children." "If either ignorance, selfishness, or immorality
is permitted to obstruct or violate them, then the psychology
of humanity will become progressively more and more diseased,
and no matter what cleverness of invention or knowledge may be
attained, untruth, crime, immorality, and hatred, will make
i
these ornaments look like diamonds upon a dunghill."
He accepts the doctrine of an unconscious self independent
of the repressed unconscious which "controls all the vital pro¬
cesses of his (man's) own body: the nourishment, growth, and
right working of every cell, muscle, gland, organ, and function
in his physical structure. The force and health of his nervous
system, circulation, digestion, and other functions, are under
3
the sway of his xmconscious self."
Hayward's suggestion is that the repressed unconscious may
interfere with the normal unconscious self, and prevent its
fulfilling its functiion in relation to the efficient working of
the physical system. He reoognises the place of reason in
the/
'
Charles W. Hayward, "Recreating Human Ratlire '' p. 21.
■? Op. cit. , p. 22. JOp.cit., p. 26,
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the life of man, but states that he is "the only animal who has
had the power of aborting reason, so as to turn it into a pro-
f
duct more degrading than the animal instincts from which it was
derived." In passing, we would draw attention to the conception
of animal instincts as "degrading". Does it not appear that
Hayward is implicitly accepting the doctrine of human nature as,
in part, evil?
He goes on to state that "entire blame must be cleared off
the innocent child victim itself" - with this we agree - 'and
3
placed upon its environment, and those responsible for it." To
the writer it appears that blame is equally misapplied both to
the environment and the educators. Hayward would seem to be
working partly under-the influence of unconscious prejudice
emanating from the superego. "Occupation and amusement do not
imply flurry and excitement, ' he says, "but the majority of those
who bring up children have not sufficient brains to. recognise
3
this." After all, we suggest, it is hardly fair to abuse parents
for lack of brains. For this-, at least, they are not responsible.
Hayward continues: "For the sake of posterity, I shall not
mince matters, but repeat that every nervous, fidgety child, is
the embodiment of the faults of those who are responsible for its
A
treatment previously."
Hayward is probably right in his main contention. He goes
on to say, however: "There is no blame whatever to the infant, but
all/
'op.cit., p.39. 5 Op.eft., p.59. 3 Op.eft., p.59. 4Qp.cit., p.60.
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all the true "blame is 011 the parents and guardians'. " Hayward
has the ardour of the reformer, but does not appear to see
that the inculcation into society of additional doses of
irrational feelings of moral culpability is hardly calculated
to effect those ends which he rightly considers desirable.
The evil results of repression he considers as permanent.
"Something," he says, "may be done to improve the conditions
afterwards (referring to the period of wrong training) but
the psychology picture will never have that definiteness and
clearness of outline which is essential to real beauty: the
psychological record will always display a harshness and
inequality of tone which will detract from the harmony, the
a
distinctness, of-the song." The first task of the educator is
to "visualise the perfect psychology, and try to copy its
3
beauty and grandeur in each one we are modelling. " He claims
that the norms which should guide the educator are "absolute
truth, fair play and honesty, which is absolute truth in
4 5"
action" and "good humour".
"The most minute bending of our standard of measurement,"
he says, '^falsifies every single calculation, and even the most
conscientious of these friends (referring to inefficient parents)
can never produce a straight psychology with a flexible
L
standard."
"With absolute truth and honesty," he contends, there
would be no crime and no injustice, and there would be the
perfection/
'Op.cit., p. 60. JOp.cit., p. 61. 3 Op.cit., p. 63.
Op.cit. , p.64-5. sOp.cit., p.74. tOp.cit., p.227.
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perfection of which, under our present debased standards,
even the contemplation seems ridiculous and the realisation
i
impossible."
"The various hysterias of immorality, alcoholism, druggin
and doping, are the inevitable consequences of these nursery
and school outrages upon the developing nervous system1."
"To renounce our sins," however, "will need a revolution
of thought and ideals. The animal passions and lusts will
not relax their degrading forces until we use the elevating
forces of reason, and use them with honesty and determination
to follow them until they drag us up above our present level
of only super-animal, and elevate us towards the true destiny
*
of the super-man". "
Hayward also protests against "silly - but insistent -
adulation of show and prettiness" stating that it 'does as
much harm to a child's psychology as would equally silly and
<
insistent condemnation and fault-finding."
Hayward's attitude towards repression is that it is evil
and due to preventable causes. He does not envisage the
possibility that repression may have had and may still have
a function to cariy out in human life. He apparently takes
no account of the imposing body of "facts" brought fonward by
psychoanalysts, and anthropologists who are influenced by
psychoanalysis/
'Op.cit., p. 101. 30p.cit., p. 61. J0p.cit., p. 70.
'' Op. cit., p. 77.
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psychoanalysis, to prove that repression is a phenomenon which
has at least been the concomitant of racial development. His
position is that of common sense when the reflective faculties
have been awakened as to the ethical implications of ordinary
methods of child treatment. It is not -unlikely that, in its




Fritz Kunkel wrote a book in 1929, under the intriguing
title, "let's Be Normal: The Psychologist Gomes to His Senses",
and another volume from his hand was published in 1936, "What
It Means to Grow Up."
Both books are written from an Adlerian standpoint.
Because of this, no references are made to the unconscious as
such, or to the subject of sublimation. The present writer,
however, is convinced that Kunkel raises a few points which
are by no means irrelevant for the present study.
Throughout his earlier book there runs the concept of
"clarification". Clarification could almost be described as
a type of conversion. Kunkel claims, to use Freudian terms,
that it is possible to break up the superego. Since he does
not specifically recognise the existence of a repressed uncon¬
scious, and therefore is unable to analyse out the manifold
impulses of what, to Freud, is an extraordinarily complex and
elaborate system - we refer to the superego - Kunkel's curative
process must either enable the patient, who, incidentally, is
the normal man, to undermine the superego structure by removing
the fundamental cause, or afford a means of removing the
keystone of the superego edifice.




In many ways his view is similar to that of Stekel, as
described in "The Beloved Ego". His theoiy can also be
correlated with that of Trigant Burrow.1' Our interest here
lies in the light shed by Kunkel on the formation of what
Freudians describe as the superego, and his views have a
certain bearing on the theory of sublimation. He does, indeed,
demonstrate with a high degree of clarity that any considerable
amount of repression is incompatible with that objectivity which
is a prerequisite of cultural process, whether the instinctual
energy is directly applied or passes indirectly through the
superego system, that is, by way of sublimation. Kunkel
believes that behind all psychic disorder is the inferiority
feeling. Unlike some other Adlerians, he does not consider
that the inferiority feeling is inevitable, given for the
child ideal surroundings.
As in the case of Burrow, Kunkel's terminology is some¬
times a little difficult to follow. He-has, indeed, a meta¬
physical background, and he thinks that if we were really normal
the science of psychology would be without content. He uses
the term "subject" in the sense of an ego which is a mere
experient. What psychology deals with is the self as object,
a something which comes between the pure ego and reality.
Ideally, the ends of this metaphysical self are "infinal".
The young child is in this happy situation, but his ends in
the course of time become "refinalised": they have finality".
What/
'See section on Trigant Burrow, thesis p.311 et seq.
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Ihat he describes as "nonic science" is a description of
that which blocks the way of the ego in its search for the
infinal. A synonym for "nonic science" appears to be
"characferology" which is "the study of the deviations of the
subject, of the difficulti.es which arise as soon as the human
being 110 longer behaves like a subject.'" "Clarification" is
a process which dissipates the self as an object, and the ego
is again face to face with reality. We are afraid that the
average reader-, by the time he reaches the end of the intro¬
duction, will be inclined to reverse Kunkel's subtitle, "The
Psychologist Comes to his Senses" 1
Speaking of clarification, Kiinkel says: "Clarification
itself, the new shining of the subject, the new appearance
of the infinal, are all beyond all scientific perception.
So far as characterology tries to delineate the process of
clarification, it is from the standpoint of science indemonstrable
poetry: and from the standpoint of life, an attempt to speak the
truth!"
The present writer persisted in his reading of the book,
his interest meantime being diverted from "let's Be normal", to
Kiinkel. He has indeed to confess that in his explorations of
psychoanalytical literature he has often maintained his
flagging interest by attempting to psychoanalyse the psycho¬
analyst. But further perusal of the book convinced him that
Kunkel/
'"let's Be Hormal " p. 25. 20p.cit., p. 25.
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Kunlcel has a very real contribution to make to the elucidation
of our present problem. He considers that at the base of our
abnormality is a feeliiig of inferiority, that automatically com¬
pensates itself by a claim of superiority. The greater the
feeling of inferiority, the greater the claim for superiority.
Here is the basic distorting mechanism of human life. To interpret
his viewpoint in Freudian terms, a feeling of inadequacy has its
automatic compensation in a strongly developed superego. The
more intense the repression, the stronger the repressing force.
Kunkel then provides us with a symbol of great value. He
says: "We illustrate the behaviour of the egocentric by a vertical
line, the middle point of which is zero. Every point above zero
is in relation to the equidistant point below zero. That is,
the deeper a human being's feeling of inferiority, the greater
his desire to amount to something, or to be recognised; and vice
versa. The whole line represents the self-evaluation of an
individual. He is not consciously aware of the amount of tension
between this need of recognition and his feeling of inferiority,
i.e., the distance between the point above and the point below....
Most people are occasionally conscious of only one of these two
points. we feel ourselves superior and secure, or inferior and
insecure A closer examination shows, without exception, that
I




He develops his symbolical representation as follows:
"Let us illustrate the objective attitude by concentric
circles which are at right angles to zero in the vertical
line.. We place the subject in the centre of the circles,
which is also the zero point in the vertical line. The
objective connections are the radii which link him to the
periphery. The size of the circles symbolises the degree of
objectivity. We call this tie between a human being and the
world his aliveness or delicacy of perception, or objective
I
sensitiveness...."
Kunkel's point appears to be that the greater claims we
make for superiority, this based on a correspondingly intense
inferiority feeling, the less we are capable of an objective
attitude. As a corollory, we may state that as a general
rule the greater the development of the superego, the less
sublimation of the instinctual impulses will occur in the
sense of building up effective contacts with external reality.
Has repression a relation to cultural development? If
Ktlnkel is right, repression is essentially a dysfunction of
cultural process, if such process is directed to the world of
real things. from the standpoint of ethics, Eunice1 insists
that the greater the distance between the inferiority feeling
and the claim for superiority, the more irritable will the





in respect of rational thought, the greater the distance
above and below zero of the superiority and inferiority
feelings, the less effective contact the individual has with
the objectively real. Aesthetically, also, the superego-
obsessed hardly sees the beauty in external reality. Prom
the standpoint of the community, the individual who has what
Freudians describe as excessive repressions, will tend to be
useless in so far as his job requires of him any degree of
adaptivity, this being based on a knowledge of facts. That
is, the greater the degree of repression, the less contact with
the objective world, the final stage being insanity, where the
patient has ceased to be conscious of reality as such.
Kunkel gives- as a basic idea of his system that sensitive¬
ness is in inverse ratio to irritability.' He tells us that the
situation as symbolised by him is not present in the young child,
and he devotes a long section to describing how the disease
formation creeps into the mind. It is not necessary here to
go into detail. According to his findings, what is responsible
for human nature losing what he describes as its "subjectivity"
is the undiscriminating use of praise and blame. His views
here are very similar to those of Trigant Burrow. The child
feels it increasingly necessary to attend to the expression of
others in respect of their suggestions that he is inferior or
superior, and his interest is thus divided. "The refinalis-
ation lies in the fact that a life process is detatclied from
its/
'Op.cit., p.42.
5 See also section on Edwin Holt, thesis p. 192 et seq.
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its original purposive connection and is made to serve a
special individual purpose! ' In the end, according to Kunkel,
the inferiority feelings become so intense that the child feels
that his friendly relations with his mother are endangered.
He will, we take it, come to hate her, and thereby lose the
sense that he is loved by her and therefore under safe pro¬
tection. Then the child enters into the catastrophic period of
his development. There is at first an ''occasional ego cent ricity"
but later the child commits himself to the constant employment of
a
the inferiority balancing mechanism.
Kunkel, indeed, is not too clear as to precisely what
happens at this period, but he is convinced that something does
happen of a catastrophic nature. The Freudians tell us that
the superego is a result of a more or less violent reaction
formation. Kunkel appears to be speaking of the same phenomenon
in other terms. He uses, however, a conception which he think
is of considerable value. He tells us that the child's
inferioritjr feelings find expression in what he describes as
''training formulas". The content of a child's consciousness
after a 'negative experience" has within it such phrases as, "I
am no good at doing that." "Grown-ups can do things, but
children are useless." "There is something bad about me.
"I am not quite sane." "I am a dirty person". "I hate my
mother (or father) and that is bad." "I can't do such-and-such
a/
'Op.cit.j p.59. J0p.cit., p.62.
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a thing's and so on. In other words, what the child receives
as a result of his "negative experiences" is a system of
beliefs. And we may take it that beneath the superego system
is a very definite set of negative self-evaluations in respect
of specific activities and "moral" qualities. The person
saddled with a superego is implicitly committed to a definite
philosophy, and throughout life he is acting under the domin¬
ation of beliefs gained at a time when his critical faculties
were relatively undeveloped, and moreover when those which he
possessed were incapable of operating on account of his being
involved in emotional situations. "Training formulas", to
use Kunkel's expression, lie beneath the superego.
Eunkel insists that at the time of the catastrophe, an
ego-ideal was formed as a means of combating the child's
feelings of painful inferiority, and sense of isolation.
This ego-ideal holds, as it were, the training formulas in
position, and thus in later life the application of the
"training formula is not dependent upon concrete advantage or
disadvantage accruing to an individual!" In speaking of
the "repression" as a whole, he says: "It is not a living
development, but an inflexible and unhealthy condition which
a
changes the living subject into a dead object." In our view,
Kunkel here expresses the essential truth. It is true that
the superego as part of the entire reactive organism cannot
rightly be regarded as being "dead", and what is more the
possessor/
'Op.cit., p.66. a0p.cit., p.66.
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possessor of the superego, under normal circumstances, has
a fair knowledge both of its existence and of what steps may
be taken to keep the superego within bounds, and moreover, how
to make use of it in pursuing his life purposes. But notwith¬
standing, we believe that Kunkel puts the emphasis in the right
place when he says that the superego leads to "an unflexible
and unhealthy condition which changes the living subject into
a dead object."
In "What It Means to Grow Up", Kunkel applies the
principles described in his earlier work to the education of
young children. We shall here only refer to a single con¬
ception which we find in this work. He says: "Repression will
be the result if the young person's courage is insufficient for
him to meet in actual life the experiences that really do seem
I
to him the most important in the world." We aks ourselves
here what ,is the difference between normality and abnormality
as ordinarily understood. According to our belief, normal and
abnormal alike have within their psychic constitutions a super¬
ego formation. We believe that Ehnkel supplies the clue.
If, during the stormy period of the formation of the superego,
the child is not, to use a popular phrase, completely "downed'1,
he has a good chance both of adapting himself to life and of
keeping within bounds the influence of his relatively autonomous
superego system. If courage is completely or almost completely




Etinkel leaves out of consideration the Freudian Oedipus
complex. As far as we remember, he makes no mention of
what Freud considers to be the foundation of the repressed
unconscious. In our opinion, Kunkel lays the emphasis in the
right place. The child is driven to form a superego under
the stress of inferiority feelings which are environmental in
their origin. He has, in short, learnt to distrust his en¬
vironment. It had inflicted hurts, not on an innate narcissism
as Wittels would have us suppose, but upon the child's legitim¬
ate sense of self-esteem. The child has become "depressed"
and takes refuge in "elation". Human psychological ills are
of environmental origin.
We would like to believe that this is the whole story, but
before us we have the writings of Melanie Klein, Susan Isaacs,
and other psychoanalysts who have observed the lives of young
children. Reluctantly, perhaps, we find ourselves in the
position of being unable altogether to dismiss as fictitious
the findings of these psychologists. Melanie Klein tells us
that the superego is set up after six months of age.'* She
also infoxms us that evexy sublimation is the indirect
expression of the masturbatoxy activity. She declares that
•j
a young child has desires to devour his mother's body", and
considers that sexual theories in children are a phylogenic
heritage". The child has phantasies in which the parents/
'Melanie Klein, "Psychoanalysis of Children" p.28.
* Op.cit., p.31. 3 Op.cit., p.187. *0p.cit., p.188.
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parents destroy each other, and she says that night terrors
are due to the Oedipus complex.
Susan Isaacs has rather dark theories of urine being an
instrument of aggression, although at other times it is a good
gift towards the mother', and she sums up her viewpoint by
stating that whatever is the training "there will always be
some intense emotions and inarticulate imaginings behind diff-
3
culties." And again, "most of these difficulties are to a
greater of less extent inherent in the human situation; they
3
cannot be altogether avoided no matter what we do."
While not attempting to express a detailed opinion on
the views of the child analysts, there seems to us reason to
believe that a good deal of conflict is subjectively determined.
The question arises as to whether we can safely ignore the
purely psychological factor when planning for stability.
Whatever we do by way of modifying the environment, is there
not a likelihood that the child will still become involved in
painful psychological situations which he must resolve by a
process of repression?
The present writer is not a child analyst, nor has he a
particular predilection for the theories of the psychoanalysts.
But, as a result of observing the behaviour of his own child,
and by studying the child's dreams, he has been led to the con¬
clusion that a great deal of conflict is subjectively determined.
In our home, eveiy effort has been made to avoid emotiona.1
situations/
Susan Isaacs in "Qn -the Bringing Up of Children" p. 148.3 op-cit., p.151. 3 op.cit. , p.155.
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situations with the child and to prevent conflicts being set
up within his mind. On occasions when it seemed necessary to
prevent him indulging in some inconvenient activity, we have
endeavoured to do so by diverting his attention, rather than
by directly frustrating his original desire. Disciplinary
measures have been confined to placing the child in his cot
upstairs for five minutes or so, on a few occasions.
We would simply here recount two dreams recently given us
by the child, who is now three-and-a-half years of age.
Philip woke up crying, and told his mother the following
dream; "I was in a garage, and there was a lorry made of rubber.
It was coming out of the garage, and the man shouted to me to
keep back, and I couldn't keep back because I was in bed."
A few minutes later he was the subject of a day-dream which was
also of a painful nature. "Mummy, I was dreaming again." (He
had not actually been asleep, however). 'There was a balloon
in my bed, and it got wee and then big again, and there were
prickles in it; and I was trying to keep Teddy off the prickles
because they would burst him."
We shall not here attempt any theoretical explanation of
the symbolism. We would simply point out that there was every
indication that the child's mind was involved in painful conflict.
Two days later, the child came into his father's study for
"a story", but was easily persuaded to recount his dreams, and
then/
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then quite spontaneously he added a story about "Johnny's
Daddy and Mummy, Mr. and Mrs. Johnny" who both had their
heads cut off and "went all funny; and Johnny went away
with his Violet." (Violet is our maid). Speaking about
his dreams, the child's father asked why he did not want the
"prickly balloon" in his bed. Philip replied: "I wanted to
get out of my bed so that, when I'm grown up, I can sleep
with Mummy and you will have gone away."
Asked about the car situation, he stated that he was in
danger of having his leg cut off. On the basis of Freud's
theory of wish fulfilment, it was decided that it was improb¬
able that the child contemplated self-injury. He held to it,
however, that in the dream he was Philip and not the driver
of the lorry; but immediately told his father that he was
going to cut his (Daddy's) feet off,and moreover suggested
that he should get his pedal car and play at knocking his
father down and running over his legs. partly for experi¬
mental purposes, and partly as a prophylactic measure, this
activity was allowed in a modified form. The child was
asked whether he thought Daddy would hurt a little boy even
though Philip did want to send him away. Philip replied;
"Ho, and I won't hurt a little Daddy".
We are thus forced to the conclusion that the Oedipus
situation is a reality, and it must be decided that Ktirykel




psychological disorders. Yet there seems little reason for
despair. Contrary to the assertion of the Freudians, the
child's conflicts would appear to be anything but unconscious.
We do not say that he necessarily reflects on his psychological
processes, but we may presuppose that an introspective record¬
ing of such processes is not altogether absent. With a little
trouble, there would appear to be no difficulty in caixsing the
child to become fully conscious of the implications of the
trends bound up within the Oedipus situation, and if he is
neither afraid nor ashamed of his impulses, and if he is
assured that his possession of them will not lead to the loss
of love, there seems every reason to suppose that the child's
keen intellect will resolve the conflict without resort to the
drastic method of repression.
Behind the whole theory of a catastrophic event leading to
the formation of the superego as taking place in the child, there
is the belief that the acute tension which ultimately necessit¬
ates repression is essentially composite, and below it lie a
great number of contending sentiments whose juxtaposition
involves painful affects. If each conflict can be dealt with
separately, and the issues involved within it subjected to
conscious control, there appears no reason to believe that
anything of a catastrophic nature would occur. Even if a
few conflicts remained unresolved, the child would not thereby
be driven into strong identifications, reaction formations,
etc., in order to avoid painful feelings bound up with these
conflicts/
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conflicts. A more or less intelligent use of the principle
of dissociation would be sufficient, and as the child grew
older he would retrospectively deal with the "left overs".
To Jfiinkel, then, repression is a dysfunction of cultural
process, in that it narrows down our capacity for objectivity.
He makes suggestions as to how repression may be prevented, and
if these are followed out, there seems reason to believe that
repression will prove to be a preventible evil, provided due
recognition is given to the existence of types of conflict
whose determinants are only in part of environmental origin.
These need not present insuperable difficulties in the
educator's task of bringing all impulses under the control
of the conscious personality.
Note: At the time of re-reading this essay, preparatory to
submitting it for examination, it was pointed out by the
child's mother that he had not been troubled by painful dreams
since the occasion when prophylactic measures took place.
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Trigant Burrow.
Dr. Burrow's work entitled 'The Social Basis of Conscious¬
ness" is interesting in that he has largely broken away from
the traditional psychoanalytical school. He came to the con¬
clusion that Freud's psychology was inadequate to make fully
conscious the disorders of the personality which it sought to
cure. He even goes so far as to suggest that psychoanalysis is
I
"just another application of the method of suggestion." He
regards analysts themselves as "unconscious dupes of the
3
suggestive process."
Throughout his work he uses the term 'organismic ', which
he defines as "the feelings and reactions common to the social
body regarded as a coherent integral organism." He tells us
that "organismic" is "identical with the term 'organic' in its
3
individual application." We at once ask ourselves what pre¬
cisely is the significance of Burrow's basing his theorjr on a
term which is suggestive of the group mind. It would appear
to be this: Burrow has formed the conclusion that human nature
in contemporary society has gone wrong because the child has been
obliged to develop with the feeling that a large part of his
nature is disapproved of by the society which surrounds him.
He has therefore repressed a great deal of his human nature,
forming an "unconscious".
We/
'Trigant Burrow, "The Social Basis of Consciousness'' p.3.
a Op.cit., p.3. 3 Op.cit., p.3.
We would here seem to have an application of the conceptions
developed by Trotter in his "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and
War". Throughout his work, Burrow has in mind the essentially
human setting of the child who is passing through the process of
education, this in striking contrast to what we so often find
when reading the works of other psychoanalysts. He says that
he has arrived at his views by eliminating the personal equation,
by which he means the "unconscious and arbitrary tendency within
us all to adopt a personally systematised mental attitude toward
life in substitution for the physiological reality of life itself.'"
He states, then, that he has succeeded in viewing things
impersonally, and he considers that previously he was influenced
by the "unconscious projection" of his own ego.
As complementary to the term "organismic", Burrow repeatedly
uses the term "organic unity of personality." This, he says,
rises "naturally from the harmony of function that pertains
biologically to the primary infant psyche." He envisages normal
development as a gradual growth of the child personality, and lias
no place for the conception that normality may only be obtained
after the infant psyche has effected within itself those changes
which bring into existence the superego. Normal growth should
be spontaneous, unhindered, and should be a gradual development
in which the original unity is preserved. And then he says:




identical with the unconscious, while the -unification of person¬
ality is alone to be found through eliminating the resources of
substitution and sexuality and thus reuniting the elements of the
conscious and organic modes now kept asunder through the inter¬
position of the unconscious Sexuality," he goes on to say,
"as it now exists, is not only utterly unrelated to sex, but it
is intrinsically exclusive of sex. Sex is life. It is life in
its deepest significance. Sex is the spontaneous expression of
a natural hunger. In the instinct of sex, there is felt a yearn¬
ing from the depths of man's organism for mating and reproduction,
while sexuality is the personal coveting of momentary satis¬
faction in mere superficial sensation!" He defines sexuality
as "the restless, obsessive, over-stimulated quest for temporary
self-gratification that everywhere masquerades as sex, and is
everywhere substituted for the strong, simple, quiet flow of
feeling that unites the organic and the conscious life in a single
stream, and is the expression of personality in its native
inherency3. "
Speaking of normality, he says; 'The organic denial and the
restless compensations and substitutions comprising the unconscious
are, in essence, the psychology of the mental reaction average
known as normality. The popular analytic view places a premium
upon this manifestation of the collective unconscious, and
assigns/
'Op.cit., p. 10-11. J0p.cit., p. 11.
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assigns the criterion of normality as the desired goal of
adaptation for the neurotically repressed personality'."
Leaving out of account the possibility of an overstatement,
we feel that we are on far surer ground in accepting Burrow's
views than when we are under the influence of psychoanalytical
doctrine. It is a peculiarity of psychoanalytical doctrine
that when the mind enters into the labyrinth of the Freudian
unconscious, one tends to become more and more blinded to the
existence of a psychological world outside that labyrinth.
On a closer inspection, the creatures that inhabit the repressed
unconscious, beings, on the whole, very tame and manageable,
take on the foim of monsters, and they attain to a significance
out of all proportion to the influence which they normally
exert on conscious life.
Mccurdy definitely asserts that, alongside of our ordinary
consciousness, is a pathological co-conscious, and if the
separating barriers are broken down, the individual becomes
insane3. Our theory is that although it may well be that the
repressed unconscious acts as a secondary personality, it
cannot, in the normal mind, be regarded strictly speaking as
pathological. It is not that in insanity the barriers between
the foreconscious and the co-conscious are broken down. Rather,
the reverse is the case. The normal personality has a consider¬
able control over and implicit knowledge of the workings of
the/
1Op.cit., p.11.
aJ. T. McCurdy, "The psychology of Emotion" p.470.
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the superego system. The pathological situation only follows
when there is a complete rift between the foreconscious and the
co-conscious, the latter having become autonomous. Such a
theory, we suggest, best covers the facts. Human beings in
civilised communities are made that way, and despite inevitable
limitations, we are able to get along reasonably well, and succeed
in maintaining a large number of direct contacts with outer
reality.
But the peculiarity of the repressed unconscious is that it
only behaves normally when no attempt is made to bring its com¬
ponents into the clear light of consciousness. when thi3 attempt
is made, to use a homely analogy, we stir up a hornet's nest,
and it is understandable that we should, for the time being,
consider that hornets and their nests are the most significant
part of reality. As a result of sympathetic process, the
constant observers of those whose minds are preoccupied with
their unconscious manifestations, cannot easily escape the
tendency to over-estimate the part played by the unconscious
in people who are able to adopt an attitude of healthy neglect
towards it.
It is easily possible to level criticism against normality
as we know it - the psychological situation is far from ideal -
but in so doing, we must not forget that our very criticism is
based upon values which have become manifest to us during the
ordinary/
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ordinary functioning of our minds under present conditions.
Dr. Burrow, after emerging from the Freudian labyrinth, is,
we feel, inclined to think that he has discovered ideals which
have been hidden from the beginning of the world. We consider
it very probable, however, that the normal person reading Dr.
Burrow's views will discover, on a little reflection, that the
high-sounding and impressive phraseology of the writer on "The
Social Basis of Consciousness" can easily1- be interpreted in
terras of a very workaday prose which the plain man has been
using all the time; and that the ideas wrapped up in Burrow's
rather involved diction are already present, implicitly at
least, in the thought systems which we apply in our ordinary
everyday activities.
Dr. Burrow gives his opinion of normality in no uncertain
terms. To Burrow, normality, like the law in the opinion of
certain individuals, is asinine; his suggestion is probably
accurate, but our defence is that, in our best moments, none
of us are quite normal. We apply the gentle art of dissoci¬
ation, and if not more moral than we know, we are at least far
more kindly, human, and rational.
But keeping in mind what we have said above, we feel that
Burrow's description of the psychic organism is worthy of our
close attention. If what he says is true, then we have in our
hands a method which, if applied, may considerably alter human
nature/
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nature as we know it. Repressions will be swept away, and,
given certain safeguards which Burrow does not himself discuss,
humanity might be set on a new path of progress and be released
from those psychological limitations which many think are
responsible for wars and the numerous social maladjustments by
which we are all too patently surrounded.
We find Burrow saying: "In truth, normality, in evading
the issues of the unconscious, envisages less the processes of
growth and a larger consciousness than the neurotic type of
reaction which, however blind its motivation, at least comes to
grips with the actualities of the unconscious It is the
hall-mark of normality that, suspecting nothing, it takes
itself completely for granted. in the spirit of true conform¬
ity, it accepts its expressions of the vicarious at their face
value, and assumes the burden of its self-inflicted compen¬
sations with entire complacency. The neurotic, on the other
hand, at least senses the inherent discrepancy in his life. He
at least demurs in so far as to withhold assent from the mass
compromise embodied in the substitutions and connivances of the
social unconscious. in a word, it is the distinction of the
neurotic personality that he is at least consciously and
I
confessedly 'nervous'".
Burrow is probably right, but our reply is that almost




the terra. We are rather afraid of taking seriously many of
the promptings of conscience; mercy often seasons justice.
It is only the ultra-religious and those in the grip of high
moral ideals who, as individuals, act in accordance with
Burrow's view of the normal. It may be, however, that the
group mind has within it tendencies far harsher and more inhuman
than those found in the ordinary individual. Our capitalist
system may, for instance, have qualities of callousness and
cruelty, but we are wrong if we read these feelings into the
individuals who form part of the system, whether they belong to
the higher or the lower classes.
Still referring to normality, Burrow says that much of our
adult behaviour is "an expression of the distorted and symbolic.
This distortion is to be seen upon every hand, in the restless
greed, the obsessive self-seeking, that underlie the national,
industrial, political, social, and religious possessivism and
competition which are the typical psychology of the normal mind
notwithstanding its plausible exterior of human progress and
universal goodwill.' " But "normality possesses the warrant of
the institutionalised and current, it enjoys the protection of
the concensus^" It is the complaint of the present writer that
Freudians have not realised the implications of their theories.
Burrow, looking at things from a slightly different angle,
expresses the same view. "But if we will look beyond the
narrow/
1 Op.cit,, p.13. 5 Op.cit., p.13.
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narrow confines of the clinic, and face squarely the logical
issue of Freud's thesis, we cannot avoid the conclusion that
it is an indictment of man's consciousness in its entirety!"
There is an Adlerian flavour in the following: "In
analysing the unconscious of the neurotic personality, it has
become gradually clearer to me that the factor underlying and
actuating the conflict Freud describes as repressed sexuality,
is nothing else than the personal desire of ascendency or the
lust of acquisition concomitant with the organism's unconscious
reversion upon its own imageJ. " That is, the secret of the
neurosis is not to be found by a study of the workings of the
sex instinct. To Burrow, the consciousness of the normal indi¬
vidual is as much determined by irrational mechanism as Freud
claims. He says, for instance: "It is well nigh impossible to
study the virgin soil of consciousness from our present adaptive
premise without vitiating our conclusions with the bias of our
own adaptations." It will be impossible to have a science of
psychology unless we are able to attain to an "envisagement of
3
consciousness in its ultimate pre-adaptive composition."
The seat of all psychological disorder, in the normal as
well as the abnormal, to Burrow, lies in children being taught
that certain things are "right" and certain things "wrong". It
is probably unfortunate that Burrow uses these terms, though on
occasion he qualifies "right" by the word "arbitrary". To the
present/
r
'Op.cit., p.14. JOp.cit., p.14. 3 Op.cit., p.52.
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present writer, it would be necessary to secure a much more
complete 'envisagement of consciousness in its ultimate pre-
adaptive composition" before we could come to an adequate
decision as to the significance of the concepts to which we
have referred. What Burrow really means is that by applying
the sanctions of social approval and disapproval, we create
artificial categories of the praiseworthy and the disgraceful.
With the disgraceful is often associated the fear of punishment,
and with the praiseworthy the expectation of reward. Certain
parents also suggest to their children that a divine being or
beings share their views as to the ultimateness of the
categories referred to.
Burrow considers that it is through the adoption of what
might be described as a moral attitude towards young children
that the child is led to construct out of his native impulses
the unconscious, as understood by the Freudians. He thinks
that parents adopt a "moralising" attitude merely for their
own convenience. If certain modes of behaviour are labelled
as "bad" and others "good" the child may be controlled in such
a way that the adults suffer the minimum of disturbance.
Dr. Burrow makes considerable use of the conception of an
"artificial image of life." He seems to suggest that if our
image of life were to correspond with reality, it would require
a third dimension, and this should be supplied by what he
describes as "the inclusive societal factor.1' What he appears
to/
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to suggest is this; Under present methods of child rearing,
the individual constructs a picture of himself the purpose
of which is to offset the conception he has gained of himself
from his educators as something low and disgraceful. Under
the stress of circumstances, the child takes refuge in this
consoling picture. He is not the inferior child, but a
superior being. Those impulses which he has learnt are
intrinsically evil are not himself. To use the words of
an old nursery song, he denies the existence of those qualities
which are likened to :'snaps and snails and puppy dogs' tails".
He is a "nice" child, with pleasing qualities of the nature,
according to his childish eyes, of "sugar and spice". Probably
there enters into the child's fictitious belief system an
identification with older individuals of his family circle,
and later if the negative self-feeling which is responsible
for the consoling idea is intensified, belief that his nature
is divine: he is God. He is no longer able to see himself as
others see him. The image he has formed, according to Burrow,
is bi-diraensional. The tri-dimensional factor, which could
be more simply described as the truth, is absent.
There is formed, to quote Dr. Burrow, "a fictitious brain
state which has become entirely withdrawn from continuity with
his (the child's) organic life, so that, from the point of view
of consciousness, in the sense of an integral mental life -
the/
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the especial mark whereby we claim prerogative over all other
species - man is, by this very token, the least integrant of
them all'." Referring to the same subject, he continues:
"Unlike the adult, the spontaneous joy of children is their
wholehearted participation in the free impersonal radiation of
life. Unlike ourselves, their personal importance has not yet
defeated their impersonal significance. As yet they do not
live under the curse of a dogma of conduct. Theirs is no creed
of behaviour that is of one cloth with an enforced pretence of
'goodness'. Their lives are not a daily concession to fanciful
needs of self-protection against an arbitrarily predicated world
of 'evil'. Adult vigilance, however, early inculcates its
delusion of separateness - of a self to be defended against
other selves - and its dissociative infliience is slowly imparted
to the confiding mind of childhood. In a world of dissociation
this universal suggestion acts with powerful effectiveness, and
the child of yesterday, having once been inducted into the general
guild of secret mistrust and compensatory behaviourism, and
grown to parenthood, may be safely trusted to pass on without
question the secret code of differentiation, self-distinction
and disharmony to the offspring by which he is in turn succeeded."
We have described the viewpoint of Burrow, because we
believe his description of the repressed unconscious is largely
true/
'Op.cit., p.144. JOp.cit., p.145.
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true. If we accept his position, the conclusion must be
drawn that repression is a dysfunction of cultural process.
N£t only does it cut off the individual from society, but also
it changes the creative urge of sex into what Burrow describes
as "sexuality".
Speaking on a similar subject, Waldo Prank says: "But the
most pernicious aspect of these dangers comes from the denial
....of the communal principle of sex: from the assumption that
sex is or can healthily be a private matter. The immature
person is an insulated ego; he is autoerotic, he is a wilful,
absolutistic atom. In this stage his sexuality is private.
To confine his sexuality to this stage is to bar the dynamic
energy of man from growth; it is to fixate the individual in
immaturity. It is to make maturity almost impossible. Sex
censorship in a people stratifies and perpetuates infantility;
it is the profoundest imaginable check on the emotional growth
i
which must precede the growth of intelligence and of the spirit."
And also, on another page: "Here, then, is our condition: we
are a people of private persons: collectively the mass;
individually alone. And in consequence of our solitude we are
a
emotionally under-nourished, spiritually insecure."
Repression of the sex instinct is, according to these
writers, incompatible with any considerable development of
cultural/
1
Waldo Frank, in "Sex in civilisation", p.178.
3 Ibid, p.172.
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cultural interests in those whose minds contain impressed
complexes.
If we would seek a final answer to our question: Is
repression a determinant of cultural development, it is, in
our opinion, to writers like Burrow, Frank, and Ktinkel, that
we should turn. These, one feels, come very near to the truth
in their respective viewpoints. Repression is an evil because
it creates artificiality, and therefore, in varying degrees,
shuts off the conscious mind from the wellsprings of its
cultural life.
